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 †  This Article reflects the present views and considerations of the authors and 
does not necessarily reflect the views of Jones Day or its clients past, present, or 
future.  The reader should be aware that the authors, or other members of their 
Firm, have been involved in several of the cases discussed in this Article, including:  
Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 
832, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1442 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010); 
Goeddel v. Sugano, 617 F.3d 1350, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 
F.3d 1296, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 
617 F.3d 1282, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1956 (Fed. Cir. 2010); King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon 
Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1833 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Haemonetics 
Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 607 F.3d 776, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1556 (Fed. Cir. 
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(Fed. Cir. 2010); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. U.S.I.T.C., 601 F.3d 1319, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1607 (Fed. Cir. 2010); and Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 599 
F.3d 1277, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  The authors express their 
most sincere thanks to Matthew J. Chisman, Gene Crawford, Daniella A. Einik, Ryan 
T. Holte, Kevin B. Comeau and Christopher Haake for their valuable assistance in 
this ambitious project. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the almost thirty-year history of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, commentators have routinely noted 
the court’s unique place in the federal appellate structure as the only 
federal court of appeals without a geographic supervisory jurisdiction 
over district courts, and as the only federal court of appeals whose 
jurisdiction is defined exclusively by the subject matter of the cases 
appealed to it.1  The Federal Circuit, the youngest child among the 
thirteen federal courts of appeals, was treated as a special child for 
much of its young life, with the Supreme Court first taking a hands-
off, and then only a very deferential approach to its review of the 
Federal Circuit’s decisions, particularly in the area of patent law.2   
Over time, however, this focus on the Federal Circuit’s special 
characteristics has served to mask a larger truth about this court:  
Despite its unique appellate jurisdiction and caseload, the Federal 
Circuit is still a federal appellate court whose basic roles and 
functions are little different than those carried out by its twelve older 
siblings across the nation.  Many of the developments affecting the 
Federal Circuit in recent years, including 2010, have reflected the 
theme that, while it is a federal appeals court like no other, the 
Federal Circuit is still a federal appeals court like any other. 
Certainly, the Supreme Court has begun to take this view of the 
Federal Circuit.  No longer can it be said that the Court is taking a 
“well nigh invisible,”3 “hands-off,”4 or even a particularly deferential 
                                                          
 1.  See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:  A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1989) (discussing the creation of the 
Federal Circuit as a response, in part, to the difficulties in reviewing patent cases); S. 
Jay Plager, The Federal Circuit as an Institution:  On Uncertainty and Policy Levers, 43 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 749, 750 (2010).  
 2.  See Gregory A. Castanias, Lawrence D. Rosenberg, Michael S. Fried & Todd 
R. Geremia, Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Law Decisions in 2006:  A New Chapter in 
the Ongoing Dialogue with the Supreme Court, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 793, 798–816 (2007) 
(discussing “three waves” in the Supreme Court’s approach to review of Federal 
Circuit patent decisions, beginning with a hands-off approach, moving to a more 
aggressive approach that addressed core issues in patent law, then finally using an 
actively reform-oriented approach); see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in 
2010:  A New Dialogue Between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 
845 (2011). 
 3.  See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387 (2001).  
 4. Castanias, et al., supra note 2, at 798. 
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attitude towards the patent work of the Federal Circuit.5  In the 2006 
edition of American University Law Review’s Federal Circuit review, we 
chronicled this change in attitude, dividing the phases of Supreme 
Court review of Federal Circuit patent-law decisions into three waves, 
with the most current wave “marked by more aggressive Supreme 
Court review of the substance of patent law and patent procedure 
and less deference to the Federal Circuit’s views of what the content 
of U.S. patent law should be.”6  No longer is the Federal Circuit “the 
de facto supreme court of patents.”7  Since then, we have seen even 
more of that third wave of aggressive, less deferential Supreme Court 
review, including the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bilski v. 
Kappos,8 and three patent cases presently pending on its docket, 
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,9 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. 
Partnership,10 and Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. 
Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.11 
One sees this phenomenon as well in the identities of the advocates 
increasingly appearing before the Federal Circuit in patent cases.  No 
longer is the Federal Circuit bar the exclusive province of patent 
lawyers holding degrees in electrical, chemical, or mechanical 
engineering.  To the contrary, these days one is at least as likely to 
find a member of a large law firm’s general appellate practice, a 
former lawyer of the U.S. Solicitor General’s office, or a generalist 
trial lawyer standing at the lectern at 717 Madison Place.12 
The Federal Circuit itself, through its own policies and procedures, 
has contributed to this change in attitude as well.  In 2006, the court 
returned to a practice (one followed in most of the other circuits) of 
having visiting judges sit with the Federal Circuit for one or two days 
at a time.  From September 2006 through December 2010, forty-seven 
visiting judges sat to hear and decide cases with the judges of the 
Federal Circuit.13  In most (forty-three) of those instances, the visiting 
                                                          
 5. See, e.g., Castanias et al., supra note 2, at 798; Janis, supra note 3, at 387. 
 6.  Castanias, et al., supra note 2, at 798. 
 7.  Janis, supra note 3, at 387. 
 8.  130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (2010). 
 9.  SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1617 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 
131 S. Ct. 458 (2010). 
 10.  i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 
(Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010). 
 11.  Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 
F.3d 832, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1442 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 502 
(2010). 
 12.  See, e.g., Kelly Casey Mullally, Gregory Castanias & Franklin E. Gibbs, 
MedImmune v. Genentech, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 59, 61 (2009) (quoting Gregory 
Castanias, who described himself as a generalist intellectual property litigator).  
 13. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Visiting Judges, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 
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judges were district judges, although three sitting circuit judges and 
one judge of the U.S. Court of International Trade have also been 
among the visitors.14  The Federal Circuit’s judges, too, take 
assignments among the regional circuits, and have been doing so 
regularly since 2006.15  This sort of cross-pollenization among the 
federal courts can only further an understanding that the Federal 
Circuit is, for the most part, a federal appellate court like every other. 
Yet, the Federal Circuit remains, in significant ways, a court like no 
other.  By statute,16 it remains, with rare exception,17 the court of 
appeals for patent cases.  This means that unless and until Congress 
takes up the task of patent law reform, it will continue to be up to the 
Federal Circuit (and, in a handful of cases, the Supreme Court) to 
make the sort of interstitial changes to patent law that come from 
common-law rulemaking.  As we will discuss at some length below, 
the year 2010 certainly saw more of that in the Federal Circuit’s (and 
in the Supreme Court’s) jurisprudence. 
Significant change came to the Federal Circuit’s membership in 
the year 2010.  In his 2009 “State of the Court” address before the 
Federal Circuit Bar Association’s Bench and Bar Conference, Chief 
Judge Paul R. Michel noted “the potential of a generational 
reconstitution of the membership of the court” because eight of the 
twelve active judges are eligible to retire or take senior status as of 
September 2010.18  Chief Judge Michel then surprised the Federal 
Circuit bar only five months later when he announced his intent to 
retire from the bench on May 31, 2010.19  His decision to retire from 
the bench meant that Judge Randall R. Rader, the next most senior 
active judge eligible for the position, became Chief Judge on June 1, 
2010.20 
                                                          
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements/2010/VJ_Chart_for_
Website_8.pdf. (last visited Mar 8, 2011). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  See United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Judges Sitting by 
Designation with Other Circuits January 2010–present, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements/2010/2010_CAFC_J
udges_Sitting_by_Designation.pdf.  
 16.  28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006); see also id. § 1292(c)–(d). 
 17. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831, 
833, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1804–05 (2002) (holding that the Federal Circuit 
does not have jurisdiction over patent claims that arise in counterclaims but not in 
complaint). 
 18. Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, 2009 
State of the Court Speech as Prepared for Delivery at the Federal Circuit Bar 
Association Annual Bench-Bar Conference (June 19, 2009), 
 http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements/2009/soc09.pdf. 
 19.  Mike Scarcella, Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel Announces Retirement, 
NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202435764527.  
 20.  Id. 
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There were other significant personnel changes in 2010.  In 
January, Former Chief Judge H. Robert Mayer announced his 
decision to take senior status effective June 30, 2010.21  On March 10, 
2010, President Obama nominated Judge Kathleen O’Malley of the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio to take the seat 
previously occupied by Judge Alvin A. Schall, who had assumed 
senior status on October 5, 2009.22  Judge O’Malley, who had been 
one of the forty-seven visiting judges to sit with the Federal Circuit 
since 2006, became the first former district judge to sit on the Federal 
Circuit in its history when she was confirmed on December 22, and 
sworn in on December 27, 2010.23 
President Obama made two other nominations to the Federal 
Circuit in 2010, but the Senate did not confirm either one before the 
end of the 111th Congress.  Edward DuMont, a partner in the 
appellate practice of a Washington law firm, was nominated to take 
Chief Judge Michel’s seat on April 14, 2010.24  Jimmie Reyna, a 
partner in the international trade and customs practice of another 
Washington, D.C. firm, was nominated to take Judge Mayer’s seat on 
September 29, 2010.25  Both men were renominated by the President 
on January 5, 2011.26  As of the publication of this Article, Reyna had 
been confirmed by the U.S. Senate, but DuMont’s nomination was 
still pending, awaiting a hearing. 
                                                          
 21.  Haldane Robert Mayer, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT,  
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/haldane-robert-mayer-circuit-judge.html  
(last visited Feb. 3, 2011). 
 22. Judge Kathleen O’Malley Sworn-In on December 27, 2010, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT,  http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/announcements (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2011); Alvin A. Schall, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/alvin-a-schall-circuit-judge.html (last 
visited Feb 3, 2011). 
 23. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Visiting Judges, U.S. COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT,  
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements/2010/VJ_Chart_for_
Website_8.pdf; Judge Kathleen O’Malley Sworn-In on December 27, 2010, supra note 22. 
 24. Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Nominates Edward C. 
DuMont for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, The White 
House (April 14, 2010) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-
obama-nominates-edward-c-dumont-united-states-court-appeals-federal-circu;  
Judicial Nomination Materials:  111th Congress, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE 
JUDICIARY, http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/Materials111thCongress.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 25. Judicial Nomination Materials:  111th Congress, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE 
JUDICIARY, http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/Materials111thCongress.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011); Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Names Two 
to U.S. Circuit Courts, The White House (Sept. 29, 2010),  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/29/president-obama-names-two-us-circuit-
courts-0; Judicial Nomination Materials:  111th Congress, supra note 24.  
 26. Judicial Nomination Materials:  112th Congress, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE 
JUDICIARY, http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/Materials112thCongress.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011).  
2011] 2010 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 853 
Thus, as of January 1, 2011, the Federal Circuit comprised ten 
active judges (with two seats still open), and six senior judges.  
Moreover, of the court’s ten current active judges, five are presently 
eligible to take senior status under the judicial code’s “Rule of 80.”27  
Former Chief Judge Michel’s promise of a “generational 
reconstitution” of the Federal Circuit is already taking shape, and 
likely to accelerate its pace in the very near future.28 
Another interesting development in the Federal Circuit in 2010 
was an apparent upturn in the court’s use of its en banc power.  In 
2006, when we last surveyed the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence, the 
court decided no full cases en banc.29  By contrast, in 2010, the 
Federal Circuit decided three patent cases en banc,30 and heard 
argument in two others in November 2010.31  Various judges of the 
court also issued dissents from the denial of rehearing en banc in 
four other cases.32  This increased en banc activity in 2010 may 
presage a more muscular use of the court’s en banc capabilities in the 
near term. 
Some 2010 developments in Federal Circuit administration bear 
note as well.  The Federal Circuit continued its practice of hearing 
arguments outside of Washington, D.C., with a calendar of oral 
                                                          
 27. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(c) (2006) (permitting judges to remain in office but 
retire from full active service when the sum of their age and years of service is 
eighty).  Those judges presently eligible to take senior status are Judges Pauline 
Newman, Alan Lourie, William Bryson, Arthur Gajarsa, and Timothy Dyk. 
 28. See Michel, supra note 18. 
 29. Castanias, et al., supra note 2, at 797; see DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 
1293, 1304-06, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc as to 
part III-B only). 
 30. See Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (en banc); Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 
F.3d 1336, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).  
 31. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1489 (Fed. Cir. 2010), reh’g granted per curiam, 374 Fed. Appx 35 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (per curiam), setting reh’g, 379 Fed. Appx 979 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (setting oral 
argument before en banc court for November 9, 2010); TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Corp., 
597 F.3d 1247, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2010), reh’g granted, 376 Fed. 
Appx.F. App’x 21 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  
 32. See Sun Pharm. Indus. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 625 F.3d 719, 721, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1830, 1831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc); Novo Nordisk v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 615 F.3d 1374, 1375, 95 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880, 1881 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Gajarsa, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (per curiam); Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Import 
Corp., 614 F.3d 1330, 1331, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1830, 1831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(Newman, J., dissenting from denial of stay pending resolution of Therasense, Inc. v. 
Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam)); Boehringer 
Ingelheim Int’l GmbH v. Barr Labs., Inc., 603 F.3d 1359, 1360, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1188, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Gajarsa, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(per curiam). 
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arguments in Atlanta, Georgia in November 2010.33  The court also 
continued its program of courtroom renovations with a still-underway 
reconstruction of its Courtroom 203, which is the third and final 
Federal Circuit courtroom to undergo significant renovations, 
representing not only aesthetic improvements to the courtrooms but 
technological ones as well (including the capability, not yet used to 
the best of our knowledge, of hearing and seeing arguments from 
attorneys in remote locations).34   
The Federal Circuit also premiered a revamped website in 2010, 
but the court has yet to introduce e-filing, which leaves it as the only 
federal appeals court that has not enabled e-filing through the 
federal courts’ CM/ECF (Case Management/Electronic Case Files) 
system.35  There have been occasional public promises that e-filing is 
coming to the Federal Circuit, but for now, it remains an unfulfilled 
promise for the lawyers practicing before its bar—and for the public, 
whose access to the briefs filed in the court’s cases is limited to 
seeking out copies from the clerk’s office, or through expensive 
electronic research in databases such as Thomson Reuters’ 
WESTLAW.  
The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus first set forth the notion 
that nothing is constant but change.  In the Federal Circuit, 2010 
certainly reflected that doctrine, with changes in court membership, 
changes in practice, and changes in the law.  In the pages that follow, 
we will address many of these continued developments as they were 
reflected in the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence of 2010.  And, 
as we did in our articles surveying the Federal Circuit’s 2000 and 2006 
jurisprudence,36 we again conclude with an addendum that discusses 
the statistical output of the Federal Circuit and its judges.  
I.  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT  
One word—one name, really—dominated discussions of patent law 
in 2010 like no other:  Bilski.   
In 2010, thanks to the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, 
Bernard Bilski joined Herbert Markman,37 Eugene Markush,38 and 
                                                          
 33. Federal Circuit Announces Oral Argument Schedule for Atlanta, 717 MADISON PLACE 
(Sept. 28, 2010, 6:19 p.m.), http://www.717madisonplace.com/?p=3066.  
 34. See Michel, supra note 18. 
 35. Federal Circuit Debuts New Web Site, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/2010/page-2.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2011).  
 36. Castanias, et al., supra note 2, at 975–85; Kenneth R. Adamo, Gregory A. 
Castanias, Mark N. Reiter, & Lawrence D. Rosenberg, Survey of the Federal Circuit’s 
Patent Law Decisions in 2000:  Y2K in Review, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1435, 1699–1706 
(2001). 
 37. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1461 (1996). 
2011] 2010 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 855 
Mr. Jepson (whose first name is lost to the ages)39 as one of those few 
inventors whose names have become synonymous with patent-law 
doctrine.  In Bilski v. Kappos,40 the Supreme Court again considered 
the proper scope and interpretation of the statute defining the 
subject matter eligible for patenting.41  In ruling that Bilski and his co-
inventor’s claimed invention was not patent-eligible, the Supreme 
Court technically affirmed the judgment of the en banc Federal 
Circuit, but did so on different reasoning than that adopted in the 
Federal Circuit’s 2009 decision.42  
Bilski and his co-inventor, Rand Warsaw, claimed a new method of 
hedging in commodity trading.43  This “method” was technically 
within the scope of the statute governing patent eligibility, which 
makes eligible for patenting, “subject to” the other requirements of 
Title 35, “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof.”44  Yet the examiner rejected the inventors’ claim because it 
“is not implemented on a specific apparatus and merely manipulates 
an abstract idea and solves a purely mathematical problem without 
any limitation to a practical application.”45  The Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences affirmed the examiner’s judgment on 
similar grounds.46 
The Federal Circuit heard the case en banc and affirmed the 
Board’s judgment in a decision that produced five separate 
opinions.47  The majority’s core holding was that “the sole test” for 
patent eligibility is whether “(1) [a process] is tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a 
different state or thing.”48  The correctness of this machine-or-
transformation test became the subject of the dispute as it made its 
way to the Supreme Court. 
The reason that a “method” could be ineligible for a patent, 
notwithstanding the language of the patent statutes, lay in ancient 
Supreme Court decisions:  “The [Supreme] Court’s precedents 
provide three specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent-eligibility 
                                                          
 38. Ex parte Markush, 1925 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 126 (1925). 
 39. Ex parte Jepson, 1917 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 62 (1917). 
 40. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (2010). 
 41. Id. at 3223, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.  
 42. Id. at 3231, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.  
 43. Id. at 3229, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.  
 44. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  Under the statute, a “process” includes a “method.”  
Id. § 100(b). 
 45. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3224, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004–05.  
 46. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004–05.  
 47. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (en banc). 
 48.  Id. at 954, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 
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principles:  ‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas.’”49  While the statute does not expressly state these exceptions, 
they fit within the requirement that the process be “new and useful.”50  
The Court further noted that “these exceptions have defined the 
reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 
years.”51 
The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the Federal Circuit that 
Bilski and Warsaw’s application sought to patent the “concept of 
hedging” in commodity transactions, a mere abstract idea.52  But it 
refused to endorse the machine-or-transformation test as “the sole 
test” for the patentability of methods or processes, although it 
retained some of that test’s vitality as “an important and useful clue” 
in determining patent eligibility.53  Instead, the Court portrayed its 
decision as a narrow, straightforward application of prior case law 
holding that abstract ideas are unpatentable54  Significantly, the Court 
concluded its opinion by noting that the Federal Circuit remained 
free to place other limits on patentability so long as the criteria are 
consistent with the text and purposes of the Patent Act.55 
What lessons can be drawn from Bilski?  First, the language of the 
Patent Act is still predominant.56  Second, even in the area of patent 
law, “[t]he Supreme Court is still ‘supreme,’”57 and even Supreme 
Court decisions going back more than a century must be respected 
under the principles of stare decisis.58  Third, although the Federal 
Circuit has the ability to develop limitations on patent-eligibility in its 
case law, such criteria will have to be tied closely to the language and 
purposes of the statute59  Fourth, even though the Federal Circuit 
may desire to create hard-and-fast rules for patent litigation, such as 
the machine-or-transformation test, the Supreme Court seems to 
prefer guidelines and open-ended judicial inquiries.60   
This last point may be the most enduring lesson about the 
differences in approach between the Federal Circuit and the 
Supreme Court when it comes to patent law.  Over the past ten years, 
the Supreme Court has rejected a rigid prosecution-history bar to 
                                                          
 49. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005–06 (quoting Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).  
 50. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005–06 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 51. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005–06.  
 52. Id. at 3231, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.  
 53. Id. at 3226, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006–07.  
 54. Id. at 3231, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010. 
 55. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010. 
 56. See id. at 3225–27, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005–08.  
 57. Castanias, et al., supra note 2, at 816.  
 58. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005–06. 
 59. Id. at 3231, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010. 
 60. Id. at 3226; 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006–07. 
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application of the doctrine of equivalents,61 a virtually irrebuttable 
presumption of irreparable harm for injunctions against future 
patent infringement,62 a bar on federal jurisdiction for patent 
licensees seeking to challenge the license or the patents underlying 
it,63 a rigid teaching-suggestion-or-motivation test for obviousness,64 
and, in 2010, a rigid machine-or-transformation test for patent 
eligibility.65  Professor Kathleen Sullivan defined this dichotomy as a 
battle over “the choice of rules or standards—over whether to cast 
legal directives in more or less discretionary form.”66  The Federal 
Circuit keeps endorsing rules, and the Supreme Court, despite its 
general preference for rules over standards, responds by correcting 
the Federal Circuit’s rule-based decisions and replacing those rules 
with more malleable, more open-ended standards.67 
As lawyers who advise clients and practice with regularity before 
both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, we have a great deal 
of sympathy for what the Federal Circuit has been trying to do with 
these rules-based decisions.  Lawyers and clients, especially clients 
with significant investments in technology and intellectual property, 
desire predictability and certainty.68  The fact that significant property 
rights and reliance interests are always at the core of patent cases 
makes certainty all the more important; more than one client has said 
to us, in essence, “I don’t care what the Federal Circuit does, as long 
as I know what the rules are.”  District judges, too, who as a group are 
likely to suffer reversals at the hand of the Federal Circuit far more 
frequently than by their respective regional circuits, have expressed 
similar concerns in their public comments,69 and even, occasionally, 
in their opinions.70 
                                                          
 61. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1711–12 (2002). 
 62. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1577, 1580 (2006). 
 63. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1225, 1234 (2007). 
 64. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 422, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1385, 1398 (2007). 
 65. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.   
 66. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:  The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 22, 26 (1992). 
 67. See Adamo, et al., supra note 36, at 1643 & n.1680 (noting that even though 
the Supreme Court generally favors rules over discretionary standards, it often rejects 
rules developed by the Federal Circuit in favor of standards). 
 68.  See, e.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgment) (“In the area of patents, it is especially important that the 
law remain stable and clear.”). 
 69.  See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?  An Empirical Study of Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 226–27 n.7 (2008) 
(discussing comments by judges on frustrations in the reversal rates on claim 
construction, including the lament by District Court Judge Marsha J. Pechman that 
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This is the price of this era of more active Supreme Court review of 
Federal Circuit decisions.  In the days when the Federal Circuit 
functioned, in the words of Professor Mark Janis, as the “de facto 
supreme court of patents,”71 the Federal Circuit could more freely 
frame rules governing patent litigation and prosecution.  Because of 
the court’s expertise—well-earned from hearing and deciding 
hundreds of patent cases every year—the Federal Circuit could 
appropriately detect patterns that made the announcement of these 
kinds of rules both comfortable and appropriate.   
A good example of this phenomenon was the almost black-letter 
rule that an injunction would follow after a finding of patent 
infringement.72  This rule was not made by the Federal Circuit willy-
nilly; rather, it grew up from a vast body of experience demonstrating 
that, in patent-infringement suits between competitors, there was 
almost always irreparable harm that would flow from not enjoining 
the infringing competitor.  This is a classic mode of common-law 
adjudication:  When courts have accumulated enough experience 
with respect to a particular issue, whether legal or equitable, through 
case-by-case decisionmaking, they can pronounce rules for future 
application so that courts do not have to engage in balancing 
multifarious factors in every individual case.73 
Ironically, though, the virtually irrebutable presumption of 
irreparable harm from infringement—which led to an almost 
inviolable rule that jury verdicts of patent infringement would be 
followed by injunctions against future infringement, no matter what 
                                                          
“you might as well throw darts” to rule on claim construction because the reversal 
rate is so high). 
 70. See, e.g., Warrior Sports Inc. v. Dickinson Wright P.L.L.C., 666 F. Supp. 2d 
749, 751 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (noting that the Federal Circuit has been inconsistent 
on the issue of its jurisdiction over state claims arising from patent disputes); Abbott 
Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 846 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (attempting to predict 
what the Federal Circuit will do upon a third hearing of the same issue, when its 
previous two hearings had different results); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) 
(reiterating that “‘in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law 
be settled than it be settled right’” (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 
U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Dorsey v. Tisby, 234 P.2d 557, 564 
(Or. 1951) (“[W]hen property rights are at stake, consistency, that is, adherence to 
precedent, is a . . . virtue . . . .”). 
 71.  Janis, supra note 3, at 387. 
 72.  See, e.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338, 74 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1238–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (articulating the general rule of 
granting a permanent injunction once infringement and validity have been 
established), rev’d, 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006).  
 73.  See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394–396, 78 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1580 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (emphasizing the 
history of granting injunctive relief but holding that this does not warrant a general 
rule of injunctive relief); id. at 395–96, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580–81 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (highlighting the importance of the historical practice of granting 
injunctive relief in future decisions on whether to grant injunctive relief).  
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devastating costs might be worked on the losing party or upon third 
parties—helped to create a new industry of non-practicing entities, 
called NPEs, or, more derisively, “patent trolls.”74  These NPEs could 
accumulate patents as their principal or only asset, never 
manufacture a thing, but obtain a patent-infringement judgment 
against a manufacturer.  The potential money judgment, a 
reasonable royalty for past infringement, might be modest, but the 
real value would be the threat of an injunction of devastating 
consequence which might shut down the defendant’s business.75  By 
the time the Federal Circuit had developed its pro-injunction rule 
from its experience in cases largely involving head-to-head litigation 
between competitors, its decisions had paradoxically deprived the 
court of the equitable flexibility to deal with the rise of the NPE in 
patent litigation.  Thus, the Supreme Court had to step in to restore 
the equitable norms and return the Federal Circuit (and the district 
courts) to case-by-case adjudication of injunction requests.76 
Institutionally, however, the Supreme Court is unlikely to endorse 
rules over standards in patent cases because it is the inverse of the 
Federal Circuit with respect to its base of experience.  Even in this era 
of more aggressive Supreme Court review of Federal Circuit patent 
decisions, the Justices’ experience with patent law is going to 
represent only a few cases each year, whereas the judges of the 
Federal Circuit will have repeat exposure to all of the issues that 
regularly arise in patent disputes.  The Supreme Court will more 
naturally be disposed to presumptions, standards, and “useful clues,”77 
whereas the Federal Circuit will more naturally seek to transform its 
repeat experiences into more concrete rules to guide litigants and 
individuals.  The pull-and-tug between rules and standards is likely to 
be on display again as the Supreme Court takes up three other patent 
cases from the Federal Circuit this year.78 
                                                          
 74.  See id. at 396–97, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(discussing the rise of firms that use patents and the attendant injunctive relief to 
charge excessive licensing fees). 
 75.  See id. at 396, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(noting that the use of injunctive relief in patent cases reflects the difficulty of 
permitting monetary damages to compensate a plaintiff for the use of an invention 
against the plaintiff’s wishes). 
 76.  Id. at 391–92, 394, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578–80 (majority opinion).  
 77. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 
(2010).  
 78. In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, the Court will confront the question of 
whether challenges to the validity of a patent—at least in cases where the relevant 
prior art was not before the patent examiner—must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd 
P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (No. 10-290), 2010 WL 3413088 at *ii [hereinafter 
Microsoft v. i4i Petition].  In Global-Tech Appliances Inc. v. SEB S.A., the Court will take 
up the question of the proper standard for finding induced patent infringement 
860 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:845 
This institutional tension is apparent on the face of the Bilski 
decision.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court contained two 
subsections (denoted “II-B-2” and “II-C-2”) that represented his views 
as well as those of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Justice 
Thomas.79  Justice Scalia, who otherwise joined Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion for the Court, did not join these two subsections.80  In section 
II-B-2, Justice Kennedy expressed his concern that, in the course of 
applying a hard-and-fast “machine-or-transformation” rule, “courts 
may pose questions of such intricacy and refinement that they risk 
obscuring the larger object of securing patents for valuable 
inventions without transgressing the public domain.”81  Justice 
Kennedy opined that the Information Age has created greater 
possibilities for innovation and presents particular challenges for 
patent law in finding ways to protect inventors while not foreclosing 
new, creative applications of established principles.82  And in section 
II-C-2, which concluded the portion of the Court’s opinion rejecting 
a categorical exception to patent-eligibility for “business methods,” 
Justice Kennedy expressed similar concerns that adopting a bright-
line rule forbidding all business-method patents might foreclose 
some legitimately patentable processes under § 101.83 
 In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership,84 the Court will confront the 
question of whether challenges to the validity of a patent—at least in 
cases where the relevant prior art was not before the patent 
examiner—must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.85  The 
relevant statute provides that “[a] patent shall be presumed valid,” 
and that “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any 
claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such validity,” but 
makes no mention of the standard of proof required to sustain such a 
                                                          
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), particularly the role of knowledge of the specific patent.  
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Global-Tech Appliances Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 
458 (2010) (No. 10-6), 2010 WL 2813550 at *i [hereinafter Global-Tech v. SEB 
Petition].  Finally, in Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche 
Molecular Systems, Inc., the Court will decide whether a university’s right to inventions 
created through federally-funded research can be terminated when one of the 
inventors purports to assign the inventor’s rights to a third party.  Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at i Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010) (No. 09-1159), 2010 WL 1138571 at *i. [hereinafter Board 
v. Roche Petition]. 
 79.  See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223 & n.*, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.  
 80.  Id. at 3223 n.*, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.  
 81.  Id. at 3227, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007–08 (plurality opinion). 
 82.  Id. at 3228, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008–09 (plurality opinion). 
 83. Id. at 3229, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009–10 (plurality opinion). 
 84. 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010), cert. granted., 598 F.3d 831, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 
(Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 85.  Microsoft v. i4i Petition, supra note 78, at *ii. 
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challenge.86  Nonetheless, the clear-and-convincing standard of proof 
for validity challenges predates the Federal Circuit, having originated 
with one of that court’s predecessors, the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals (CCPA).87   
In Global-Tech Appliances Inc. v. SEB S.A.,88 the Court will take up the 
question of the proper standard for finding induced patent 
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), in particular the question of 
whether knowledge of the specific patent is required for inducement 
liability.  In the case below, the Federal Circuit held that the 
defendant’s deliberate indifference to a known risk of infringement 
was sufficient to support liability.89   
And in Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche 
Molecular Systems, Inc.,90 the Court will confront a question arising 
under the Bayh-Dole Act, namely, whether a university that is a 
federal contractor may have its statutory right to inventions arising 
from federally funded research terminated when one of the 
individual inventors makes a separate agreement purporting to assign 
that inventor’s rights in the invention to a third party.91  The Federal 
Circuit held that Stanford University’s rights could be (and were) so 
terminated.92   
In sum, we may look back on 2010 as a milestone in a period of 
enormous change in the Federal Circuit—among them, changes in 
leadership, changes in membership, changes in en banc practices, 
and changes in doctrine.  The following sections explore some of 
those changes—as well as the areas of relative stability—in some 
detail. 
                                                          
 86.  35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
 87.  See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law:  The Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 
869 (2010). 
 88. 131 S. Ct. 458 (2010), cert. granted, 594 F.3d 1360, 1377, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1617, 1628–29 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 89.  SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1377, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1617, 1628–29 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom., Global-Tech Appliances 
Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 458 (2010) 
 90. 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010), cert. granted, 583 F.3d 832, 836, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1442, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 91. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford 
Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010) (No. 09-
1159), 2010 WL 1138571 at *i.  
 92.  Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 
583 F.3d 832, 836, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1442, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
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II. FEDERAL COURT AND AGENCY PRACTICE 
A. District Court Practice 
1. Initiating the case 
a. Standing 
The year 2010 offered the Federal Circuit several opportunities to 
address the constitutional requirement of standing.  Article III of the 
Constitution limits the federal judicial power to “Cases” and 
“Controversies” between two or more parties.93  Under the Patent Act, 
standing often involves the question of who can serve as the proper 
plaintiff in a patent infringement suit.  The Act says that a “patentee 
shall have a remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.”94  
This right to bring a civil action extends beyond the party to whom 
the patent was issued.  It may include successors in title,95 co-owners,96 
and, in some cases, licensees.97 
Perhaps the Circuit’s most significant standing case of 2010 came 
at the end of the year, when the court examined the fundamentals of 
its Article III standing jurisprudence in the context of exclusive 
patent licensees.  In WiAV Solutions LLC v. Motorola, Inc.,98 WiAV, as 
the licensee of the patents-in-suit, filed an infringement action 
against Motorola and others.99  The defendants moved to dismiss, 
claiming that WiAV lacked standing because the patent licensor had 
retained a limited right to license patent rights notwithstanding 
WiAV’s otherwise exclusive license.100  The district court granted the 
motion.101  While recognizing that Federal Circuit precedent allows a 
party to be considered an exclusive licensee even though the license 
is subject to pre-existing licenses by others,  the district court 
nonetheless rejected what it characterized as “‘a new legal principle 
that, if a grantor retains a limited right to sublicense, it does not 
defeat exclusivity.’”102  Interpreting Textile Productions, Inc. v. Mead 
Corp.,103 the district court held that the right to grant sublicenses 
                                                          
 93. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
 94. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 95. Id. § 100(d) (2006). 
 96. Id. § 261. 
 97. See 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 863 (2010) (citing cases finding standing for 
licensees). 
 98. 631 F.3d 1257, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1484 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 2010).  
 99. Id. at 1259–60, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.  
 100. Id. at 1260, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487–88.  
 101. Id. at 1262, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.  
 102. Id. at 1262–63, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488–89 (quoting WiAV Solutions, 
LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 639, 648 (E.D. Va. 2009)). 
 103. 134 F.3d 1481, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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under a patent defeated patent exclusivity, even if sublicensing is only 
available to subsidiaries and affiliates.104 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit began by recounting its exclusive 
license jurisprudence, emphasizing that an exclusive license sufficient 
to confer Article III standing is one that creates the right to exclude 
others from exercising certain patent rights.  Because the Patent Act 
protects exclusionary rights in a patent, a party that holds an 
exclusionary right suffers an injury under the Patent Act by 
unauthorized encroachment on the right.105  The court thus found 
that constitutional standing in a patent infringement suit depends on 
“whether a party can establish that it has an exclusionary right in a 
patent that, if violated by another, would cause the party holding that 
exclusionary right to suffer legal injury.”106  With that point clear, the 
court rejected the argument that a licensee must be the sole party 
who can license the patent in order to be considered an exclusive 
licensee, instead holding that an exclusive licensee is a party that 
holds any of a patent’s exclusionary rights.107  Going further with 
respect to the case at hand, the court held that “[b]ecause an 
exclusive licensee derives its standing from the exclusionary rights it 
holds, it follows that its standing will ordinarily be coterminous with 
those rights.”108  In that sense, the standing question was “whether 
WiAV has shown that it has the right under the patents to exclude the 
Defendants from engaging in the alleged infringing activity and 
therefore is injured by the Defendants’ conduct.”109  After reviewing 
the various license agreements, the panel held that WiAV did indeed 
have the right to exclude Motorola and the other defendants from its 
patent rights under the license, and thus had Article III standing to 
file suit.110 
In Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC,111 the court considered the 
extent to which a patentee and licensee can agree to a nunc pro tunc 
assignment of the patent in order to establish standing in the licensee 
after the infringement suit has already been filed.112  Abraxis 
purchased the assets of AstraZeneca on April 2006.113  The purchase 
agreement required AstraZeneca to assign the patents-in-suit to 
Abraxis, and AstraZeneca purportedly did so through a later-
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 111. 625 F.3d 1359, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1977 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 112. Id. at 1366, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1983. 
 113. Id. at 1361, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1979. 
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executed intellectual property assignment agreement, which further 
required AstraZeneca to execute any additional assignments 
necessary to vest full title to the patents-in-suit in Abraxis.114  The 
problem, however, was that the patents-in-suit were still owned by 
third parties, and the rights had not been assigned to AstraZeneca at 
the time AstraZeneca signed the agreements with Abraxis.115 
On the day Abraxis filed its infringement suit, March 15, 2007, the 
third party owners of the patents-in-suit assigned their rights to 
AstraZeneca.116  Eight months later, AstraZeneca assigned all of its 
rights to the patents-in-suit to Abraxis.117  That assignment agreement 
further stated that AstraZeneca and Abraxis had considered Abraxis, 
as of June 28, 2006 at the latest, to be the holder of all rights to the 
patents.118  The district court held that Abraxis nonetheless had 
standing because the intent of the parties could be taken to imply a 
nunc pro tunc assignment of the patents-in-suit because of the 
relationship between the parties.119 
The Federal Circuit first held that its law determined the 
assignment question here because “[w]e have stated that [a]lthough 
state law governs the interpretation of contracts generally . . . the 
question of whether a patent assignment clause creates an automatic 
assignment or merely an obligation to assign is intimately bound up 
with the question of standing in patent cases.”120  The court then 
examined the assignment agreements involved and determined that 
the transfer of the patents was to occur by separate agreement in the 
future and that such agreements “do not vest legal title to the patents 
in the assignee.”121  While Abraxis and AstraZeneca did execute an 
intellectual property assignment agreement in June 2006 (months 
before suit was filed), AstraZeneca was not able to assign the patents 
at that time because it did not possess them.122  AstraZeneca’s 
acquisition of title to the patents-in-suit on the day Abraxis filed its 
infringement suit likewise did not matter because AstraZeneca’s title 
to the patents, per the agreement, did not pass by operation of law to 
Abraxis.123  Rather, as per the parties’ agreement, the actual transfer 
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from AstraZeneca to Abraxis did not occur until they executed a 
separate assignment agreement in the future.124  Moreover, it did not 
matter that the parties intended a nunc pro tunc assignment.125  The 
court held that “[e]ven if the November 12, 2007 agreement is 
considered to be a nunc pro tunc assignment, for purposes of standing, 
Abraxis was required to have legal title to the patents on the day it filed 
the complaint and that requirement can not [sic] be met 
retroactively.”126   
Judge Newman dissented, arguing that state law controlled the 
effect of an assignment agreement, including its effective date.127  
Applying New York law, Judge Newman found it “beyond cavil that 
parties to a contract can set the effective date of their agreement,” 
and that Abraxis and AstraZeneca intended to assign the patents 
prior to Abraxis filing suit.128  Judge Newman also criticized the 
majority’s reliance on “promise to assign” cases, characterizing such 
cases as irrelevant because the patents were already in existence 
here.129  
In Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.,130 the 
court set a high bar for parties claiming rights under an unwritten 
license agreement.  There, a patent owner sought to join its sister 
corporation as a co-plaintiff.131  The sister corporation actually 
practiced the patent and could claim lost profits from the alleged 
infringement.132  In the absence of a formal license agreement, the 
patent owner sought to rely on the corporate organizational structure 
and the working relationship between the patentee entity and its 
sister company to establish the exclusive license agreement required 
for standing.133  Based on deposition testimony, the patent holder 
argued that the corporate family has an “understanding” that the 
sister company has the sole right to practice the patent-in-suit.134  The 
court rejected this argument, noting that “the fact that the [sister 
corporation] is currently the only entity practicing the [patent-in-
suit] does not mean that [the patent holder] has promised to exclude 
all others from doing so.”135  The alleged “understanding” between 
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the patent holder and its sister corporation, moreover, was “nothing 
more than the way in which the various [corporate family] entities 
presently operate.”136   
In Alfred E. Mann Foundation for Scientific Research v. Cochlear Corp.,137 
a patent holder granted to a licensee an exclusive license covering 
two hearing-aid patents.138  The license agreement specified that 
either party could sue for patent infringement, with the licensee 
holding the right to do so first.139  When the licensee declined to sue 
the defendant for infringement, the patent holder, per the licensing 
agreement, sued instead.140  The district court dismissed the suit on 
the argument that the patent holder did not retain a sufficiently 
substantial right to sue and thus lacked standing.141   
The Federal Circuit reversed.142  Recognizing that “the nature and 
scope of the licensor’s retained right to sue accused infringers is the 
most important factor in determining whether an exclusive license 
transfers sufficient rights to render the licensee the owner of the 
patent,”143 the court held that the patent holder had the “absolute 
right to decide whether or not to initiate litigation” and would 
maintain “complete control” over any litigation it initiated.144  That 
“unfettered” level of control, despite the licensee’s first refusal right, 
meant the Foundation’s retention of litigation rights was not illusory 
and thus sufficiently substantial to create standing.145 
Another case, A123 Systems, Inc. v. Hydro-Quebec,146 involved the 
prudential standing requirement that an exclusive licensee must join 
all patent owners to a suit, considering that requirement in the 
context of a declaratory judgment action by an alleged infringer.147  
A123 Systems sought a declaration of noninfringement and invalidity 
of patents belonging to the University of Texas and licensed to 
Hydro-Quebec.148  A123 did not join the University of Texas.149  The 
district court held that A123 was required to join both the patentees 
as each patentee was a necessary party just as an exclusive licensee 
that lacks some substantial rights in a patent must join the patentee 
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in order to sue.150  The district court dismissed the suit, reasoning that 
the University of Texas was a necessary party because it had not 
transferred all substantial rights in the patents at issue to Hydro-
Quebec.151 
The Federal Circuit agreed.152  It held that Hydro-Quebec “holds an 
exclusive license to some, but not all, fields of use under the patents 
in suit, mandating the legal conclusion that [Hydro-Quebec] holds 
less than all substantial patent rights.”153  The court rejected A123 
Systems’ argument that the University of Texas was not a necessary 
party because Hydro-Quebec and the University of Texas held Hydro-
Quebec out as the exclusive licensee with all substantial rights to the 
patents-in-suit in prior infringement litigation.154  The court instead 
held that the University of Texas and Hydro-Quebec had made clear 
that Hydro-Quebec was the exclusive licensee to some, but not all, 
fields of use.155  More importantly, the court held that “even if 
[Hydro-Quebec] had held itself out as having all substantial rights in 
the patents, such a unilateral representation could not alter the 
[University of Texas’s] own rights in the patents.  In determining 
ownership for purposes of standing, labels given by the parties do not 
control.”156 
With the University of Texas now a necessary party, the court asked 
if the university could be joined in light of its Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, ultimately concluding that it could not.157  Neither party 
disputed the university’s status as a state entity entitled to immunity158  
The panel also held that the University of Texas had not waived its 
immunity by acting as a plaintiff in an earlier infringement action.159  
The court relied on its earlier decision in Biomedical Patent 
Management Corp. v. Department of Health Services,160 which held that 
waivers of immunity in one suit do not operate to waive immunity in 
other suits, including suits about the same issues and between the 
same parties.161  Thus the University could not be joined as a party 
unless it waived its immunity in this specific lawsuit.162 
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The only remaining question was whether the University of Texas, 
as a necessary party incapable of being joined, was also an 
“indispensible party” such that the suit must be dismissed under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a).163  Applying Fifth Circuit law, 
the court held that the University was an indispensible party, citing 
the prejudice that would result to the University if suit were 
permitted to proceed without the University because of the risk that 
the University’s interests would not be fully represented, as well as the 
risk of multiple future lawsuits.164  On balance, then, Rule 19(a) made 
the University an indispensible party, and the district court correctly 
dismissed A123 Systems’ declaratory judgment action.165 
During this past year, the Federal Circuit also considered its 
prudential standing requirement that all those with ownership rights 
to the patents-in-suit be joined in an infringement or invalidity 
action, a question that turns on who has those ownership rights.166  
Ownership rights in the context of employment contracts and the 
assignment of inventorship rights to employers arose in SiRF 
Technology, Inc. v. International Trade Commission.167  In that case, an 
employee assigned to his employer “all inventions . . . which are 
related to or useful in the business of the Employer . . . and  
which were . . . conceived . . . during the period of the  
Employee’s employment . . . .”168  The employee invented certain GPS 
technologies while working for the employer and subsequently left 
for a competitor.169  The employee then obtained a patent for the 
technologies and assigned it to the competitor.170  The question 
became whether the employer, through the automatic assignment 
agreement with the employee, had an ownership interest in the 
subsequently-assigned patent.171  If so, the former employer was 
required to be joined as a plaintiff with the new employer (i.e., the 
competitor) because a co-owner of patent bringing suit without the 
voluntary joinder of all other co-owners does not have standing.172   
The competitor as assignee had already recorded the assignment 
with the Patent and Trademark Office, thus “creat[ing] a 
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presumption of validity as to the assignment and plac[ing] the 
burden to rebut such a showing on one challenging the assignment,” 
meaning the defendant in the infringement action.173  The defendant 
failed to meet that burden because it was unable to show that the 
employee’s invention was “related to” or “useful in” the former 
employer’s business as required by the employment contract so that 
the invention did not trigger the automatic assignment clause from 
the employment contract.174  As support for that conclusion, the court 
looked to a prior settlement agreement between the employer and 
competitor in which they agreed that the competitor could freely use 
the now-patented technology.175  “If [the former employer and the 
employee] recognized that [the competitor] was the owner of the 
trade secret rights to the invention,” the court concluded, “it logically 
follows that [the employer] did not think that [it] was the owner of 
similar rights that eventually became the subject of the [patent-in-
suit].”176  Thus, the competitor was not required to join the employer 
to the suit, and the competitor had standing to assert its infringement 
claims.177 
Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Communications, Inc.,178 required the court to 
consider the impact of a divorce decree on a patent owner’s standing 
to bring suit179  Enovsys had acquired ownership of several patents 
from a manager and part owner of Enovsys, who obtained the patents 
before divorcing his wife.180  The defendant, Nextel, moved to dismiss 
the suit on the ground that Enovsys had failed to join the original 
patentee’s ex-wife who, Nextel claimed, retained an ownership 
interest in the patents under California’s community property laws.181  
Because an infringement plaintiff must join all patent owners in 
order to establish standing, if the ex-wife retained an ownership 
interest in the patents, then Enovsys had no standing to sue.182  The 
district court refused to dismiss, and a jury ultimately decided the 
case in the plaintiff’s favor.183 
Patent ownership is a matter of state law, and thus the Federal 
Circuit looked to California law, the state where the original patent 
owner and his ex-wife were married, to determine whether the ex-
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wife had any ownership interest in the patent.184  California law 
presumes that all property obtained during marriage is community 
property, but Enovsys overcame that presumption by arguing that the 
ex-wife signed a California divorce petition indicating that the couple 
had “no community assets or liabilities,” and the state court entered 
judgment on that petition, thus extinguishing any ownership interest 
the ex-wife may have had in the patents.185  Without an ownership 
interest, the ex-wife was not required to be joined in the suit in order 
to establish standing.186  
Beyond the question of who possessed the right to sue for 
infringement under the Patent Act, the Federal Circuit also 
considered standing in two unique contexts—the Patent Act’s qui tam 
false-marking provision, and the Hatch-Waxman Act’s generic drug 
approval framework. 
The Patent Act’s false-marking qui tam provision187 was at issue in 
Stauffer v. Brooks Brothers, Inc.188  Stauffer, a patent attorney, bought 
Brooks Brothers bow ties that contained a sizing mechanism marked 
with two patents, each of which expired in the 1950’s.189  Believing 
that this patent-marking was intended to deceive, Stauffer sued 
Brooks Brothers.190  Brooks Brothers argued that Stauffer lacked 
standing because his claim that Brooks Brothers’ markings quelled 
competition was “too conjectural and hypothetical to constitute an 
injury in fact.”191  The district court agreed and dismissed the suit.192 
The Federal Circuit reversed because “even though a relator may 
suffer no injury himself, a qui tam provision operates as a statutory 
assignment of the United States’ rights, and the assignee . . . has 
standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.”193  To 
have standing, the panel concluded, the plaintiff must assert that the 
United States has sustained an injury-in-fact,  which it did by virtue of 
having one of its statutes violated.194  Relying on Vermont Agency of 
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,195 and its conclusion that 
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Congress historically often assigned its sovereign injuries to private 
parties,196 the panel held that Stauffer could establish standing merely 
through the alleged violation of 35 U.S.C. § 292 and declined to 
address whether Stauffer’s alleged personal injuries were sufficient to 
confer standing.197 
The Federal Circuit also addressed whether claimed injuries from a 
generic drug manufacturer’s efforts to gain approval for its drugs 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act framework198 were sufficiently concrete 
to support Article III standing.199  In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. 
Eisai Co.,200 Teva sought a declaratory judgment that its generic 
Alzheimer’s disease drug did not infringe on Eisai’s patents listed in 
the FDA’s Orange Book, thus clearing the way for approval of Teva’s 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”).201  But because Teva 
was not the first generic manufacturer to file an ANDA for the 
Alzheimer’s drug, Teva’s ANDA was indefinitely delayed until the first 
ANDA filer’s 180-day exclusive marketing period was  triggered.202  
The period could be triggered either by the marketing of the generic 
drug or a court judgment that Eisai’s patents were invalid or not 
infringed.203  Because the first ANDA filer’s plans were on hold due to 
a preliminary injunction entered in another case, Teva sought on its 
own to obtain an order of invalidity or non-infringement which 
would trigger the exclusivity period and bring Teva closer to having 
its own ANDA approved.204  The district court agreed with Eisai that 
the delay in running the exclusivity period was an insufficiently 
concrete injury to establish Article III standing and dismissed Teva’s 
suit.205 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and held that the delay in 
the running of the exclusivity period was a sufficient Article III injury 
to Teva.206  Teva’s “injury (i.e., exclusion from the market) is fairly 
traceable to the defendant’s actions because ‘but-for’ the defendant’s 
decision to list a patent in the Orange Book, FDA approval of the 
generic drug company’s ANDA would not have been independently 
delayed by that patent.”207  A favorable judgment declaring Eisai’s 
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 201. Id. at 1343, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810. 
 202. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810. 
 203. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810. 
 204. See id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810. 
 205. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810. 
 206. Id. at 1343–44, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810. 
 207. Id. at 1347, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813. 
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patents invalid or not infringed would remove the possibility that 
Eisai’s patents would bar Teva from the market and that was sufficient 
to create Article III standing.208  In a holding discussed more fully in 
Section A(1)(d)(i) below, the panel also held that the district court 
abused its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act and thus remanded the case for 
resolution.209   
b. Subject-matter jurisdiction 
Subject-matter jurisdiction issues arose in the context of the scope 
of the federal courts’ exclusive patent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338(a) and the ongoing existence of an Article III “case or 
controversy” between the parties in litigation. 
The Federal Circuit considered the scope of jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1338(a)210 in Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A.,211 a legal 
malpractice suit by an inventor who claimed her patent counsel failed 
to file timely patent applications.212  Although the plaintiff initially 
filed suit in Ohio state court, the defendants removed to federal 
court arguing that the patentability of the inventions was key to the 
malpractice claim and thus fell under the district court’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.213  A federal court has jurisdiction over a patent claim 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) if federal patent law creates the cause of 
action or if the plaintiff’s relief depends on determining a substantial 
question of patent law as a necessary element of one of the claims in 
the well-pleaded complaint.214  The question in Davis was whether 
patent law was a necessary element of one of the plaintiff’s claims.215 
Ohio follows the “case-within-a-case” malpractice doctrine for some 
claims, meaning the plaintiff must prove she would have been 
successful in the underlying matter before she can recover for 
malpractice.216  As such, Davis could “prevail only by proving that U.S. 
patents would have issued on her application but for Defendants’ 
malpractice—i.e., that her inventions were patentable under U.S. 
                                                          
 208. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814 (quoting Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. 
Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1293, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 
2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 209. Id. at 1348–50, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814–15. 
 210. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) (granting exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts 
of any claim arising under federal patent law). 
 211. 596 F.3d 1355, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1917 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 212. Id. at 1358–59, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919–20. 
 213. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919–20. 
 214. Id. at 1359, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1109, 1110 (1988)). 
 215. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920. 
 216. Id. at 1360, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921. 
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law.”217  The court reasoned that since federal patent law determines 
the patentability of Davis’ inventions, federal patent law was a 
necessary element of Davis’ malpractice claim.218  Therefore, 
jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).219 
The second subject-matter jurisdiction question, the existence of 
an ongoing Article III “case or controversy” between litigating parties, 
arose in several cases.  In Dow Jones & Co. v. Ablaise Ltd.,220 the Federal 
Circuit considered the effect of a patent holder’s offer of a covenant 
not to sue for infringement on the existence of an Article III “case or 
controversy” in a suit for patent invalidity.221  Since 1995, the Federal 
Circuit has held “that a covenant not to sue for patent infringement 
divests the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over claims that 
the patent is invalid” because it eliminates the controversy over 
whether the defendant has infringed the patent.222  On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit applied this rule, holding that Ablaise’s offer of a 
covenant not to sue extinguished the “case or controversy” between 
the parties and left the district court without subject-matter 
jurisdiction to decide the case.223 
In so holding, the panel took time to reject the district court’s 
belief that the Federal Circuit’s covenant-not-to-sue rulings could be 
avoided for “sound prudential reasons,” like judicial efficiency.224  To 
the contrary, “no amount of ‘prudential reasons’ or perceived 
increases in efficiency, however sound, can empower a federal court 
to hear a case where there is no extant case or controversy.”225 
The Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction in the context of a 
declaratory judgment action arose in Laboratory Corp. of America 
Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories.226  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), 
the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction if the district 
court’s jurisdiction “was based, in whole or in part, on § 1338.”227  To 
answer the § 1338 question in the context of a declaratory judgment 
action, the court looks to the hypothetical action that the declaratory 
                                                          
 217. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921. 
 218. Id. at 1362, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922. 
 219. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921. 
 220. 606 F.3d 1338, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 221. Id. at 1345, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371. 
 222. Id. at 1346, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372. 
 223. Id. at 1349, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
 224. Id. at 1347, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373. 
 225. Id. at 1348, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
 226. 599 F.3d 1277, 1282, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1224, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 227. Id. at 1282, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) 
(2006).   
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action defendant would have brought rather than to the declaratory 
judgment action itself.228   
Noting that § 1338 incorporates § 1331’s “arising under” 
standard,229 the § 1331 (and thus § 1338) “arising under” question is 
whether “a state-law claim necessarily raises a states federal issue, 
actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum many 
entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of 
federal and state judicial responsibilities” when a case involves state 
law claims such as in LabCorp.230  The appellant bears the burden of 
showing that the standard is met under § 1295(a)(1) because the 
ultimate question is one of appellate jurisdiction.231 
A majority of the three-judge panel concluded that Metabolite, the 
appellant, could not meet its burden.232  The “hypothetical action” 
underlying the declaratory judgment would have been a breach of 
contract action involving a patent license.233  Although Metabolite 
claimed that this hypothetical breach of contract action would have 
required an infringement inquiry (to know if LabCorp had breached 
its license), that infringement inquiry already had been resolved in 
prior litigation between the parties.234  Thus, the infringement 
question was no longer “substantial and disputed.”235  Accordingly, 
the court transferred the case to the Tenth Circuit.236   
The dissent, on the other hand, would have exercised appellate 
jurisdiction.237  Judge Dyk argued that the suit was essentially a suit to 
enforce or determine the res judicata effect of a prior federal 
judgment, and that the res judicata effect of a federal judgment is 
itself a federal question.238  He acknowledged that the res judicata 
question did not rest on patent law and thus did not arise under 
                                                          
 228. LabCorp, 599 F.3d at 1282, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228 (quoting Speedco, 
Inc. v. Estes, 853 F.2d 909, 912, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637, 1640 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 229. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228. 
 230. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228 (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. 
v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 231. Id. at 1282–83, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228–29. 
 232. Id. at 1283, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228. 
 233. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228. 
 234. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229; see Metabolite Labs. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. 
Holdings, No. 99-CV-870, 2001 WL 34778749, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2001), aff’d, 370 
F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005) (entering judgment in 
favor of Metabolite Laboratories).  
 235. LabCorp, 599 F.3d at 1283, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228. 
 236. Id. at 1286, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.  The Tenth Circuit ultimately 
affirmed the district court’s judgment.  See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite 
Labs., No. 10-1194, 2011 WL 310574 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 2011). 
 237. Id. at 1287, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 238. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232. 
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§ 1338.239  Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Semtek International 
v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,240 Judge Dyk argued that in the context of 
determining the res judicata effect of a prior judgment, the court 
should “look through” to that prior judgment, and determine the 
jurisdictional basis on which that prior judgment rested.241  He 
concluded that the initial case had arisen in part under § 1338, and 
thus a later suit to determine the res judicata effect of that prior 
judgment afforded the Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction.242 
ClearPlay, Inc. v. Abecassis,243 involved a similar scenario.  ClearPlay 
brought six state law claims against Abecassis, all of which could 
potentially raise patent law issues in the course of litigation.244  
However, because there was a theory of liability for each of the six 
claims that did not require resolving an issue of patent law, the court 
held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction (and that the district court 
lacked original jurisdiction) over the claims.245 
In King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc.,246 the court held that a 
case or controversy ceases to exist when a plaintiff files an 
infringement suit but subsequently assigns all of its rights to the 
patents-in-suit to a third party.247  In this generic drug case, the patent 
holder, Elan, sued Eon for infringement.248  After filing suit, Elan 
assigned all of its rights to the patents-in-suit to King Pharmaceuticals 
and recorded that assignment with the Patent and Trademark 
Office.249  Elan then attempted to extricate itself from the litigation, 
including repeatedly offering to waive its rights to the patents-in-
suit.250  Those efforts were ignored and the district court ultimately 
entered judgment against both Elan and King invalidating the 
patents-in-suit.251  
The Federal Circuit vacated the judgment against Elan, holding 
that there was no current case or controversy between the parties in 
                                                          
 239. See id. at 1288, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232. 
 240.  531 U.S. 497 (2001).  
 241. Id.; LabCorp, 599 F.3d at 1288, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 (Dyk, J., 
dissenting) (citing Semtek Int’l v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508–09 
(2001)).  Semtek, however, arose under § 1332 diversity jurisdiction, and the majority 
concluded that the decision should not be extended beyond that setting.  See Semtek, 
531 U.S. at 508. 
 242. LabCorp, 599 F.3d at 1288, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 243. 602 F.3d 1364, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 244. Id. at 1367–68, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766–77. 
 245. Id. at 1367, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766. 
 246. 616 F.3d 1267, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1833 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 247. Id. at 1282–93, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845. 
 248. Id. at 1281, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844. 
 249. Id. at 1281, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844. 
 250. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844. 
 251. Id. at 1282, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844. 
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light of the assignment of the patents-in-suit to King.252  Noting that 
the acquisition documents showed that Elan sold all of its interest in 
the patents-in-suit and separately promised not to sue Eon for 
infringement, the court held that Elan’s “broad and unrestricted 
covenants not to sue” eliminated a case or controversy between Eon 
and Elan, and thus the district court was without jurisdiction to enter 
judgment against Elan.253  “Had Elan retained the right to sue Eon in 
some instances, then an actual case or controversy” may have 
existed.254  That not being the case, the district court was without 
jurisdiction to decide the case.255 
c. Personal jurisdiction 
With personal jurisdiction looming large on the Supreme Court’s 
docket in the 2010 Term,256 the Federal Circuit’s personal jurisdiction 
cases—and their currency—took on an added interest in 2010.  Near 
year’s end, the court weighed-in on the propriety of exercising 
specific jurisdiction over foreign corporations.  In Nuance 
Communications, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House,257 Nuance sued Abbyy 
USA for infringement in the Northern District of California and later 
joined Abbyy Production (a sister corporation organized under 
Russian law) and Abbyy Software (a parent to Abbyy USA and Abbyy 
Production, organized under Cypriot law).258  With scant analysis, the 
district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
holding that neither foreign Abbyy entity purposefully directed 
activity towards California and that both foreign Abbyy entities were 
improperly served.259 
On appeal, the court began with the familiar test:  personal 
jurisdiction “over an out-of-state defendant is appropriate if the 
relevant state’s long-arm statute permits the assertion of jurisdiction 
without violating federal due process.”260  California’s long-arm statute 
                                                          
 252. Id. at 1283, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845. 
 253. Id. at 1282, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845. 
 254. Id. at 1283, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845. 
 255. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845. 
 256. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, S.A. v. 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 63 (2010) (No. 10-76), 2010 WL 2786988 at *i (seeking 
consideration of question involving personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation 
because other entities distribute the corporation’s products in the forum state); 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. 
Ct. 62 (2010) (No. 09-1343), 2010 WL 1789706 at *i (seeking consideration of 
question involving the role of the globalized economy in personal jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations who target the forum state for sale to consumers). 
 257. 626 F.3d 1222, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 258. Id. at 1227–28, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354. 
 259. Id. at 1229, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355. 
 260. Id. at 1230, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356 (quoting 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech 
Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1376–77, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1773, 1775 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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permits personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by due process, 
therefore the court asked whether exercise of jurisdiction over the 
foreign Abbyy defendants was consistent with due process.261  No facts 
suggested that the court could exercise general jurisdiction over the 
foreign Abbyy defendants, so the court inquired whether the 
defendants intentionally established minimum contacts in the forum 
state.262  This specific-jurisdiction inquiry required an analysis of three 
factors:  “(1) whether the defendant purposefully directed activities at 
residents of the forum; (2) whether the claim arises out of or relates 
to those activities; and (3) whether assertion of personal jurisdiction 
is reasonable and fair.”263  Since the case lacked a record on 
jurisdiction and the parties had not exchanged discovery, the court 
was required to construe factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor264  
The court began with the sister corporation, Abbyy Production, 
holding that exercise of personal jurisdiction was appropriate based 
on Abbyy Production’s “CEO’s stated goal of ‘conquering’ the U.S. 
market; the importation of allegedly infringing products into 
California; the extraction of royalty payments for the sale of those 
products; and Abbyy Production’s agreement to provide assistance to 
Abbyy USA in selling, reproducing, and modifying the accused 
products in California.”265  Further, according to an industry 
publication, Abbyy’s product held about a thirty percent share of the 
U.S. market.266   
The court also had little trouble concluding that the infringement 
claims related to Abbyy Production’s California contacts, which were 
based on importing infringing products into the state.267  The court, 
however, went further, holding that Abbyy Production’s actions “also 
run[] afoul of the Supreme Court’s and this court’s stream of 
commerce jurisprudence.”268  Noting that the most restrictive “stream 
of commerce” tests require factors warranting the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction in addition to proof of placing goods into the 
stream of commerce (stream of commerce plus), the court held that a 
plus factor was present here.269  By intentionally shipping the products 
in question into California through an established distribution 
channel in order to sell the products in California and by providing 
                                                          
 261. Id. at 1230–31, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356. 
 262. Id. at 1230–31, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).   
 263. Id. at 1231, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356. 
 264. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356. 
 265. Id. at 1231–33, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357–58.   
 266. Id. at 1231, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357.   
 267. Id. at 1232–33, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357–58. 
 268. Id. at 1233, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358. 
 269. Id. at 1234, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358–59.   
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Abbyy USA with updated versions of the software, technical support, 
and general assistance, Abbyy Production engaged in the sort of 
purposeful contacts that would support personal jurisdiction in a 
“steam of commerce plus” analysis and this indicated that Abbyy 
Production should have reasonably anticipated being haled into 
court in California.270   
Addressing the foreign parent, Abbyy Software, the court held that 
the record was insufficient to decide whether the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction was proper.271  That uncertainty raised the question of 
jurisdictional discovery and whether the district court correctly 
refused to allow it.272  Applying Ninth Circuit law, the panel held that 
the district court abused its discretion in refusing discovery because 
Nuance offered more than a “mere hunch” that discovery would 
uncover important jurisdictional facts.273  The court noted that Abbyy 
Software “functions as more than a holding company” for its 
subsidiaries, and that its CEO managed all of the entities through a 
global management team.274  These facts were sufficient to allow 
additional discovery to decide whether additional facts may support 
personal jurisdiction over Abbyy Software.275 
Finally, the court held that Nuance should have been afforded the 
opportunity to conduct alternate service on the Russian entity, Abbyy 
Production, which Nuance had served in person with a local process 
server.276  The court held that plaintiffs are not required to attempt to 
serve foreign parties in accord with the Hague Convention by using a 
country’s central authority for service before they may use an 
alternative method of service if a nation, like Russia, categorically 
refuses to participate in Hague Convention service procedures.277  
Recognizing that “[s]ubstituted service under” Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(f)(3) has previously been used to serve parties from 
Russia in many federal courts, the court held that “substitute service 
on Abbyy USA would satisfy [due process], as it is reasonably 
calculated to apprise Abbyy Production of the pendency of the action 
and afford it an opportunity to respond.”278 
Patent Rights Protection Group, LLC v. Video Gaming Technologies, 
Inc.,279 offered the court another opportunity to explore personal 
                                                          
 270. Id. at 1234, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358–59.   
 271. Id. at 1235, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360. 
 272. See id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360.  
 273. Id. at 1236, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360. 
 274. Id. at 1235, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1359.   
 275. Id. at 1236, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360–61. 
 276. Id. at 1238–39, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1362–63. 
 277. Id. at 1238, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1362. 
 278. Id. at 1239–40, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1363.  
 279. 603 F.3d 1364, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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jurisdiction issues.  Patent Rights Protection Group sued several 
gaming companies in Nevada for infringement, including VGT, a 
Tennessee corporation, and SPEC, a Michigan corporation.280  The 
district court subsequently dismissed VGT and SPEC for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.281 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first concluded that because 
Nevada’s long-arm statute allowed its courts to exercise personal 
jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the U.S. Constitution, 
determining whether personal jurisdiction is proper requires 
answering only whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction accords 
with due process282  That inquiry turned on whether SPEC and VGT 
had the requisite minimum contacts with Nevada.283  If the minimum 
contacts are present, however, a court must still determine whether 
asserting jurisdiction based on those contacts “would comport with 
fair play and substantial justice, i.e., whether exercising jurisdiction 
would be reasonable.”284  In its analysis, the district court did not 
engage in a minimum contacts inquiry and refused to allow 
jurisdictional discovery on the subject, reasoning instead that even if 
minimum contacts were present, the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
would not be reasonable.285   
The Federal Circuit agreed with Patent Rights Protection Group’s 
argument that its and Nevada’s interests were not outweighed by 
SPEC’s and VGT’s burden of defending the litigation and thus 
exercise of personal jurisdiction would be reasonable.286  SPEC and 
VGT argued that defending the suit would be unduly burdensome 
because the witnesses and documents they would need were located 
outside of Nevada.287  Moreover, the companies claimed that 
Tennessee and Michigan have equal interest in the suit and either 
would be a preferable forum.288  In rejecting these arguments, the 
Federal Circuit held that all of the interests asserted in Michigan and 
Tennessee’s favor weighed equally in Nevada’s favor.289  The court 
also found that defending the suit was clearly not overly burdensome 
since “their admitted presence at numerous trade shows in Nevada 
indicates that, despite their arguments to the contrary, neither 
company faces a particularly onerous burden in defending itself in 
                                                          
 280. Id. at 1366–67, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181. 
 281. Id. at 1367, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181. 
 282. Id. at 1369, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183. 
 283. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183. 
 284. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 285. Id. at 1367, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181. 
 286. Id. at 1370, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183. 
 287. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183. 
 288. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183. 
 289. See id. at 1370–71, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1184. 
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Nevada.”290  Also finding that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying jurisdictional discovery, the court remanded the case with 
instructions to allow the parties to engage in jurisdictional 
discovery.291 
In Bradford Co. v. ConTeyor North America, Inc.,292 the court 
considered personal jurisdiction in the context of a foreign 
infringement defendant who claimed that it was not amenable to suit 
in any state.293  Applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), the 
district court agreed that the defendant did not have sufficient 
contacts for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.294  Rule 4(k)(2) says 
that for a claim arising under federal law, personal jurisdiction exists 
if “(A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts 
of general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent 
with the United States Constitution and laws.”295  The district court 
held that personal jurisdiction would not comport with due process 
because the foreign defendant’s contacts with Ohio were not 
“continuous and systematic.”296 
The Federal Circuit noted, however, that the district court’s 
decision was handed down before the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr.297  In Touchcom, the Federal Circuit 
rejected a standard requiring a plaintiff to prove that a defendant is 
not subject to jurisdiction in any state.  The court instead adopted the 
Seventh Circuit approach, which permits the use of Rule 4(k)(2) 
whenever the defendant asserts that it cannot be sued in the forum 
state and will not provide any other state where suit can be brought.298  
The district court’s approach was inconsistent with this rule because 
it “failed to analyze ConTeyor NV’s contacts with the United States as 
a whole and imposed an improper burden on the plaintiff” to prove 
minimum contacts with the forum state.299  The court accordingly 
remanded the case for a personal jurisdiction analysis under the 
appropriate Rule 4(k)(2) framework.300 
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 295. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). 
 296. Bradford, 603 F.3d at 1272, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917. 
 297. 574 F.3d 1403, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 298. Bradford, 603 F.3d at 1272, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924 (citing Touchcom, 
574 F.3d at 1415, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616). 
 299. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924. 
 300. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924. 
2011] 2010 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 881 
d. Specific issues affecting the initiation of a case 
i. Declaratory judgments 
Even when a district court has jurisdiction to hear a case, it 
nonetheless has discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction in 
limited circumstances, such as cases filed under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act.301  In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co. Ltd.,302 
the Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in 
refusing to exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment 
Act.303  The district court based its decision on two factors:  its lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction and its belief that Teva was engaged in 
improper gamesmanship.304  The Federal Circuit reversed the district 
court’s ruling that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, thus 
eliminating lack of jurisdiction as a basis for declining declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction.305  In exercising discretion under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, a district court should “typically consider 
the usefulness of the declaratory judgment remedy, the fitness of the 
case for resolution, and the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act.”306  On these factors, the court noted that it had “upheld 
discretionary decisions declining jurisdiction when the declaratory 
judgment action was duplicative of other proceedings, the party 
instituted an action solely to enhance its bargaining power in 
negotiations, or when reexamination proceedings were pending.”307  
The existence vel non of subject matter jurisdiction not being within 
these considerations, it was inappropriate for the district court to 
consider it.308 
Although concerns regarding gamesmanship fit this framework, 
the district court’s gamesmanship concerns were misplaced because 
the concern was insufficiently supported by the facts.309  The Hatch-
Waxman Act did not prevent companies from “filing multiple ANDAs 
covering different formulations of the same drug,” even when the 
filings are under different corporate names.310  The district court’s 
concerns for gamesmanship were thus unfounded and, with no other 
appropriate reason for declining jurisdiction, the panel held that the 
                                                          
 301. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02 (2006). 
 302. 620 F.3d 1341, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1808 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 303. Teva Pharm., 620 F.3d at 1349, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815.   
 304. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 305. See id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814–15. 
 306. Id. at 1349, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. 
 307. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. 
 308. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 309. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 310. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
882 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:845 
district court abused its discretion in declining declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction.311 
While the Teva Pharmaceuticals district court abused its discretion in 
refusing to exercise declaratory judgment jurisdiction, the district 
court in Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc.312 did not.313  
There, a competitor sought a declaration that the patents-in-suit were 
invalid or not infringed by the competitor’s product.314  The 
defendant patent holder had not seen the competitor’s products, 
examined them for possible infringement, nor accused the 
competitor of infringement.315  The competitor claimed several facts 
that created an actual controversy within the scope of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, including phone calls between the competitor and 
patent holder and the patent holder’s history of aggressive 
enforcement.316  The district court rejected all of these grounds, 
holding that events subsequent to the complaint’s filing could not 
create jurisdiction, and further refusing to exercise declaratory 
jurisdiction because the competitor’s informal phone calls to the 
patent holder to provoke threats of litigation amounted to an 
improper attempt to manufacture jurisdiction.317  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed in all respects.318 
The phone calls at issue involved the competitor’s employees 
contacting the patent holder’s employees, describing the 
competitor’s product, and then seeking the patent-holder’s 
employees’ opinions as to whether the patent holder would sue for 
infringement.319  The district court labeled these calls a “sub rosa” 
attempt to create jurisdiction and noted that none of the patent 
holder’s employees understood the nature of the phone calls and 
were not decision-makers in any event.320  The panel held that the 
“indirection reflected in these conversations did not produce a 
controversy of such immediacy and reality as to require the district 
court to accept declaratory jurisdiction.”321 
                                                          
 311. Id. at 1350, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 312. 599 F.3d 1377, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 313. Id. at 1385, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314. 
 314. Id. at 1379, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310. 
 315. Id. at 1380, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310. 
 316. Id. at 1379, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310–11. 
 317. Id. at 1383–84, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312, 1314.  
 318. Id. at 1385, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314. 
 319. Id. at 1381–82, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 320. Id. at 1381, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 321. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1378, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1173, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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The panel also rejected the patent holder’s enforcement history as 
a basis for declaratory jurisdiction.322  The court noted that previous 
litigation should be factored into the court’s assessment of the totality 
of the circumstances, but held that prior infringement suits against 
other parties for other products were not sufficient without an act 
directed toward the competitor.323   
Events occurring subsequent to the original complaint, namely 
litigation between the parties concerning the competitor’s product, 
likewise could not establish jurisdiction:  “[U]nless there was 
jurisdiction at the filing of the original complaint, jurisdiction could 
not be carried back to the date of the original pleading.”324  This was 
true even though the competitor filed an “amended” complaint 
adding those subsequent facts to the case.325  That “amended” 
complaint was, in truth, a “supplemental” complaint under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(d) because it added facts that 
occurred after the date of the original pleading.326  As such, Rule 
15(c) governing amended pleadings did not “treat events that post-
date the original pleading as if they had occurred at an earlier 
time.”327  Since jurisdiction is measured at the time of filing, the 
subsequent facts could not thereby create jurisdiction.328 
Lastly, the panel agreed with the district court that the 
competitor’s gamesmanship provided an alternative basis for 
dismissing the suit.329  The panel said that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in holding that the case should be dismissed 
because the competitor had attempted to create jurisdiction through 
phone calls, a tactic that was not consistent with the purposes of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act.”330 
ii. Supplemental jurisdiction 
In addition to exercising original jurisdiction in, for example, 
federal question cases,331 federal district courts may also exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over other related claims in the lawsuit,332 
which typically means deciding state law claims asserted in the 
                                                          
 322. Id. at 1381, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.  
 323. Id. at 1382, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
 324. Id. at 1384, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313. 
 325. Id. at 1384, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313. 
 326. Id. at 1384, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313; see FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d). 
 327. Innovative Therapies, 599 F.3d at 1384, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313; see also 
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). 
 328. Innovative Therapies, 599 F.3d at 1384, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313. 
 329. Id. at 1384–85, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314. 
 330. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314. 
 331. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
 332. Id. § 1367(a). 
884 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:845 
complaint.  Patent law cases concerning supplemental jurisdiction 
over state law claims occasionally involve the antecedent question of 
whether the state law claims are, in fact, patent claims subject to the 
district court’s exclusive patent law jurisdiction in the first instance.333   
The Federal Circuit considered this issue in HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung 
Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co.334  The case involved a dispute over 
inventorship for two patent applications and related state law claims 
filed in California state court.335  The defendants removed the suit to 
federal court.336  The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal 
claims, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and remanded 
to state court after holding that all of the remaining claims were 
based on state law, including the inventorship claims.337 
The Federal Circuit first held that the district court was wrong to 
characterize the inventorship claims as state law claims subject to a 
discretionary decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.338  To the 
contrary, those claims arose under patent law and were thus subject 
to the district court’s exclusive original patent jurisdiction under  
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).339  That jurisdiction extends to any case involving 
a cause of action created by federal patent law or which requires the 
resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law in order to 
determine the plaintiff’s right to relief.340  “[B]ecause inventorship is 
a unique question of patent law,” the state law claim based on 
inventorship “arises under § 1338(a)” and is subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal court.341  The district court, however, was 
given little to do on remand because the Federal Circuit also held 
that patent law provided no avenue for the plaintiffs to challenge 
inventorship on the facts of the case, and thus instructed the district 
court to dismiss those claims.342  The court carefully examined the 
remainder of the claims, concluding that only the slander of title 
claim implicated patent law and should be dismissed like the 
inventorship claims.343  None of the other state law claims required 
resolution of a patent law issue, and thus did not fall under the 
                                                          
 333. Id. § 1338. 
 334. 600 F.3d 1347, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 335. Id. at 1351, 94 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1289.  
 336. Id. at 1351, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289. 
 337. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289. 
 338. Id. at 1352–53, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.  
 339. See id. at 1353, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) 
(2006). 
 340. HIF Bio, 600 F.3d at 1352, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290 (quoting 
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1109, 1110 (1988)). 
 341. Id. at 1353, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 
 342. HIF Bio, 600 F.3d at 1357, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294. 
 343. Id. at 1355, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292. 
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federal court’s exclusive patent law jurisdiction.344  With no viable 
federal claims remaining in the case, the court held that the district 
court should remand the case and its remaining claims to state 
court.345 
iii. Venue 
In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc.346 asked the question of when it is 
appropriate for the Federal Circuit to issue a writ of mandamus 
requiring a district court to transfer a case to a different venue.347  
MedIdea filed suit against Zimmer Holdings in the Eastern District of 
Texas, claiming that the district was a proper venue because 
MedIdea’s principal place of business was in the district.348  MedIdea, 
however, was not registered to do business in Texas and did not 
appear to transact any business from Texas; MedIdea’s only apparent 
connection to Texas was that it shared office space with another of its 
patent counsel’s clients.349  Zimmer Holdings claimed that the 
Northern District of Indiana was the more convenient forum for both 
parties:  MedIdea was formed under Michigan law, where it had an 
office, the vast majority of evidence would come from either Indiana 
or Michigan, and many key witnesses resided in Michigan and 
Indiana.350  The district court held, however, that neither venue was 
more convenient than the other and noted that MedIdea had 
another pending suit in the Eastern District of Texas concerning the 
same patent.351  According to the district court, moving the case 
would “prevent the parties from taking advantage of the built-in 
efficiencies that result from having related cases before the same 
judge.”352 
Applying Fifth Circuit law, the Federal Circuit held that courts 
apply the public and private factors in deciding whether the 
transferee venue is more convenient.”353  The public factors include 
concern for crowded dockets, desire to resolve local issues in local 
courts, the court’s familiarity with the controlling law, and desire to 
                                                          
 344. Id. at 1355–56, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292–93. 
 345. Id. at 1357, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294. 
 346. 609 F.3d 1378, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1733 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 347. Id. at 1379, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734. 
 348. Id. at 1379, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734. 
 349. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734. 
 350. Id. at 1379–80, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734. 
 351. Id. at 1380, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734–35. 
 352. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735. 
 353. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1342, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027, 1030 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
886 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:845 
eliminate unnecessary conflict of laws issues.354  The private factors 
include access to proof, the availability of subpoena power to ensure 
that necessary witnesses will attend, the cost of witness attendance, 
and all other logistic issues that make a trial efficient and 
inexpensive.355 
The Federal Circuit clearly viewed the case as an attempt to 
manufacture venue for convenience of patent counsel.356  In light of 
MedIdea’s decision to copy its patent prosecution files and send them 
to an office in Texas shared by another of its counsel’s clients, the 
court held that its evaluation of the circumstances of the case 
indicates that the Eastern District of Texas was not convenient for 
anyone but MedIdea’s counsel.”357  Neither party disputed that 
MedIdea’s patent work took place exclusively in Michigan, and there 
was no evidence that MedIdea had employees in Texas.358  The court 
concluded that this was “a classic case where the plaintiff is 
attempting to game the system by artificially seeking to establish 
venue by sharing office space with another of the trial counsel’s 
clients.”359  Accordingly, the court ordered a transfer.360 
Following In re Zimmer, the Federal Circuit again granted 
mandamus relief for a venue transfer and again did so for a case in 
the Eastern District of Texas.361  Of all the parties in In re Acer America 
Corp.,362 only one was located in Texas.363  Many of the others, 
including the plaintiff, were located in the Northern District of 
California.364  The district court denied a change of venue request, 
and the defendants petitioned for mandamus relief.365 
The court granted the writ, recognizing that prior “venue transfer 
cases make clear that the combination of multiple parties being 
headquartered in or near the transferee venue and no party or 
witness in the plaintiffs [sic] chosen forum is an important 
consideration” in transfer cases.366  The fact that the transferee 
venue’s subpoena powers could be used to secure the attendance of 
                                                          
 354. Id. at 1381, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735 (quoting In re TS Tech USA Corp., 
551 F.3d 1315, 1319, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 355. Id. at 1380–81, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735 (quoting TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 
1319, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569). 
 356. See infra text accompanying note 267. 
 357. Id. at 1381, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735.  
 358. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735.  
 359. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735.  
 360. Id. at 1382, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735.  
 361. In re Acer Am. Corp., 626 F.3d 1252, 1254, 1256, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1253, 
1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 362. 626 F.3d 1252, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 363. Id. at 1254, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254. 
 364. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.  
 365. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.   
 366. Id. at 1254–55, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.  
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those witnesses at trial and the absence of any significant evidence in 
the transferring venue also weighed in favor of the transfer.367  The 
court concluded that the convenience of the parties and witnesses, 
access to proof, the transferee venue’s interest in the case, and the 
availability of compulsory process all indicate that transfer is 
appropriate while “no factor remotely favors keeping this case in the 
Eastern District of Texas.”368  
Venue continued as a hot topic in the Eastern District of Texas 
with In re Vistaprint Ltd.369  The plaintiff, a New Jersey limited liability 
company, sued two defendants for infringement, neither of which 
was incorporated or had its principal place of business in the Eastern 
District of Texas.370  The defendants sought a change of venue to 
Massachusetts, which the district court denied, reasoning that it was 
familiar with the patent-in-suit due to prior litigation with the plaintiff 
that involved a hearing and resulted in a long opinion, as well as a 
related suit before the court concerning the same patent.371  The 
defendants then sought a writ of mandamus seeking a venue 
transfer.372 
This time, the Federal Circuit denied the writ, carefully 
distinguishing its earlier In re Zimmer decision granting a venue 
transfer.373  The Vistaprint court held that “where the convenience 
factors strongly weigh in favor of the transferee venue,” as was the 
case in In re Zimmer, “a decision to deny transfer based solely on 
‘negligible’ judicial efficiencies may be such a clear abuse of 
discretion as to warrant extraordinary relief.”374  The court rejected, 
however, the petitioners’ contention that denial of a venue transfer 
based on judicial economy is always improper “when all of the 
convenience factors clearly favor transfer.”375  The court found the 
judicial economy factors cited by the district court to be substantial,376 
and “[a]t the end of the day, § 1404(a) balances a number of case-
specific factors, not just convenience.”377  Thus, considering the 
amount of discretion placed in district courts in weighing those 
                                                          
 367. Id. at 1255, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.  
 368. Id. at 1256, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.  
 369. 628 F.3d 1342, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 370. Id. at 1344, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250–51.  
 371. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1251.  
 372. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250.  
 373. Id. at 1346–47, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1251, 1253.  
 374. Id. at 1344, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1251 (citing In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 
609 F.3d 1378, 1382, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 1733, 1736 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
 375. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1251–52. 
 376. Id. at 1347, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253. 
 377. Id. at 1346, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252. 
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factors, the court held that the petitioners failed to establish 
entitlement to the writ.378 
iv. Hatch-Waxman counterclaims 
The year 2010 presented the opportunity to examine and define 
the scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s counterclaim provision.379   
In Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd.,380 Caraco 
sought to bring a generic form of Novo’s diabetes drug Prandin® to 
market under the Hatch-Waxman Act’s framework.381  In short, that 
framework provides a dispute resolution process to allow patent 
holders and generic manufacturers to resolve their patent disputes 
quickly and pave the way for generic manufacturers to market lower-
cost drugs.382  FDA approval of generic drugs first requires the generic 
manufacturer to identify all patents listed in the FDA’s Orange Book 
that might be infringed by the generic drug.383  The generic 
manufacturer then must state its position concerning possible 
infringement, with one of those options, called a Paragraph IV 
statement, serving as a certification that an Orange Book patent is 
either invalid or will not be infringed by the generic drug.384  Should 
the generic manufacturer make a Paragraph IV statement, that 
statement constitutes a statutory act of infringement,385 and the patent 
holder must sue the generic manufacturer in order to avoid FDA 
approval of the generic drug.386  The Hatch-Waxman Act provides a 
statutory counterclaim to defendants in Paragraph IV infringement 
suits, allowing those defendants to “seek[] an order requiring the 
holder to correct or delete the patent information submitted by the 
holder [for the Orange Book] on the ground that the patent does 
not claim either—(aa) the drug for which the application was 
approved; or (bb) an approved method of using the drug.”387   
The scope of this counterclaim provision was at issue in Novo.388 
                                                          
 378. Id. at 1347, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253. 
 379. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii) (2006) (authorizing counterclaims by the 
applicant to require the patent holder to correct or delete information because the 
patent “does not claim either—(aa) the drug for which the application was 
approved; or (bb) an approved method of using the drug.”). 
 380. 601 F.3d 1359, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 381. Id. at 1368, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038 (Clevenger, J., concurring).   
 382. See id. at 1360, 1362, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033, 1034  (majority opinion). 
 383. Id. at 1361, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033. 
 384. Id. at 1362, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 385. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006). 
 386. Id. § 271(e)(5). 
 387. 21 U.S.C. § 335(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2006). 
 388. Novo Nordisk, 601 F.3d at 1362, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
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Caraco filed an Abbreviated New Drug Approval Application for its 
generic version of Prandin®.389  Caraco identified Novo’s Orange 
Book patents at issue, and filed a Paragraph IV statement with respect 
to the ‘358 patent that was assigned use code U-546 in the Orange 
Book.390  Accordingly, Caraco claimed that the ‘358 patent was either 
invalid or that Caraco’s drug would not infringe the patent.391  Novo 
then sued Caraco for infringement.392 
Caraco subsequently stipulated that its drug would infringe the 
‘358 patent if it included the combination of its generic drug with 
another drug as a potential use claimed by Novo.393  Caraco submitted 
a label to the FDA that carved out this stipulated infringing use, 
which the FDA approved.394  Novo responded by seeking to change 
the Orange Book narrative covering its ‘358 patent.395  Under the new 
narrative covering the ‘358 patent, now assigned use code U-968, the 
FDA could no longer approve Caraco’s carve-out label because it 
overlapped with Novo’s new Orange Book use code, and Caraco’s 
drug now fell under its earlier stipulation of infringement of the ‘358 
patent.396 
Caraco then added a Hatch-Waxman Act counterclaim, seeking an 
order requiring Novo to change its Orange Book use code back from 
U-968 to U-546.397  That counterclaim provision allowed the court to 
order Novo to correct its patent information submitted to the FDA if 
Novo’s ‘358 patent did not claim either “the drug for which the 
application was approved” or “an approved method of using the 
drug.”398  The parties agreed that the ‘358 patent claimed one, and 
only one, of the three approved methods for using Novo’s 
Prandin®.399 
Caraco argued that a Hatch-Waxman Act counterclaim allows 
correction of patent information for any patent that did not claim all 
of the approved methods for using a drug, and the ‘358 patent 
claimed only one use of Prandin®.400  In other words, Caraco argued 
that in providing a counterclaim on a patent that did not claim “an 
approved method of using the drug,” Congress allowed 
                                                          
 389. Id. at 1363, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 390. Id. at 1362–63, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 391. See id. at 1363, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 392. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 393. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
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counterclaims on patents that failed to claim “all approved 
method[s]” of using the drug.401   
The Federal Circuit rejected this reading, reasoning that 
grammatically, “[w]hen an indefinite article is preceded and 
qualified by a negative, standard grammar generally provides that ‘a’ 
means ‘any,’” and therefore “‘an approved method’ means ‘any 
approved method.’”402  The ‘358 patent claimed one of those 
approved methods, and therefore the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 
counterclaim provision did not cover Caraco’s claim.403 
The court added one other point, namely that the Hatch-Waxman 
counterclaim covered only the correction of “patent information” 
submitted to the FDA, which the court narrowly construed to include 
only the patent number and expiration date for a given Orange Book 
listing based on its reading of “patent information” elsewhere in the 
statute as limited to “patent number and expiration.”404  In that sense, 
the court’s construction rejected the notion that the Hatch-Waxman 
counterclaim created a catch-all action for the correction of any 
Orange Book data.405   
Judge Dyk dissented, taking a broader look at the problem sought 
to be addressed by the Hatch-Waxman Act and then reading the 
counterclaim provision accordingly.406  He began by noting that 
Hatch-Waxman was a reaction to the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,407 where the court held that 
plaintiffs could not use declaratory judgment actions to police errors 
in the Orange Book.408  With that as the starting point, Judge Dyk 
believed the counterclaim provision should be read to allow 
correction of Orange Book errors as a means of ending patent 
holders’ manipulation of the Orange Book by associating irrelevant 
patents with certain uses and thus obstructing a generic 
manufacturer’s efforts to bring a cheaper drug to market.409  Judge 
Dyk believed the term “patent information” capable of correction was 
far broader than merely the patent number and expiration date 
claimed by the majority.410  Novo’s U-968 use code did not refer to a 
                                                          
 401. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036 (emphasis added). 
 402. Id. at 1364–65, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036. 
 403. Id. at 1365, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036. 
 404. Id. at 1366, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), 
(c)(2), (j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2006)). 
 405. See Novo Nordisk, 601 F.3d at 1366, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037. 
 406. Id. at 1368–69, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039 (Dyk, J., dissenting).  
 407. 268 F.3d 1323, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1576 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 408. Novo, 601 F.3d at 1370, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 409. See id. at 1373, 1376, 1382, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043, 1045, 1050. 
 410. See id. at 1370–72, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041–42.  
2011] 2010 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 891 
patented use of Prandin®, and thus could be corrected with a 
counterclaim.411 
2.  Pre-trial matters 
a. Res judicata and collateral estoppel 
The Federal Circuit also addressed issues of res judicata (claim 
preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) in 2010.   
In Gillig v. Nike, Inc.,412 an inventor and his company (collectively 
“Triple Tee”) sued Nike on a correction of inventorship claim under  
35 U.S.C. § 356413 and a state law misappropriation of trade secrets 
claim, asserting that Nike had misappropriated Triple Tee’s trade 
secrets for golf club design.414  In an earlier suit, Triple Tee (without 
the inventor as a party) had sued Nike for misappropriation of trade 
secrets alone.415  The district court granted summary judgment to 
Nike in the earlier suit, holding that Triple Tee had no standing to 
assert the trade secret claims because Triple Tee, which had acquired 
ownership rights from the inventor after the alleged 
misappropriation, had no ownership rights to the trade secrets at the 
time they were allegedly misappropriated.416  Since Triple Tee could 
not establish its ownership of the trade secrets, the district court 
dismissed the suit both for lack of standing and on the merits.417   
The Fifth Circuit affirmed.418 
Triple Tee again sued Nike, this time with the inventor as a co-
plaintiff, alleging the same misappropriation of trade secrets claim 
and the new correction of inventorship claim arguing that the 
inventor was the sole inventor or a co-inventor of various Nike golf 
club patents.419  After noting that the district court in the first action 
properly dismissed the first action on the merits, the district court 
likewise dismissed the correction of inventorship claims on res 
judicata grounds as arising from the same nucleus of operative facts 
as the claims brought in the previous action.”420 
                                                          
 411. Id. at 1380, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048. 
 412. 602 F.3d 1354, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 413. 35 U.S.C. § 256 (2006) (allowing for correction of the name of the inventor 
on an issued patent). 
 414. Gillig, 602 F.3d at 1357, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743. 
 415. See Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., No. 4:04-CV-302-A, 2007 WL 4260489, 
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2007), aff’d, 281 F. App’x. 368 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 416. Id. at *14, *26, *28. 
 417. Id. at *28. 
 418. Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 281 F. App’x 368, 368 (5th Cir. 2008)  
(per curiam). 
 419. Gillig, 602 F.3d at 1357, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743. 
 420. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744 (citing Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 
618 F. Supp. 2d 586, 599 (N.D. Tex. 2009)). 
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The Federal Circuit reversed the res judicata ruling on the 
correction of inventorship claims.421  Under Fifth Circuit law, res 
judicata bars actions in which the parties are identical or in privity, 
involving the same claims or causes of action, and when the earlier 
judgment was a final judgment on the merits issued by a court of 
competent jurisdiction.422 
The court first noted that, to the extent the prior action was 
dismissed on lack of standing grounds rather than on the merits of 
the trade secret claims, res judicata does not bar a later action by a 
party with standing.423   
The court also rejected Nike’s argument that the inventor had 
been in privity with Triple Tee in the first action.424  The privity 
argument was based on the fact that the inventor was “an officer and 
the principal owner of Triple Tee.”425  But, the court noted, “control 
of a party to the litigation through stock ownership or corporate 
officership is not enough to create privity, absent a showing that the 
corporate form has been ignored (which is not the case here).”426  
Rather, control of the litigation must be shown, and the court found it 
“doubtful” that the necessary showing had been made here because 
Nike’s assertion that the inventor was the ultimate decision maker for 
the company was inadequate to show control of the litigation.427  In 
any event, the court concluded, it need not decide whether the 
inventor controlled the litigation because that theory of privity only 
applied to collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), not to res judicata 
(claim preclusion).428  Res judicata did not apply because the only 
issue determined in the first lawsuit was the validity of the assignment 
of the trade secret rights of the patent, whereas the second suit 
involved the completely unrelated issue of the inventor’s inventorship 
interest.429   
And in a final point, the court held that Triple Tee, even though a 
party to the first suit, was not barred from bringing inventorship 
claims so long as those claims were based on events occurring during 
the pendency of the first suit.430  Quoting the Second Circuit, the 
court held that “[t]he res judicata doctrine does not apply to new 
                                                          
 421. Id. at 1361, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.  
 422. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746 (quoting Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. 
Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1871 (5th Cir. 2005)). 
 423. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
 424. Id. at 1362, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746–47. 
 425. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
 426. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746–47.  
 427. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.  
 428. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.  
 429. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.  
 430. Id. at 1362–63, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747–48.  
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rights acquired during the action which might have been, but which 
were not, litigated.”431 
The Federal Circuit was faced with the issue of collateral estoppel 
in Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, 
Inc.432  There, Transocean sued Maersk, claiming infringement of 
various patents relating to improvements to an offshore drill.433   
Maersk asserted that Transocean was collaterally estopped from 
bringing the suit because Maersk’s drill was identical to an apparatus 
that a court had previously held to be non-infringing.  In that prior 
suit, in which Transocean brought the same infringement claims and 
succeeded in proving infringement, an injunction required that 
defendant “to install a casing sleeve” on its drill to “avoid[] 
infringement” and to make certain reports to Transocean regarding 
the modified apparatus. 434  Maersk modified its drill to conform to 
the injunction in that other case, but refused to abide by any other 
part of the injunction.435   
The Federal Circuit concluded that Transocean was collaterally 
estopped from bringing its infringement claims against Maersk.436  
After noting that collateral estoppel was analyzed “under the law of 
the regional circuit,” the court applied Fifth Circuit law, which 
requires that an issue “1) be identical in the two actions, 2) have been 
actually litigated in the prior action, and 3) have been necessary to 
the judgment in the prior action” for collateral estoppel to apply. 437    
Focusing on the first requirement, the only requirement in 
dispute, the court held that Maersk satisfied the only condition 
relevant to the issue before the court, the noninfringing design of the 
drill. 438   None of the other portions of the injunction in the other 
case, such as the reporting requirement, related to the infringement, 
and thus Maersk’s refusal to abide by these terms of the injunction 
did not change the infringement analysis or result. 439   Additionally, 
the fact that the other defendant’s apparatus was analyzed under the 
rubric of an injunction had no effect on the infringement 
determination that Maresk’s modified drill did not infringe 
                                                          
 431. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747 (quoting Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. 
Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 370, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1284 (2d Cir. 1997)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 432. 617 F.3d 1296, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 433. Id. at 1300–01, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. 
 434. Id. at 1311, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114. 
 435. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114. 
 436. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114. 
 437. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114. 
 438. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114. 
 439. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114. 
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Transocean’s patents. 440  In both cases, the relevant consideration was 
whether the modified device infringed. 441 
b. Equitable estoppel 
Applying its own law, the Federal Circuit considered equitable 
estoppel in Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc.442  There, Aspex 
wrote a letter informing Clariti of its belief that Clariti was selling 
“magnetic frame attachments” that infringed on Aspex’s ‘747 patent 
and demanding that Clariti cease sales.443  Aspex sent this letter in 
2003, and Clariti did not cease selling its products.444  Aspex took no 
further action on the ‘747 patent until 2006, when it sent another 
letter claiming infringement, this time specifically naming Clariti’s 
AirMag® product as an infringing item.445  Aspex subsequently sued 
for infringement in 2007.446  The district court awarded Clariti 
summary judgment based on equitable estoppel from the three years 
of silence between the letters threatening enforcement.447 
The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding Aspex’s conduct was 
misleading, because  Aspex threatened an infringement suit under 
several patents in 2003 and responded to Clariti’s denial of 
infringement with “silence for three years,” allowing Clariti to 
continue to market the products in the interim.448  Equitable estoppel 
requires a showing that:   
(1) the patentee, through misleading conduct, led the alleged 
infringer to reasonably believe that the patentee did not intend to 
enforce its patent against the infringer; (2) the alleged infringer 
relied on that conduct; and (3) due to its reliance, the alleged 
infringer would be materially prejudiced if the patentee were 
permitted to proceed with its charge of infringement.449   
Moreover, “[m]isleading conduct may include specific statements, 
action, inaction, or silence when there was an obligation to speak.”450   
Although Aspex’s letters did not specify which Clariti products 
were infringing, Aspex’s claim that its patents “may” cover “some” of 
Clariti’s products was sufficiently threatening to invoke the equitable 
                                                          
 440. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114. 
 441. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114. 
 442. 605 F.3d 1305, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 443. Id. at 1308–09, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858. 
 444. Id. at 1309, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858–59. 
 445. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859. 
 446. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859. 
 447. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859. 
 448. Id. at 1310, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859. 
 449. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859 (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides 
Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 450. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859 (quoting A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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estoppel doctrine.451  Thus, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it assessed the parties’ correspondence in its entirety 
and determined that Clariti had reasonably interpreted the 
correspondence between the parties as threat of an infringement 
suit.452  Clariti also reasonably relied on Aspex’s inaction and changed 
its position accordingly.453  Clariti in 2003 had denied infringement 
and demanded a list of claims that Aspex believed were infringed.454  
Aspex provided a list of infringed claims related to other patents, but 
not the ‘747 patent.455  Clariti’s president, in reliance on that inaction, 
decided to expand the AirMag® product line on the perceived 
withdrawal of Aspex’s infringement claims.456  The Federal Circuit 
agreed with the district court that these facts constituted detrimental 
reliance.457   
Judge Rader dissented, arguing that the majority opinion 
expanded equitable estoppel beyond its previously recognized 
bounds.458  To Judge Rader, the case was about silence and whether 
there was a duty for Aspex to speak about its infringement claims.459  
He concluded that there was no duty,460 and argued that the majority 
had misconstrued A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co.,461 
which said that silence “must be combined with other facts respecting 
the relationship or contacts between the parties to give rise to the 
necessary inference that the claim against the defendant is 
abandoned.”462  Aspex’s ‘747 patent letter in 2003 to Clariti was not 
specific enough, in Judge Rader’s view, to create this duty to speak.463  
He also believed that the record failed to reflect any prejudice to 
Clariti because “[m]arketing products, which is all Clariti did here, 
generally does not require the same kind of investment as developing 
and manufacturing products.”464 Finding “lingering questions of fact,” 
Judge Rader deemed this case inappropriate for summary 
judgment.465 
                                                          
 451. Id. at 1310–11, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859–60.  
 452. Id. at 1311, 1314, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860, 1862. 
 453. Id. at 1312, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861. 
 454. Id. at 1309, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858. 
 455. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858. 
 456. Id. at 1311–12, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860. 
 457. Id. at 1312, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861. 
 458. Id. at 1316, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864 (Rader, J., dissenting).   
 459. See id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864 (Rader, J., dissenting).  
 460. Id. at 1317, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.  
 461. 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 462. Aspex Eyewear, 605 F.3d at 1317, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864 (Rader, J., 
dissenting) (quoting A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 463. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 464. Id. at 1318, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 465. Id. at 1319, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866. 
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c. Settlement agreements 
Disputes under patent law can lead to unique issues in interpreting 
release language in a settlement agreement, as seen in 2010 in 
Baseload Energy, Inc. v. Roberts.466  The Federal Circuit applies its own 
law to the question of whether a settlement agreement bars a party 
from later challenging the validity of a patent.467  The court 
concluded that invalidity and unenforceability claims may be released 
in a settlement agreement, but only if the language of the agreement 
is “clear and unambiguous.”468 
Prior to the suit at issue, the parties had unsuccessfully attempted 
to enter into a joint venture, resulting in David Resnick, founder and 
CEO of Baseload, suing Bryan W. Roberts and his company under 
various state law contract claims unrelated to patent invalidity.469  The 
parties settled that dispute.470  The settlement agreement contained a 
release provision releasing Roberts “from any and all losses, liabilities, 
claims, expenses, demands and causes of action of every kind and 
nature . . . .”471  The settlement agreement further included an option 
agreement that, if exercised, would provide Baseload with a 
nonexclusive license to use Roberts’s patent.472  When Baseload let 
the option lapse, it could no longer continue its technology 
development efforts without risk of Roberts bringing an infringement 
action.473  Accordingly, Baseload sought a declaratory judgment that 
the patent was invalid and unenforceable.474  Roberts moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that the settlement agreement’s 
language barred Baseload’s claim.475  The district court granted 
Roberts’s motion, holding that the “unambiguous and expansive 
language” of the settlement agreement barred all claims.476 
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision.477   
The court began by noting that even though Lear, Inc. v. Adkins478 had 
eliminated the doctrine of “licensee estoppel” (thus generally freeing 
                                                          
 466. 619 F.3d 1357, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 467. Id. at 1361, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524. 
 468. Id. at 1361–62, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524. 
 469. Id. at 1358–59, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
 470. Id. at 1359, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
 471. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (emphasis removed). 
 472. Id. at 1360, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523. 
 473. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523. 
 474. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523. 
 475. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523. 
 476. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523 (quoting Baseload Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, 
654 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2009)). 
 477. Id. at 1358, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
 478. 395 U.S. 653, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1969). 
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licensees to challenge patent validity),479 a settlement agreement 
could still “provide for a patent license while barring challenges to 
patent invalidity and unenforceability.”480  Because of the important 
policy concerns expressed in Lear, however, such bars are enforceable 
“only if the language of the agreement or consent decree is clear and 
unambiguous.”481   
Baseload sought further limitations on enforceability, arguing that 
under Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc.,482 such bars are enforceable only if 
the question of invalidity or unenforceability had been actually 
litigated in the prior action that led to the settlement.483  The court 
disagreed, holding that clear and unambiguous language alone is 
sufficient to release an invalidity claim.484   
Nonetheless, applying that standard, the court found the 
settlement agreement did not contain a clear and unambiguous 
release of patent claims or defenses.485  In reaching that conclusion, 
the court noted that the agreement made no reference to patent 
claims and defenses in general or invalidity issues in particular.486  
Moreover, the court observed that the agreement granted Baseload 
an option to acquire a nonexclusive license to the patent, an option 
that would not be necessary if the agreement precluded all future 
infringement claims.487  Baseload was thus essentially arguing that the 
agreement should be understood to treat invalidity claims and 
infringement claims differently, but since the agreement contained 
no language whatsoever pertaining to patent claims or defenses, 
there was certainly nothing to suggest different treatment of invalidity 
and infringement claims.488 
d. Motions for reconsideration 
When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion for 
reconsideration, the Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law.489  
Typically, reconsideration is only justified in the event of “(1) an 
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new 
                                                          
 479. See id. at 670, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 8 (holding that licensee estoppel was 
inconsistent with the “spirit” of contract law, which attempts to balance the claims of 
the parties in line with the principles of good faith). 
 480. Baseload, 619 F.3d at 1361, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524. 
 481. Id. at 1361–62, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1524. 
 482. 238 F.3d 1362, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 483. Baseload, 619 F.3d at 1363, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525. 
 484. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525–26. 
 485. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525. 
 486. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525. 
 487. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525. 
 488. Id. at 1363–64, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525. 
 489. Del. Valley Floral Grp., Inc. v. Shaw Rose Nets, LLC, 597 F.3d 1374, 1379,  
94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1064, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
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evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest 
injustice.”490  Generally when a party seeks to introduce new evidence 
on a motion to reconsider, the party must show that the evidence it 
seeks to admit was not initially available.491 
In Delaware Valley Floral,492 appellant Shaw argued that a post-
judgment declaration by an employee was newly available evidence, 
and thus the district court abused its discretion in denying 
reconsideration.493  The Federal Circuit found no merit to this 
argument, because the evidence did not show that the employee was 
unavailable, but rather that Shaw did not attempt to find the 
employee earlier.494  Next, the court rejected Shaw’s “half-hearted” 
assertion that manifest justice requires reconsideration because the 
new evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact that would 
preclude summary judgment:  “[a] motion for reconsideration 
should not be used as a vehicle to present authorities available at the 
time of the first decision or to reiterate arguments previously 
made.”495  The court thus affirmed the district court’s denial of 
reconsideration.496 
e. Attorney-client privilege and work-product protection 
Issues arising in Shanghai Meihao Electric, Inc. v. Leviton 
Manufacturing Co.497 allowed the court to clarify the relationship 
between the work-product doctrine and an inequitable conduct 
defense.  The general rule is that a party cannot obtain documents 
and items prepared for trial or in anticipation of litigation by another 
party or counsel.498  Such materials may be discovered, however, if 
another party shows “substantial need for the materials to prepare its 
case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial 
equivalent by other means.”499 
In Shanghai Meihao Electric, Meihao asserted an inequitable conduct 
defense against Leviton and issued subpoenas to some of the 
attorneys that had helped Leviton file and prosecute its patent 
                                                          
 490. Id. at 1383, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 491. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. (citing Shuford v. Fid. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 1337, 1345 (11th Cir. 2007)). 
 492. 597 F.3d 1374, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 493. Id. at 1378, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 494. Id. at 1384, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 495. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071 (quoting Z.K. Marine, Inc. v.  
M/V Archigetis, 808 F. Supp. 1561, 1563 (S.D. Fla 1992) (alteration in original)).  
For a discussion of the summary judgment issues presented in this case, see supra 
notes 486–92 and accompanying text.  
 496. Del. Valley Floral, 597 F.3d at 1384, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 497. 606 F.3d 1353, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1432 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 498. Id. at 1365, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)). 
 499. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii)). 
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applications.500  The attorneys did not appear for their scheduled 
depositions, and the attorneys’ firm withdrew from representation of 
Leviton, which then acquired new counsel.501  Following withdrawal, 
two of the subpoenaed attorneys appeared for depositions, where 
they asserted numerous work-product and privilege objections and 
refused to answer many questions on advice of counsel.502  Meihao 
filed motions to compel, but Leviton dismissed the case prior to the 
magistrate judge’s ruling.503  The district court gave Meihao leave to 
move for fees and costs, and later adopted the magistrate judge’s 
finding that Leviton’s inequitable conduct and strategy of vexatious 
litigation justified an award of over one million dollars to Meihao.504 
The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s fee 
award with respect to both inequitable conduct and vexatious 
litigation.505  In doing so, the court was troubled by the district court’s 
treatment of the work-product doctrine.506  The Federal Circuit noted 
that the magistrate judge was correct that exceptions to the work 
product privilege are “very rare,” existing only in “extraordinary 
circumstances.”507  While the magistrate judge may have ultimately 
concluded that Meihao’s requests for discovery satisfied those 
exceptions, Leviton’s arguments to the contrary were not frivolous.508  
Certainly, Leviton was not “required to concede that Meihao satisfied 
the ‘substantial need’ and ‘undue hardship’ exceptions simply 
because a defense of inequitable conduct was raised.”509  Accordingly, 
the district court clearly erred in finding that Leviton’s actions 
amounted to vexatious litigation.510 
f. Discovery 
In 2010, the court resolved two important discovery questions 
pertaining to patent prosecution bars (i.e., an order barring an 
attorney who has access to the opposing party’s confidential 
information during litigation from later participating in patent 
                                                          
 500. Id. at 1356–57, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 501. Id. at 1357, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 502. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435–36. 
 503. Id. at 1358, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436. 
 504. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436. 
 505. Id. at 1365, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442. 
 506. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441. 
 507. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441 (quoting Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 
394, 403 (4th Cir. 1999)).  
 508. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441–42.  
 509. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.  
 510. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.  The court also reversed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment on the inequitable conduct issue, thereby removing 
inequitable conduct as a basis to support the fee award.  See id. at 1364, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1441. 
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prosecution on behalf of his client) and exceptions therefrom.  In re 
Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas511 raised issues of (1) whether regional 
circuit law or Federal Circuit law should apply in deciding whether to 
impose a patent prosecution bar; and (2) what sort of inquiry courts 
should conduct in making that decision.512  Deutsche Bank petitioned 
the court for a writ of mandamus directing the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York to vacate an order exempting the 
opposing party’s lead litigation counsel from a patent prosecution 
bar that applied to other counsel representing that same opposing 
party.513  
At the outset, the court determined that Federal Circuit law should 
apply.514  While the court typically uses regional circuit law for issues 
involving the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Circuit law is 
applied to discovery matters “if the determination implicates an issue 
of substantive patent law.”515  Factors to be considered in deciding 
which law to apply include uniformity in each circuit’s law, 
consistency in outcome of patent litigation, and the nature of the 
issue involved.516  Because the issue—determining whether a 
protective order should deny a lawyer’s access to information because 
of his additional role in patent prosecution or simply bar that 
attorney from representing clients in certain matters before the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)—is specific to patent law, and 
because there is little uniformity among district courts when it comes 
to the application of patent prosecution bars, the court applied 
Federal Circuit law.517 
Next, the court defined the relationship between patent 
prosecution activities and the imposition of a patent prosecution bar.  
As a general matter, imposition of patent prosecution bars (like other 
protective order terms) turns on concerns about inadvertent 
disclosure of information learned through litigation.  Such 
determinations must be made on a counsel-by-counsel basis, and 
should turn on the extent to which counsel is involved in 
“competitive decisionmaking.”518  “Competitive decisionmaking” is 
“[s]horthand for a counsel’s activities, association, and relationship 
with a client that are such as to involve counsel’s advice and 
                                                          
 511. 605 F.3d 1373, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1399 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 512. See id. at 1377, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402. 
 513. Id. at 1375, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400. 
 514. Id. at 1378, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402. 
 515. Id. at 1377, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401. 
 516. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402. 
 517. Id. at 1377–78, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402. 
 518. Id. at 1378, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402 (quoting U.S. Steel Corp. v. United 
States, 730 F.2d 1465, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
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participation in any or all of the client’s decisions (pricing, product 
design, etc.) made in light of similar or corresponding information 
about a competitor.”519 
The court noted that district courts disagree about the extent to 
which patent prosecution activities entail competitive 
decisionmaking, with some courts holding that competitive 
decisionmaking is inherent to patent prosecution, while others have 
ruled instead that patent prosecution does not, by itself, raise an 
inference of an unacceptable risk of inadvertent disclosure.520  Citing 
the wide range of activities performed by patent prosecution 
attorneys, the court rejected a categorical assertion that every such 
attorney is necessarily involved in competitive decisionmaking.521  
Instead, the court ruled, assessing whether an exemption from a 
patent prosecution bar is proper requires an examination of “all 
relevant facts surrounding counsel’s actual preparation and 
prosecution activities, on a counsel-by-counsel basis.”522  
The court set out the legal standard for a party seeking imposition 
of a patent prosecution bar.  That party must show “that the 
information designated to trigger the bar, the scope of activities 
prohibited by the bar, the duration of the bar, and the subject matter 
covered by the bar reasonably reflect the risk presented by the 
disclosure of proprietary competitive information.”523   
In addition, the court put forth the test for a party seeking 
exemption from a patent prosecution bar.  That party must show, on 
a counsel-by-counsel basis 1) that counsel’s representation of the 
client does not and is not likely to involve competitive 
decisionmaking related to the litigation that might raise the 
possibility of accidental use of confidential information acquired 
through the litigation, and 2) that the potential injury from limiting a 
party’s choice of counsel outweighs the potential injury from 
accidental use of confidential information.524 
The court granted Deutsche Bank’s petition for writ of mandamus 
in part and remanded to the district court for reconsideration of its 
exemption order under the new standards set forth in this case.525 
                                                          
 519. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402 (quoting U.S. Steel, 730 F.2d at 1468 n.3). 
 520. See id. at 1379, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403 (comparing district court 
decisions). 
 521. Id. at 1379–80, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403. 
 522. Id. at 1380, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404. 
 523. Id. at 1381, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404. 
 524. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404–05. 
 525. Id. at 1382, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405. 
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g. Rule 11 sanctions 
The Federal Circuit decided two cases in 2010 involving review of a 
district court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.  Rule 11 sanctions are 
warranted when a party files a pleading (1) containing no reasonable 
factual basis; (2) based on a legal theory with no reasonable chance 
of success or without a reasonable argument to change existing law; 
or (3) in bad faith for an inappropriate purpose.526  Rule 11 motions 
“should be served promptly after the inappropriate paper is filed, 
and, if delayed too long, may be viewed as untimely.”527  If a party has 
enough evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment, it has 
sufficient “evidentiary support” for purposes of Rule 11.528  The 
Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law to review of Rule 11 
sanctions.529 
The first case, ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc.,530 involved ruling on 
the timeliness and appropriateness of Rule 11 sanctions in an 
infringement action.531  Soon after ResQNet filed its initial complaint, 
Lansa stated in correspondence with ResQNet that its product did 
not infringe any of the patents mentioned therein.532  In response, 
ResQNet’s attorney stated that two of the patents did not appear to 
be infringed, and thus, unless contrary evidence was discovered going 
forward, ResQNet would remove those two patents from litigation.533  
ResQNet later filed an amended complaint that continued to assert 
infringement of the two patents discussed in the correspondence.534  
Almost three years later, Lansa served a Rule 11 motion on ResQNet, 
and, when ResQNet did not respond within the 21-day period 
following service, filed the Rule 11 motion with the district court.535  
The district court imposed sanctions upon ResQNet and its counsel 
on the ground that it should have withdrawn the two patents from its 
infringement litigation at an early stage of the suit because ResQNet 
had no good faith basis to allege infringement of the two patents 
based on the parties’ correspondence.”536   
                                                          
 526. Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc., 605 F.3d 1319, 1323, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1769, 1771 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 
1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996)). 
 527. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note.  
 528. Id. 
 529. Carter, 605 F.3d at 1323, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. 
 530. 594 F.3d 860, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 531. Id. at 873–76, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563–65. 
 532. Id. at 873, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563. 
 533. Id. at 873–74, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563. 
 534. Id. at 874, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563. 
 535. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564. 
 536. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564. 
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The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s award of sanctions, 
finding the award to be an abuse of discretion.537  At the outset, the 
court noted that one of the two patents had been withdrawn two 
years before the Rule 11 motion was filed, and therefore the motion 
was untimely as to that patent.538  As for the remaining patent, the 
court found that ResQNet explicitly stated that the position of 
noninfringement asserted in the correspondence was based on 
Lansa’s representations, and there had not been discovery on the 
subject.539  Moreover, the district court declined to grant summary 
judgment of noninfringement of the remaining patent, and the issue 
subsequently went to trial, both of which suggested that there was a 
good faith basis for ResQNet to continue pursuing its claims.540   
The second Rule 11 case, Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc.,541 required 
the Federal Circuit to rule on sanctions imposed for advancing 
frivolous claims.  In Carter, a dispute arose over the listing of co-
inventors on a patent application.542  Carter, who claimed he was the 
only inventor, brought fifteen claims—nine purportedly federal 
claims and six state-law claims—against the defendants (including 
one of the named co-inventors and the patent attorney who 
prosecuted the patent) in district court.543  The district court 
dismissed the federal claims for failure to state a claim and declined 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.544  
Next, the district court found sua sponte that three of the federal 
claims were frivolous:  Count I, alleging a violation of the Patent 
Clause of the United States Constitution; Count VIII, alleging breach 
of fiduciary duty by the patent prosecuting attorney; and Count XI, 
alleging a violation of 35 U.S.C. § 122.545  The district court imposed 
sanctions of $30,356.89 against Carter’s counsel.546 
The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding 
two of the three claims frivolous.547  Count I was frivolous, the court 
held, because no legal authority suggests that the Patent Clause 
                                                          
 537. Id. at 876, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565. 
 538. Id. at 875, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564. 
 539. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564. 
 540. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564–65. 
 541. 605 F.3d 1319, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 542. Id. at 1321–22, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770. 
 543. Id. at 1321, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770. 
 544. Id. at 1322, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. 
 545. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. Section 122 requires the Patent and 
Trademark Office to keep patent applications confidential.  35 U.S.C. § 122 (2006).  
Carter contended that the prosecuting attorney violated the statute by listing two 
other persons as co-inventors, and thereafter disclosing the patent application 
subject matter to those two individuals. See Carter, 605 F.3d at 1325, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1773. 
 546. Carter, 605 F.3d at 1322, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. 
 547. Id. at 1326, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
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confers a private cause of action, and Carter’s counsel put forth no 
nonfrivolous argument that the law should be changed accordingly.548  
Next, the court held Count XI frivolous, because 35 U.S.C. § 122 only 
applies to actions by the PTO, and does not create a cause of action 
against the attorney who prosecutes a patent.549 
In contrast, the court ruled that Count VIII, alleging a breach of 
fiduciary duty, was not frivolous.550  The district court had 
characterized Count VIII as an attempt “to manufacture a federal 
cause of action by couching a garden-variety malpractice claim in 
terms of patent law.”551  The Federal Circuit applied the Christianson 
test for jurisdiction, asking whether the state law claim sufficiently 
incorporates a patent question so as to create federal jurisdiction.552  
The court concluded that because the patent prosecuting attorney’s 
compliance with the MPEP and CFR was a necessary element of the 
claim, the claim “involves a substantial question of federal patent law 
and is not frivolous.”553  The court remanded to determine whether 
sanctions should be imposed for the two frivolous claims, noting that 
the district court’s primary concern in imposing sanctions below 
appeared to have been Carter’s perceived attempt in Count VIII to 
disguise a state-law malpractice claim as a federal claim.554 
h. Choice of law 
The past term presented the court with thorny choice-of-law 
questions involving successor liability issues among domestic 
subsidiaries of a foreign corporation.   
In Funai Electric Co. v. Daewoo Electronics Corp.,555 the patentee sued 
four Daewoo entities, Daewoo Electronics Corporation (“DEC,” a 
South Korea corporation), DEC’s predecessor, Daewoo Electronics 
Company, Ltd. (“DECL,” also a South Korean entity), and their U.S. 
subsidiaries, Daewoo Electronics America, Inc. (“DEAM,” a Florida 
corporation), and its predecessor Daewoo Electronics Company of 
American (“DECA,” a California corporation).556  DECL and DECA 
did not defend, and the court entered a default judgment against 
                                                          
 548. Id. at 1325, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 549. Id. at 1326, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.  Section 122(a) provides that 
“applications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the Patent and Trademark 
Office.”  35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (2006). 
 550. Carter, 605 F.3d at 1325, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 551. Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2007).  
 552. See supra notes 340–41 and accompanying text. 
 553. Carter, 605 F.3d at 1325, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 554. Id. at 1326, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 555. 616 F.3d 1357, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 556. Id. at 1362, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. 
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those entities in the amount of $8,066,112.557  Funai then sought the 
right to collect that judgment against the respective successor 
corporations (DEC and DEAM), and to pursue independent 
infringement claims against those entities.558   
The district court determined that under choice of law principles, 
the successor liability question would be determined by South Korean 
law, which did not allow successor liability on a claim unless the 
successor company expressly assumed liability by contract.559  The 
district court held that this was true even as to the U.S. subsidiaries 
because the transfer of operations from one U.S. subsidiary to the 
other had been an “outgrowth” of the transfer between the parent 
Korean corporations, which had occurred as a result of a contract 
entered into in Korea. 560 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit revisited the choice of law issue.  
Funai asserted on appeal that as between the two American 
subsidiaries, United States law, not foreign law, should govern.561  
Funai argued that “the question is not of interpretation and 
enforcement of the Korean contract between the Korean companies 
[i.e., the parent companies], but enforcement of a United States 
judgment against United States companies . . . .”562 
The Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s determination that 
because the plaintiff, Funai, was a foreign company, no state had an 
interest in applying its own law.563  According to the court, “it is 
fundamental to the rule of law that courts are open to native and 
alien alike, when affected by a violation of United States law.”564  
Moreover, when entities doing business in the United States violate 
United States law, the United States has an “overriding interest in the 
integrity of judgments of its courts . . . .”565  With respect to successor 
liability in particular, the court concluded that “[t]his is not a 
question of conflict with foreign law, or choice between domestic and 
foreign law, for no foreign law is involved in this question of 
                                                          
 557. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. 
 558. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. 
 559. See id. at 1377–78, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345 (applying South Korean law 
to find that there was no successor liability). 
 560. Id. at 1378, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 561. Id. at 1378, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.  The parties did not dispute that 
South Korean law governed the successor liability issue as between the two South 
Korean entities (DEC and DECL), so the court did not consider that issue.  Id. at 
1379, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.   
 562. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 563. See id. at 1379, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. 
 564. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 565. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. 
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successor liability for a default judgment for violation of United States 
law.”566 
Having decided that foreign law did not control, the court then 
turned to the question of which State’s law would govern the 
successor liability issue.567  The court began with the choice of law 
rules of the forum in which the case was pending, California.568  
California uses a three-step analysis for conflict-of-law 
determinations.569  First, the court must determine whether the laws 
of the states in question are materially different.570  If so, the second 
step is for the court to determine each state’s interest in having its law 
applied.571  If both the laws of the states are materially different and 
each state has an interest in having its own law applied, then the 
court applies the third step of selecting the law of the state whose 
interests would be “more impaired” if its law were not applied.572 
The court applied this test and determined that New Jersey law 
would govern.573  DEAM is incorporated in Florida with its principal 
place of business in New Jersey, while DECA is incorporated in 
California with its principal place of business in New Jersey.574  None 
of the parties argued that there was any material difference between 
the applicable laws of California, Florida, or New Jersey.575  The court 
also noted that the Supreme Court had recently held in Hertz Corp. v. 
Friend576 that the laws of the principal place of business should 
normally apply to transactions flowing from the corporation’s “nerve 
center,”577 and New Jersey meets these criteria for both 
corporations.578 
i. Attorney disqualification 
In one case this year, Ring Plus, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless Corp.,579 the 
Federal Circuit encountered a party seeking to disqualify opposing 
                                                          
 566. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. 
 567. Id. at 1379–80, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. 
 568. Id. at 1380, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. 
 569. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340. 
 570. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. (citing Wa. Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior 
Court, 15 P.3d 1071, 1080 (Cal. 2001)). 
 571. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. (quoting Wa. Mut. Bank, 15 P.3d at 1080). 
 572. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. (quoting Wa. Mut. Bank, 15 P.3d at 1081). 
 573. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346–47. 
 574. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. 
 575. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. 
 576. 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010). 
 577. Id. at 1192 (holding that the principal place of business is “where a 
corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities”). 
 578. Funai, 616 F.3d at 1380, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347 (quoting Hertz, 130  
S. Ct. at 1195). 
 579. 614 F.3d 1354, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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counsel.580  As with many procedural issues, the court applies regional 
circuit law when reviewing attorney disqualification decisions.581  In 
the Fifth Circuit, where Ring Plus arose, applicable rules of 
professional conduct are viewed 
in light of the litigant’s rights and the public interest, considering 
whether a conflict has (1) the appearance of impropriety in 
general, or (2) a possibility that a specific impropriety will occur, 
and (3) the likelihood of public suspicion from the impropriety 
outweighs any social interests which will be served by the lawyer’s 
continued participation in the case.582 
Here, a person named Garretson emailed Cingular’s attorneys 
from his personal address, explaining his involvement with one of 
Ring Plus’s patents and his desire to pass on information to Cingular 
about the patent.583  Counsel for Cingular called counsel for Ring Plus 
to discern whether Garretson was affiliated with Ring Plus.584  The 
parties dispute what was said in that conversation, but counsel for 
Cingular sent a letter to Ring Plus’s counsel to memorialize his 
understanding from the phone conversation that Garretson was not a 
Ring Plus affiliate.585  Cingular’s counsel then responded to 
Garretson’s email, confirmed his representation of Cingular, and 
proposed scheduling Garretson’s deposition.586  Counsel for Cingular 
asked opposing counsel if Ring Plus would accept service of Mr. 
Garretson’s subpoena for deposition, but opposing counsel claimed 
not to represent Mr. Garretson.587  After Mr. Garretson’s deposition, 
Ring Plus moved to disqualify Cingular’s counsel, alleging violation of 
Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 4.02 and ABA Model 
Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2, which prohibit communication 
with any person “the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer regarding that subject.”588  Applying the Horaist factors, the 
district court denied Ring Plus’s motion to disqualify Cingular’s 
counsel.589 
                                                          
 580. Id. at 1357, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022. 
 581. See id. at 1365, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030 (applying Fifth Circuit law). 
 582. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030 (quoting Horaist v. Doctor’s Hosp. of 
Opelousas, 255 F.3d 261, 266 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
 583. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 584. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 585. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 586. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 587. Id. at 1365–66, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 588. Id. at 1366, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2010); TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.02 (1989), MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2010)). 
 589. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
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The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the 
motion to disqualify.590  Nothing in the initial emails showed that Mr. 
Garretson was affiliated with Ring Plus.591  Similarly, the court found 
nothing in opposing counsel’s behavior to suggest to counsel for 
Cingular that Mr. Garretson was so affiliated.592  The court also 
rejected Ring Plus’s argument that a 2007 privilege log showing a 
2006 communication between Mr. Garretson and a Ring Plus 
attorney put Cingular’s counsel on notice of his affiliation, reasoning 
that it only tended to show a prior affiliation.593  Finally, the court 
disagreed with Ring Plus’s assertion that the district court incorrectly 
applied the Horaist factors, agreeing with the district court that there 
was no appearance of impropriety on behalf of Cingular’s counsel, 
no danger of “specific impropriety” since “Garretson’s deposition 
showed he had no relevant information, and a low risk of “public 
suspicion.”594 
3. Trial 
a. Right to jury trial 
The court heard one fairly easy case this year involving an untimely 
demand for a jury trial.  The discretion afforded a district court to 
grant an untimely demand for a jury trial under Rule 39(b) is 
“narrow,” the court held, and may not be invoked to provide relief in 
cases of “oversight or inadvertence.”595  Under Rule 38(b), a proper 
demand for a jury trial must be served “no later than 10 days after the 
last pleading directed to the issue is served.”596 
In Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc.,597 Richardson argued that he was 
entitled to a jury trial on his infringement claim against Stanley.598  
Applying Ninth Circuit law, the court rejected Richardson’s 
argument that his jury demand was proper under Rule 38(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.599  Because Richardson’s answer was 
“the last pleading directed to any issue triable of right by a jury in this 
                                                          
 590. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 591. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 592. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030–31. 
 593. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031. 
 594. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031. 
 595. Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1297, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1937, 1942 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 596. Id. at 1296–97, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b), 
585 F.3d 1399 (11th Cir. 2009); Effective December 1, 2009, Rule 38(b) has been 
amended to provide the parties fourteen days to make a demand for a jury trial.  FED. 
R. CIV. P. 38(b). 
 597. 597 F.3d 1288, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1937 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 598. Id. at 1296, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941–42. 
 599. Id. at 1297, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
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case,”600 and the answer was filed more than ten days before 
Richardson served his jury demand, the court found the demand 
untimely.601  Prior to filing an answer, Stanley moved to dismiss, and 
that motion was still pending when Richardson served his jury 
demand.602  The court disagreed with Richardson’s use of United States 
v. Anderson603 to support his proposition that the “last pleading” for 
purposes of Rule 38(b) is not deemed filed until any motion 
attacking the pleadings is decided.604  Anderson is inapposite, the court 
ruled, because it did not involve a defendant who filed a motion to 
dismiss prior to filing an answer.605  Finally, the court upheld the 
district court’s refusal to grant Richardson’s untimely demand under 
Rule 39(b), noting the narrow discretion granted to courts by the 
Rule.606 
b. Evidentiary rulings 
The Federal Circuit rarely reverses a district court’s evidentiary 
rulings, and 2010 was no different.  In SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & 
Co.,607 the district court allowed the plaintiff’s expert to testify despite 
defendant’s objections.608  Defendant argued that, since the expert 
“lacked expertise in the art of designing deep fryers,” the district 
court abused its discretion in allowing him to testify.609  Showing clear 
deference, the Federal Circuit held that the district court had not 
abused its discretion.610  SEB’s expert worked in the PTO for thirty-
one years, and he explained that his work with a certain polymer 
material that was the same as that in the deep fryer permitted him to 
testify as an expert witness.611  In addition, the expert testified not 
about deep frying in itself, but about a more specialized process that 
was related to the district court’s claim construction.612  The court also 
rejected defendant’s reliance upon Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte 
                                                          
 600. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942 (citing Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 
No. CV-08-1040 PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 383554, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 13, 2009)). 
 601. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942 (citing Richardson, 2009 WL 383554, at *1). 
 602. Id. at 1292, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940. 
 603. 584 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1978). 
 604. Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1297 n.2, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943. 
 605. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943; (citing Anderson, 584 F.2d at 372). 
 606. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.  Rule 39(b) provides “Issues on which a 
jury trial is not properly demanded are to be tried by the court.  But the court may, 
on motion, order a jury trial on any issue for which a jury might have been 
demanded.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 39(b). 
 607. 594 F.3d 1360, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 608. Id. at 1372, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 609. Id. at 1372–73, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625. 
 610. Id. at 1373, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625. 
 611. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625. 
 612. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625–26. 
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Fabricating Ltd.,613 where the Federal Circuit found an abuse of 
discretion when the district court admitted an expert “[d]espite the 
absence of any suggestion of relevant technical expertise.”614  Here, in 
contrast, SEB’s expert had sufficient relevant technical expertise to 
testify.615 
Another 2010 case presenting a challenge to a district court’s 
admission of expert testimony was i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft 
Corp.616  Microsoft appealed the admission of i4i’s expert on damages, 
challenging the expert’s royalty calculation.617  Affirming the district 
court’s admission, the Federal Circuit concluded that Microsoft’s 
objections were to the expert’s conclusions, not his methodology, 
and such objections go to the weight of his opinion, not its 
admissibility.618  In addition, the expert’s opinion was “based on 
sufficient facts or data” under Rule 702.619  Finally, the court noted 
that Microsoft had every opportunity to cross-examine i4i’s expert 
and present its own expert testimony, which is the proper way to 
attack “shaky but admissible evidence.”620   
The court also rejected a second evidentiary appeal from 
Microsoft, which argued that the survey used to estimate the amount 
of Microsoft’s infringing use was inadmissible under Rule 403 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.621  The Federal Circuit held that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the survey 
because i4i’s experts testified that the survey dramatically 
underestimated the infringing use, the survey was relevant to i4i’s 
damage calculation, and evidence about the survey’s methodology 
and findings could help the jury evaluate the expert testimony.622 
c. Verdict forms 
In 2010, the Federal Circuit addressed inconsistent jury verdicts, 
which, like many other issues of procedure, the court reviews under 
                                                          
 613. 550 F.3d 1356, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1535 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 614. SEB, 594 F.3d at 1373, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626 (quoting Sundance, 550 
F.3d at 1361, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1538–39). 
 615. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626. 
 616. 598 F.3d 831, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 617. Id. at 852–53, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959–60.  
 618. Id. at 854, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960–61. 
 619. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1961 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702). 
 620. Id. at 856, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1962 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 578, 596, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1200, 1207 (1993)).  
 621. Id. at 856, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1962.  Rule 403 provides:  “although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 622. i4i, 598 F.3d at 856, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1962. 
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regional circuit law.623  In Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc.,624 the jury found 
two independent patent claims were not obvious;625 however, the jury 
also invalidated as obvious three claims that depended on the two 
nonobvious claims.626  Noting that “[a] broader independent claim 
cannot be nonobvious where a dependent claim stemming from that 
independent claim is invalid for obviousness,” the court upheld the 
district court’s finding of inconsistent verdicts.627  The court rejected 
Comaper’s contention that Antec waived its right to challenge the 
inconsistent verdicts by failing to raise an objection prior to jury 
dismissal because the jury returned a special verdict and circuit law 
did not require a contemporaneous objection to a special verdict in 
order to preserve the right to appeal inconsistent verdicts.628  In the 
Third Circuit, where Comaper originated, if a district court is 
presented with inconsistent verdicts, and the evidence would support 
either of them, the district court must order a new trial.629  Instead of 
granting a new trial, the district court had held that the evidence 
could not support a finding that the three dependent claims were 
obvious, and granted Comaper’s renewed motion for judgment as a 
matter of law.630  The Federal Circuit disagreed with the trial court on 
this issue, finding that the evidence could support either verdict, and 
remanded for a new trial on the issue of invalidity.631 
In 2010, the Federal Circuit also reinforced the district court’s 
discretion in interpreting ambiguous verdict forms.  In Telcordia 
Technologies, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,632 the Federal Circuit held that 
the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the jury 
compensated a party only for past infringement where the verdict 
form was unclear regarding whether a damages award compensates a 
party for past and ongoing infringement or merely past 
infringement.633  The verdict form in Telcordia asked the jury to 
“identify the amount of monetary damages that will compensate 
Telcordia for Cisco’s infringement.”634  The jury entered a verdict for 
                                                          
 623. EMI Grp. N. Am., Inc., v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1348, 
60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1423, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  
 624. 596 F.3d 1343, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 625. Id. at 1349, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 626. Id. at 1349–50, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 627. Id. at 1350, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1344, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1705, 1715 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 628. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 629. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 630. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 631. Id. at 1345, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 632. 612 F.3d 1368, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 633.  Id.  at 1377–78, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 634. Id.  at 1378, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.  
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$6,500,000, but the form was unclear regarding whether this amount 
was for both past and ongoing infringement.635  The district court 
found that the award compensated only past infringement and 
ordered the parties to negotiate a royalty rate to cover post-judgment 
sales.636 
     Based on the evidence in the record, including three sets of 
damages numbers, none of which equaled $6,500,000, the Federal 
Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
interpreting the verdict form.637  The panel noted that “[d]istrict 
courts have broad discretion to interpret an ambiguous verdict form, 
because district courts witness and participate directly in the jury trial 
process.”638  Thus, “[i]n the absence of an express statement in the 
verdict, [the Federal Circuit] cannot determine whether the jury 
compensated Telcordia for all of Cisco’s infringing activities.”639 
4. Post-trial matters 
a. Post-trial motions under Rule 50, 52, and 59 
The denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) is 
reviewed under regional circuit law.640  In Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai 
Motor America,641 the district court determined that Hyundai waived its 
right to JMOL by failing to make a proper motion under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) before submission to the jury.642  
Although Hyundai’s purported Rule 50(a) motion—two sentences in 
the middle of a discussion on jury instructions—was “insufficient” 
and “cursory” in itself, the court looked to the context, including 
previous discussions, the trial transcript, and the final jury 
instructions, in holding that the request for a “partial judgment as a 
matter of law” was sufficient under the Fifth Circuit’s “liberal” 
construction of Rule 50(a).643  Finally, the court reversed the district 
court’s denial of Hyundai’s post-verdict JMOL on the issue of 
anticipation, holding that “a reasonable jury would not have a legally 
                                                          
 635.  Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 636.  Id.  at 1367, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675. 
 637.  Id.  at 1379, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 638. Id.  at 1378, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 639. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 640. Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 605 F.3d 967, 973, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 507 
F.3d 1340, 1346, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 641. 605 F.3d 967, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 642. Id. at 973, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1300. 
 643. Id. at 973–74, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1300. 
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sufficient evidentiary basis to find that the claims at issue were not 
anticipated.”644   
The Federal Circuit also had the opportunity this past year to 
consider the implications of failing to file post-trial motions.  In  
i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.,645 the jury had found that 
Microsoft infringed, and had awarded $200 million in damages on a 
reasonable royalty theory.  On appeal, Microsoft sought to challenge 
the sufficiency of the evidence regarding damages.646  But the court 
found that the procedural posture of the case limited its ability to 
consider the issue.647  In particular, the court noted that Microsoft 
had failed to file a pre-verdict JMOL motion challenging the 
sufficiency of the damages’ evidence.  According to the court, “[o]n 
appeal, what that strategic decision means for Microsoft is that we 
cannot decide whether there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the 
jury’s damages award.”648  Instead, the court found that it was 
“constrained to review the verdict under the much narrower standard 
applied to denials of new trial motions.”649  Under that standard, the 
court could overturn the verdict only upon a clear showing of 
excessiveness, which in turn required Microsoft to clearly show that 
there was no evidence to support the jury’s damages award.650 
b. Costs 
In Shum v. Intel Corp.,651 the court settled the question of who is a 
“prevailing party” for the purposes of awarding costs under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1).652  Shum had filed multiple claims 
against a former business partner and Intel, alleging correction of 
inventorship and various state law claims concerning intellectual 
property rights developed with the former business partner, 
including a claim for $409 million in damages.653  In the district court 
Shum succeeded in only one aspect—he won his correction of 
inventorship claims for most of the patents-in-suit—but recovered no 
money.654 Both parties filed for costs under Rule 54(d)(1).655  The 
district court concluded that the defendants were the “prevailing 
                                                          
 644. Id. at 977–78, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.   
 645.  598 F.2d 831, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 646.  Id. at 857, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1962. 
 647.  Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1962 (citing Lucent, 580 F.3d at 132, 92 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577). 
 648. Id.,  93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1962. 
 649. Id.,  93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1962–63. 
 650. Id.,  93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1962–63. 
 651. 629 F.3d 1360, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1528 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 652. Id. at 1367, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.  
 653. Id. at 1363, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.  
 654. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529. 
 655. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530. 
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parties” and awarded each party the costs associated with the claims 
they won.656  The award netted to $134,368 for the defendants.657  
Shum appealed.658 
The Federal Circuit held that only one side could be the prevailing 
party under Rule 54, and here the defendants were the prevailing 
party, a question governed by Federal Circuit law.659  The court 
looked only to the text and Congress’s use of the singular “party” 
preceded by the definite article “the.”660  Those word choices meant 
only one party could prevail in the case.661  The difficulty was in 
choosing the prevailing party in a mixed judgment case.662  The court 
held that while a party was not required to win on every claim, it was 
required to obtain some relief that “must materially alter the legal 
relationship between the parties by modifying one party’s behavior in 
a way that ‘directly benefits’ the opposing party.”663  Based on this 
reasoning, Shum’s relief was insufficient because he did not recover 
any money.664  Moreover, his success on the correction of 
inventorship claims did little to change the legal relationship with the 
defendants because it gave him no greater rights than what he had 
already obtained through an agreement with his former business 
partner.665 
Judge Newman dissented, arguing that “[b]y every measure Shum 
is the prevailing party” because the defendants lost exclusive 
ownership of the patents.666  As a result, “Shum is now assured that he 
and his transferees cannot be sued on these patents, and that his 
right to practice and to grant licenses to the patented subject matter 
is not subject to challenge.”667  Regarding costs, the district court, at a 
minimum, should have awarded “no costs,” which Judge Newman 
viewed as the common practice when both parties lose important 
aspects of the case.668 
                                                          
 656. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529. 
 657. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530.   
 658. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530. 
 659. Id. at 1367, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.  
 660. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532. 
 661. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.   
 662. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.   
 663. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532–33.  
 664. Id. at 1369, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.  
 665. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534.  
 666. Id. at 1372–73, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535 (Newman, J., dissenting).  
 667. Id. 1373, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1536.  
 668. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1537.  
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B. Federal Circuit Practice 
1. Appellate jurisdiction 
Because the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction669 in large part depends 
on the district court’s proper exercise of exclusive patent 
jurisdiction,670 most appellate jurisdiction issues concern the question 
of whether the district court had patent jurisdiction to hear the case.  
Cases on that point are discussed above.671  The following cases 
concern other aspects of appellate jurisdiction. 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson, & Co.672 presented an issue of 
the court’s jurisdiction over a cross-appeal.673  Below, a jury found that 
Becton infringed two of Therasense’s claims, but that both claims 
were invalid.674  Judgment was thus entered in Becton’s favor on all 
counts.675  Regardless, Becton filed a cross-appeal against one of the 
jury’s findings.676  The court dismissed the cross-appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction because a cross-appeal is proper only when “acceptance 
of the argument [the party] wishes to advance would result in a 
reversal or modification of the judgment rather than an 
affirmance.”677 
In another case presenting a significant question of the court’s 
appellate jurisdiction, Avid Identification Systems v. Crystal Import 
Corp.,678 the issues centered on whether the terms of a settlement 
agreement between the parties eliminated the existence of a case or 
controversy.679  Specifically, Crystal agreed that it would not directly 
oppose Avid’s motion for reconsideration of the district court’s 
finding of inequitable conduct and not contest the standing, 
jurisdiction, mootness, or case and controversy requirements of the 
inequitable conduct decision on appeal to the Federal Circuit.680  The 
court nonetheless scrutinized its ability to hear the case, noting that it 
must always address its own jurisdiction sua sponte even if the parties 
themselves do not raise the question of jurisdiction.681  Because 
                                                          
 669. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006). 
 670. Id. § 1338. 
 671. See supra notes 220–73 and accompanying text.  
 672. 593 F.3d 1325, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 673. Id. at 1328, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 674. Id. at 1330, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 675. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 676. Id. at 1337, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 677. Id. at 1337, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489 (quoting Bailey v. Dart Container 
Corp. of Mich., 292 F.3d 1360, 1362, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1319, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 
2002)). 
 678. 603 F.3d 967, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1845 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 679. Id. at 971–72, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848–49. 
 680. Id. at 970–71, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848. 
 681. Id. at 971, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848. 
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Crystal was still free to oppose Avid’s motion on the merits on appeal, 
the court found “[a] live controversy [between the parties] still exists 
because [the competitor] remained free under the settlement 
agreement to oppose this appeal on the merits.”682  The panel also 
dismissed the significance of the competitor’s failure to file a brief on 
appeal and the fact that the amount at stake on appeal—the jury’s 
infringement award of $26,981—was de minimis compared to the 
other sums awarded in the case.683 
2. Waiver and preservation of error 
Taylor Brands, LLC v. GB II Corp.684 dealt with the unusual 
argument, rejected by the Federal Circuit, that an agreement on the 
form of a final judgment order amounts to an agreement on the 
substance of the order such that the appellant waived its right to 
appeal.685  Taylor Brands sued GB II for infringement.686  GB II 
obtained partial summary judgment, and, in order to obtain a final 
appealable order, the parties stipulated to a final judgment that the 
district court subsequently entered.687  Taylor Brands appealed, and 
GB II moved to dismiss, arguing that Taylor Brands, by agreeing to 
the stipulated order, waived its appellate rights.688  
The Federal Circuit rejected GB II’s argument, recognizing that 
the case turned on the “distinction between consenting to the 
substance of a judgment (i.e., agreeing as to what the substantive 
outcome of the judgment will be) and merely consenting to the 
judgment’s form (including agreeing that the judgment will be final 
instead of interlocutory).”689  In this case, Taylor Brands gave no 
indication that it was consenting to the substance of the judgment.690  
The absence of an express reservation of appellate rights did not 
change the result “because merely agreeing to the form of a 
judgment does not in itself imply that the party agrees with the 
judgment’s substantive outcome or intends to abandon its position 
on the issues.”691  The Federal Circuit found that this case was thus 
unlike those in which parties agreed to the entry of a final judgment 
based on a settlement agreement or a voluntary dismissal, “both of 
                                                          
 682. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.  
 683. Id. at 972, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849. 
 684. 627 F.3d 874, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 685. Id. at 876–77, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152. 
 686. Id. at 875, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151. 
 687. Id. at 876, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151–52. 
 688. Id. at 876–77, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152. 
 689. Id. at 878–79, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1153. 
 690. Id. at 879, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1153–54. 
 691. Id. at 878, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1153. 
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which necessarily imply a party’s consent to the substantive outcome” 
of the case.692693  
In Fujifilm Corp. v. Benun694 the court considered Fuji’s assertion 
that defendants had waived two of their arguments on appeal.695  First, 
defendants included an argument about patent exhaustion in a Rule 
50(b) motion that they did not also include in an earlier Rule 50(a) 
motion for JMOL.696  Ordinarily, this exclusion would preclude 
raising the objection in the Rule 50(b) motion,697 but Fuji failed to 
timely object, and thus the court found defendants did not waive 
their exhaustion argument.698  Second, defendants made an estoppel 
argument on appeal that was not raised in either defendants’ Rule 
50(a) or Rule 50(b) motions.699  The court found waiver because Fuji 
lacked notice that defendants were maintaining the argument 
beyond their pre-trial motions, and thus Fuji’s objection could not be 
untimely.700 
C. Patent and Trademark Office Practice 
In Hyatt v. Kappos,701 the en banc court clarified the limitations on 
introducing new evidence in § 145 civil actions.”702  The Patent Act 
affords “a patent applicant who is dissatisfied with the decision of the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences . . . regarding his 
application”703 to have a federal district court decide whether he  
“is entitled to receive a patent for his invention . . . as the facts in the 
case may appear.”704  After an extensive review of the legislative and 
drafting history, the court held that “§ 145 imposes no limitation on 
an applicant’s right to introduce new evidence before the district 
                                                          
 692. Id. at 878–79, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1153. 
 693. The case also involved another odd appellate issue.  The trial court had 
denied defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees.  The plaintiff, though, sought to 
appeal this issue (on which it had won).  Id. at 877, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.  In 
a straightforward ruling, the Federal Circuit held that, because the plaintiff was not 
aggrieved by the trial court’s order, it did not have standing to appeal.  Id. at 880, 97 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 694. 605 F.3d 1366, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 839 (2010). 
 695. Id. at 1371, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988. 
 696. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988. 
 697. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (specifying that a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict must follow an initial motion for directed verdict). 
 698. Fujifilm, 605 F.3d at 1371, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988.  Fuji also argued that 
defendants waived the exhaustion argument by consenting to jury instructions, but 
that argument was also untimely.  Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988. 
 699. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988. 
 700. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988. 
 701. 625 F.3d 1320, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 702. Id. at 1322, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843. 
 703. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843. 
 704. 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2006). 
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court, apart from the evidentiary limitations applicable to all civil 
actions contained in the [federal rules].”705 
Hyatt, representing himself pro se, filed a patent application, but 
an examiner for the PTO rejected all of Hyatt’s claims.706  Hyatt 
appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which 
reversed many, but not all, of the examiner’s rejections.707  Hyatt then 
filed a civil action in the District of Columbia against the Director of 
the Patent Office pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145.708  Hyatt sought to 
introduce a declaration in the § 145 action that he could have, but 
did not, introduce in the proceedings before the PTO.709  The district 
court held that it could not consider the declaration because Hyatt’s 
failure to submit it to the PTO was negligent, and “the district court 
need not consider evidence negligently submitted after the end of 
administrative proceedings.”710  A divided Federal Circuit panel 
affirmed,711 but the court vacated that decision and chose to hear the 
case en banc.712 
The en banc majority considered the legislative and drafting 
history of 35 U.S.C. § 145 and concluded that the provision was 
meant to allow patent applicants to introduce new evidence before a 
district court, regardless of whether that evidence was also presented 
to the PTO.713  Focusing on the 1927 amendments to the patent 
application process, the court recognized that both proponents and 
opponents of retaining the civil action in 35 U.S.C. § 145 recognized 
that this provision imposed no limitation on introducing new 
evidence.714  Proponents argued that “an applicant’s right to 
introduce evidence that had not been before the Patent Office 
created a truly distinct, and therefore valuable, alternative to an on-
the-record appeal.”715  Opponents disapproved of the provision 
precisely because a § 145 action allowed an applicant to introduce 
new evidence to the district court.716  The § 145 action survived, 
however, thus indicating that it was understood at the time to allow 
                                                          
 705. Kappos, 625 F.3d at 1323, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843. 
 706. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844. 
 707. Id. at 1323–24, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844. 
 708. Id. at 1324, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844. 
 709. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845. 
 710. Id. at 1324–25, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845 (quoting Hyatt v. Dudas, No. 03-
0901(HHK), 2005 WL 5569663, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2005)).   
 711. Hyatt v. Doll, 576 F.3d 1246, 1246–48, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1866 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) rev’d en banc sub nom. Kappos, 625 F.3d at 1320, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1841. 
 712. Kappos, 625 F.3d at 1325, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845. 
 713. Id. at 1326–31, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846–50. 
 714. Id. at 1328–30, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847–49. 
 715. Id. at 1328, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848. 
 716. Id. at 1329, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848. 
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the unfettered introduction of new evidence in a § 145 proceeding 
before the district court.717 
The district court also rejected the PTO’s arguments for a more 
limited right to introduce new evidence, the most significant of which 
was based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan v. Daniels,718 
and its characterization of a § 194 action as “something in the nature 
of a suit to set aside a judgment.”719  Those sorts of actions, the PTO 
argued, traditionally did not allow the introduction of new 
evidence.720  The en banc court disagreed, viewing Morgan as “a case 
about what standard of review ought to apply when the district court 
decides whether an applicant is entitled to a patent on exactly the 
same record that was before the Patent Office.”721  So when the 
petitioner relies solely on the record before the court and introduces 
no new evidence in a § 145 action, “the district court reviews the 
Patent Office fact findings for substantial evidence (i.e., according to 
the court/agency standard of review).”722  But when the applicant 
offers new evidence in the district court, “the court acts as a 
factfinder with respect to that new evidence and would make de novo 
fact findings if the evidence conflicts with any related Patent Office 
finding.”723  These “dual standards of review,” the majority held, 
would “maintain an appropriate level of deference to agency 
findings, while preserving to the court its role as factfinder with 
respect to new evidence.”724  The majority lastly noted that although it 
rejected limitations on admissibility, the court was free to consider 
the proceedings before the PTO in assessing the weight of the new 
evidence.”725 
The principal dissent came from Judge Dyk, joined by Judge 
Gajarsa.726  They argued that the Administrative Procedure Act 
provided the appropriate standard of review, and it “permits 
supplementation in court only when agency procedures are 
inadequate.”727  The only inadequacy of the PTO’s procedure, 
according to the dissent, was the failure to allow live testimony 
concerning an application.728  In that sense, § 145 contemplates live 
                                                          
 717. Id. at 1330–31, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849–50. 
 718. 153 U.S. 120 (1894). 
 719. Id. at 124. 
 720. Hyatt v. Dudas, No. 03-0901(HHK), 2005 WL 5569663, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 30. 
2005).   
 721. Kappos, 625 F.3d at 1332, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850–51. 
 722. Id. at 1341, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851.  
 723. Id. at 1336, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854. 
 724. Id. at 1337, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854. 
 725. Id. at 1335, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851–52.  
 726. Id. at 1341, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 727. Id. at 1342, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857. 
 728. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857. 
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testimony in the district court because live testimony cannot be 
submitted to the PTO but “does not provide for a trial de novo or 
excuse the applicant from submitting affidavit evidence to the 
PTO.”729  The dissent went on to offer its own analysis of the 
legislative and drafting history, finding support for its position and 
reasons for rejecting the majority’s opinion.730  In concluding its 
views, the dissent recognized the risk of allowing patent applicants to 
save their evidence for introduction before the district court.731  “[I]t 
is not somehow fantastic,” Judge Dyk wrote, “to imagine that 
applicants will elect to bypass the PTO in favor of a second bite at the 
apple in the district court,” and “[t]hey will do so exactly in those 
circumstances where an expert agency would reject the evidence but 
a non-expert district court might be convinced to accept it.”732 
D. International Trade Commission 
Although Federal Circuit judges did not dispute the appropriate 
standard of review for International Trade Commission (ITC) 
rulings, they hotly disputed its application in General Protecht Group, 
Inc. v. International Trade Commission.733  Pass & Seymour owned several 
patents for common household ground fault circuit interrupters 
(“GFCIs”) and sought an order from the ITC prohibiting the 
importation of GFCI’s from General Protecht Group and others 
(GPG), alleging that the imported GFCIs infringed the patents.734  An 
administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the GFCIs would infringe 
the patents, and the ITC affirmed.735 
The majority cited the familiar standard of review from the 
Administrative Procedures Act:  “this court reviews the Commission’s 
legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for substantial 
evidence.”736  The majority then applied that standard and reversed 
several of the ITC’s findings.737  Judge Newman vigorously dissented, 
making clear her view that the majority misapplied the standard of 
review.738  In her view, the ITC’s ruling was supported by substantial 
evidence, but the “court now finds its own facts, applies theories that 
were not raised by any party, uses incorrect standards of review, and 
                                                          
 729. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857. 
 730. Id. at 1343–44, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858–59. 
 731. Id. at 1358, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869–70. 
 732. Id. at 1358, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841, 1870.   
 733. 619 F.3d 1303, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 734. Id. at 1306, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293. 
 735. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294. 
 736. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294.  
 737. Id. at 1313, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299. 
 738. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299 (Newman, J., dissenting).   
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creates its own electrical technology contrary to the uniform and 
unchallenged expert testimony.”739  
The dispute over the claim term “detection circuit . . . to generate a 
predetermined signal” provides an example of Judge Newman’s 
reasoning.740  The majority recognized that the appellants did not ask 
the ITC to review the ALJ’s construction of this term and did not 
raise it before the Federal Circuit.741  Rather, GPG claimed that “the 
ALJ effectively modified the construction or misapplied it.”742  The 
ALJ had based his finding on Pass & Seymour’s expert, who testified 
that a “predetermined signal” originated from outside the  
“detection circuit.”743  The majority called the expert’s testimony  
“plainly inconsistent with the asserted claims  . . . and the ALJ’s 
construction,”744 indicating that the “detection circuit” should 
generate the “predetermined signal.”745  In that sense, the expert’s 
testimony “is not substantial evidence to support a finding” of 
infringement.746 
Judge Newman disagreed, noting in many instances that her 
“colleagues do not discuss the support for the Commission’s findings 
that the [infringing GFCIs] have a detection circuit that generates a 
predetermined signal.”747  The “definition of ‘generate’ was not 
disputed by any party before the Commission; thus the record is 
sparse and argument is nil.”748  Moreover, the expert witnesses all 
similarly understood the term and focused their testimony on 
whether the term was infringed.”749  “Instead,” Judge Newman 
concluded, “the court creates a theory not proposed by any party, and 
rules that a signal that originates from the line terminal is not 
generated by the detection circuit and thus not ‘generated.’”750  Judge 
Newman’s dissent continued in a similar vein with the other 
infringement issues on appeal, ultimately leading her to conclude 
that the majority had “disregard[ed] the rulings and findings of the 
Commission, and render[ed] de novo rules and findings on new 
theories to which the parties have had no opportunity to respond.”751   
                                                          
 739. Id. at 1314, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299. 
 740. Id. at 1307, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295 (majority opinion).  
 741. Id. at 1307–08, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295. 
 742. Id. at 1308, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295.  
 743. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295. 
 744. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295.  
 745. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295. 
 746. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295.  
 747. Id. at 1317, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1292, 1301 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 748. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301. 
 749. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301. 
 750. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301. 
 751. Id. at 1320, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1292, 1304. 
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Another case, Vizio, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,752 likewise 
involved assertions by the dissent that the majority was relying on 
arguments that no party had raised below.  There, the majority 
addressed three separate claim construction issues, upholding the 
Commission on the first two, but overturning it on the third issue, 
which related to the proper interpretation of the terms “for 
identifying” and “suitable for use in identifying.”753  Based on the 
construction of those terms that the court adopted, the court also 
overturned, in part, the Commission’s infringement determination.754  
The dissent, however, contended that the third claim construction 
issue had not been raised on appeal  Thus, Judge Clevenger would 
have relied on the rule that “litigants waive their right to present new 
claim construction disputes if they are not timely raised” to preclude 
consideration of this issue.755  At the very least, Judge Clevenger would 
have remanded to the Commission for the Commission to make 
additional factual findings regarding how the allegedly infringing 
products work in light of the new claim construction.756 
III. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY 
This section reviews the Federal Circuit’s treatment of patentability 
and validity issues in 2010.  With cases in this area taken en banc by 
the court and even taken for review by the Supreme Court, 2010 was 
an active year for patentability and validity jurisprudence. 
A. Clear and Convincing Standard 
Perhaps the most dramatic change of 2010 in the validity context 
will come as a result of a case decided by the Federal Circuit this year 
that is on review before the Supreme Court.  In its review of the 
appeal from i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.,757 the Supreme 
Court will consider the standard for proving invalidity.758  Section 282 
of the Patent Act provides that “[a] patent shall be presumed valid” 
and that “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any 
claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”759  The 
Federal Circuit has interpreted that statutory presumption as 
                                                          
 752.  605 F.3d 1330, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 753.  Id. at 1336–42, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1358–62. 
 754. Id. at 1343–44, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1363–64. 
 755.  Id. at 1345, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364 (Clevenger, J., dissenting). 
 756.  Id. at 1346, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365–66 (Clevenger, J., dissenting). 
 757. 598 F.3d 831, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub 
nom. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010). 
 758. Microsoft v. i4i Petition, supra note 78, at *i. 
 759. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).  
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requiring clear and convincing evidence to prove a patent is invalid.760  
The question presented to the Supreme Court in Microsoft’s appeal 
of the Federal Circuit’s i4i decision concerns that judicially created 
burden of proof:  “Whether the court of appeals erred in holding 
that Microsoft’s invalidity defense must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence.”761 
While the Supreme Court has not previously ruled on the issue, it 
has suggested that the clear-and-convincing standard may not be 
correct, at least not where the PTO did not consider the prior art at 
issue.762  In KSR, International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,763 the Supreme Court 
stated that “the rationale underlying the presumption—that the PTO, 
in its expertise, has approved the claim—seems much diminished” in 
cases where the patentee “fail[ed] to disclose” the prior art at issue to 
the PTO.764  Nonetheless, in its 2010 decisions, the Federal Circuit 
uniformly adhered to its requirement that invalidity must be proven 
by clear and convincing evidence.765 
  Already, many interested parties have weighed in on the 
Supreme Court’s review, filing amicus curiae briefs.  The case will be 
argued in Spring 2011, although without participation by Chief 
Justice Roberts, who has recused himself.766  While predictions are, by 
their nature, unreliable, the consensus of the bar is that the Court 
will eliminate the Federal Circuit’s judicially imposed “clear and 
convincing” requirement for invalidating patents, or at least 
eliminate it for prior art not considered by the PTO.  Indeed, the 
                                                          
 760. E.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship, 598 F.3d at 848, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943. 
 761. Microsoft v. i4i Petition, supra note 78, at ii; see also Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. 
at 647 (granting certiorari). 
 762. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 428–29, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1385, 1400 (2007). 
 763. 550 U.S. 398, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007). 
 764. Id. at 426, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399. 
 765. See, e.g., Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1334,  
97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2010); W. Union Co. v. MoneyGram Payment 
Sys., Inc., 626 F.3d 1361, 1368, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1263, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 622 F.3d 1367, 1374, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870, 
1875 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Laryngeal Mask Co. Ltd. v. Ambu A/S, 618 F.3d 1367, 1373–
74, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1757, 1762 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Green Edge Enters., L.L.C. v. 
Rubber Mulch Etc., L.L.C., 620 F.3d 1287, 1299, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1427 
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 619 F.3d 1329, 1336,  
96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI 
Techs., Inc., 607 F.3d 784, 796, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1292, 1301, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Orion IP, L.L.C. v. Hyundai Motor Am., 605 F.3d 967, 
975, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Hearing Components, Inc. v. 
Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 1366, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1331, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 
1354, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 766. Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 647 (granting certiorari, without participation by 
Chief Justice Roberts). 
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Federal Circuit itself, although adhering to its clear-and-convincing 
standard in decisions issued after its i4i decision, has indirectly 
defended the notion that prior art already considered by the PTO 
may especially warrant the court’s higher standard.  In Pressure 
Products Medical Supplies, Inc. v. Greatbatch Ltd.,767 where the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the holding that the patents were anticipated and 
rendered obvious by clear and convincing evidence, the court noted 
that the PTO “examined” the prior art “twice during the examination 
and re-examination of” one of the patents at issue, and “nevertheless, 
allowed the [patent], instilling the statutory presumption of validity 
into” the patents at issue.768  A decision in i4i is expected by June 
2011. 
B. Obviousness 
Under § 103(a) of the Patent Act, a patent may not be obtained “if 
the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and 
the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have 
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”769  
 Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual 
inquiries.  The relevant factual inquiries include “the Graham factors”:  
(1) the scope and content of the pertinent prior art; (2) the level of 
ordinary skill in the art; (3) the differences between the claims and 
the prior art; and (4) objective, secondary indications of 
nonobviousness (such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved 
need, and the failure of others to create the invention).770  In KSR, 
the Supreme Court explained that the obviousness inquiry should be 
“expansive and flexible,” account for “common sense,” and consider 
the “ordinary creativity” of a person of ordinary skill, who is “not an 
automaton.”771 
Because obviousness cases often depend on the underlying facts, a 
recitation of each case on obviousness decided in 2010 provides 
limited insight into the overall state of Federal Circuit law.  
Nevertheless, many decisions warrant mention because of their 
articulation of relevant legal principles.  In particular, the Federal 
Circuit has continued to give meaning to the Supreme Court’s 
guidance in KSR. 
                                                          
 767. 599 F.3d 1308, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 768. Id. at 1318, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268. 
 769. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).  
 770. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459, 467 (1966). 
 771. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–21, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1385, 1388–96 (2007). 
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1. Obviousness in the continued wake of KSR 
In the three years since the Supreme Court decided KSR, issues 
regarding the obviousness defense have, not surprisingly, often arisen 
in the application of KSR, and many decisions continue to give 
content to KSR’s articulation of the obviousness standard. 
One such development is the resolution of obviousness on 
summary judgment.  Whereas obviousness traditionally was an issue 
decided by a jury, the Supreme Court’s summary invalidation of the 
claim in KSR as obvious has emboldened litigants to seek, and district 
courts to grant, summary judgment of obviousness.  As a result, the 
Federal Circuit has increasingly been called upon to review 
obviousness decided on summary judgment. 
The Federal Circuit has made clear that granting summary 
judgment of obviousness can be proper in appropriate 
circumstances.772  It reiterated in a decision this year that summary 
judgment is appropriate if the first three Graham factors—the scope 
and content of the prior art; the differences between the claims and 
the prior art; and the level of ordinary skill in the art—are not in 
material dispute, and obviousness “is apparent in light of these 
factors.”773  The Federal Circuit also held that the question of 
motivation to combine, while an issue of fact, “may nonetheless be 
addressed on summary judgment or JMOL in appropriate 
circumstances.”774  Further, “expert testimony is not required when 
the references and the invention are easily understandable.”775  In 
short, “in appropriate cases, the ultimate inference as to the existence 
of a motivation to combine references may boil down to a question of 
‘common sense,’ appropriate for resolution on summary judgment or 
JMOL” and without the need for expert testimony.776 
Where the standard was met, the Federal Circuit affirmed the grant 
of summary judgment of obviousness.777  Where, however, there were 
material disputes as to what the prior art taught and whether the 
                                                          
 772. See, e.g., Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1233, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1525, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing the district court’s denial of motion for 
summary judgment because claims would have been obvious as a matter of law); 
Trimed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 608 F.3d 1333, 1341, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1577–
78 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing and remanding the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment).  
 773. Trimed, 608 F.3d at 1341, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. 
at 427, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400). 
 774. Wyers, 616 F.3d at 1239, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531. 
 775. Id. at 1242, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534. 
 776. Id. at 1240, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532. 
 777. E.g., King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1833 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Dow Jones & Co. v. Ablaise Ltd., 606 F.3d 1338, 95 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Media Techs. Licensing, L.L.C. v. Upper 
Deck Co., 596 F.3d 1334, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
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combination of the prior art would be predictable, the court found 
summary judgment inappropriate.778 
In 2010, the Federal Circuit also considered the propriety of basing 
an obviousness holding on “common sense.”  In rejecting the Federal 
Circuit’s rigid application of the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” 
test (TSM test), KSR noted that common sense can serve as a reason 
to combine or modify prior art and thus can be a means for 
determining obviousness.779  “Common sense teaches . . . that familiar 
items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in 
many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings 
of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.”780   
Nonetheless, reliance on “common sense” cannot be cursory.   
In Trimed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,781 the Federal Circuit rejected the 
district court’s reliance on common sense to find the claims obvious 
without any additional reasoning.782  On review, the Federal Circuit 
acknowledged that “an obviousness analysis ‘may include recourse to 
logic, judgment, and common sense available to the person of 
ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any 
reference or expert opinion,’” but stated that, “to invoke ‘common 
sense’ or any other basis for extrapolating from prior art to a 
conclusion of obviousness, a district court must articulate its 
reasoning with sufficient clarity for review.”783  The court went on to 
note, “merely saying that an invention is a logical, commonsense 
solution to a known problem does not make it so.”784  Because the 
record and the district court’s order lacked such reasoning, summary 
                                                          
 778. Trimed, 608 F.3d at 1336, 1341–42, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581 (reversing 
summary judgment while noting several factual questions); see also Green Edge 
Enters., L.L.C. v. Rubber Mulch, LLC, 620 F.3d 1287, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (affirming denial of summary judgment where material issues of fact existed); 
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.,  
617 F.3d 1296, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing summary 
judgment where disputed issues of material fact existed).  
 779. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402, 420, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1385, 1388, 1397 (2007); see also Wyers, 616 F.3d at 1238, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1531 (“In particular, the [KSR] Court emphasized the role of ‘common sense’:  
‘[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense . . . are 
neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.’”). 
 780. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.   
 781. 608 F.3d 1333, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 782. Id. at 1341–43, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581–82 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  In fact, the 
court had granted summary judgment simply by signing the defendant’s motion.  Id. 
at 1339, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.   
 783. Id. at 1342, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582 (citing Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. 
InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329–30, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1849, 1854 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (internal citations omitted)).  
 784. Id. at 1343, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.  
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judgment was not supported and was reversed.785  By contrast, where 
the district court provided reasoning and the Federal Circuit agreed 
that common sense rendered the claims obvious, the court affirmed 
summary judgment of obviousness.786 
The Federal Circuit applied a common-sense analysis in reversing 
the district court’s holding of nonobviousness in Wyers v. Master Lock 
Co.787  In Wyers, the three patents involved locks that secure trailers to 
passenger vehicles.788  The patents claimed an improvement over 
prior art because they included a sleeve that allowed the hitch to be 
used with different sized receivers and included an external seal that 
protected the lock from the elements.789  Because the district court 
granted JMOL of infringement at the close of the evidence, the only 
questions for the jury were whether the defendant presented 
evidence that the patent’s use of a “sleeve to adjust the operative 
thickness of a shank” and “use of an external flat flange seal would 
have been obvious.”790  The jury found that the claims were not 
obvious and the district court denied the defendant’s JMOL motion 
to the contrary, so that the court entered judgment on the verdict.791 
On appeal, a preliminary issue was whether the district court had 
properly concluded, in denying the defendant’s JMOL motion, that 
the jury could find that certain prior art was not relevant prior art.792  
Two criteria determine whether prior art is relevant:  “(1) whether 
the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem 
addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the 
inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably 
pertinent to the particular problem.”793  The Federal Circuit found 
the prior art relevant.794  Citing KSR, the Federal Circuit recognized 
that analogous prior art should be construed broadly and that a 
person of ordinary skill may look outside the specific field to “fit 
teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.”795  
While the prior art addressed padlocks, it was from the same field as 
                                                          
 785. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.  The court took the extraordinary step of 
directing that, on remand, the case should be assigned to a different district judge.  
Id. at 1344, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583. 
 786. W. Union Co. v. MoneyGram Payment Sys., 626 F.3d 1361, 1373–74,  
97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1263, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 787. 616 F.3d 1231, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 788. Id. at 1233, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1527.   
 789. Id. at 1234–35, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1527–28.  
 790. Id. at 1236, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1529. 
 791. Id. at 1237, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1529. 
 792. Id. at 1237, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1529. 
 793. Id. at 1237, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1530 (citing Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc.,  
596 F.3d 1343, 1351, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1873, 1878–79 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).  
 794. Id. at 1238, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1530. 
 795. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1530 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 
402, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1390 (2007)). 
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the patent, or at least reasonably pertinent to it, because the defined 
field of “locksmithing” inherently included padlocks.796  Thus, the 
district court erred in finding that prior art irrelevant.797 
With the relevant prior art identified, the Federal Circuit turned to 
“whether there was a motivation to combine the sleeve with the prior 
art.”798  Noting that KSR “emphasized the role of ‘common sense,’” 
which may be sufficient to decide obviousness on summary judgment 
or JMOL, the court concluded that it was a matter of common sense 
to combine the references in the manner claimed by the patent, and 
the court therefore reversed the judgment of non-obviousness.799 
Another recurring issue arising in the wake of KSR is the relevance 
of the “motivation to combine” test, which KSR rejected in its rigid 
application.800  Although recognizing that KSR ruled that “motivation 
to combine” is not the only test for determining whether a claim is 
obvious,801 the Federal Circuit has continued to use that test to assess 
obviousness.802  For instance, in Western Union Co. v. MoneyGram 
                                                          
 796. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1530–31. 
 797. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1530. 
 798. Id. at 1238, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1530. 
 799. Id. at 1246, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1537. 
 800. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418–19, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1388 
(2007).  
 801. See Wyers, 616 F.3d at 1238, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530–31 (“Before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in KSR, we required that a patent challenger show that a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would have had motivation to combine the prior 
art references and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. . . 
.  KSR, however, instructs courts to take a more ‘expansive and flexible approach’ in 
determining whether a patented invention was obvious at the time it was made.”); 
Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 1374, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1385, 1397 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Although obviousness law “does not require an explicit 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine prior art references, it may 
nevertheless be ‘important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person 
of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed 
new invention does.’” (citations omitted)). 
 802. See, e.g., King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1281,  
95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1833, 1843 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming obviousness judgment 
because it “would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine” 
teachings in the prior art); Wyers, 616 F.3d at 1240, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532 
(“[W]e consider whether the evidence established the existence of a motivation to 
combine references as to the” patents in suit.”); Rolls-Royce, PLC v. United Techs. 
Corp., 603 F.3d 1325, 1339, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2010)  
(“A particular course or selection is not obvious to try unless some design need or 
market pressure or other motivation would suggest to one of ordinary skill to pursue 
the claimed course or selection.”); Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 
1352, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1873, 1879 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding that the obviousness 
analysis “typically invokes the familiar teaching-suggestion-motivation (‘TSM’) test, 
asking whether a person having ordinary skill in the art would have found some 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine or modify the prior art references.”); 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1292, 1298, 93 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489, 1491–92 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming obviousness judgment 
where two prior patents disclosed every element of the patent at issue and a person 
of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the elements). 
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Payment Systems,803 the Federal Circuit held that, even though the prior 
art taught three specific elements of the claimed inventions, a person 
of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine 
those elements with the prior art system, and thus the claims were not 
obvious.804 
Motivation to combine was also at issue in Media Technologies 
Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck Co.,805 where the court split over the 
obviousness of the claims.806  The claimed improvement concerned 
the attachment of memorabilia to sports trading cards.807  After 
finding that the differences between the patent and the prior art 
were minimal, the majority addressed whether a person of ordinary 
skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the references, 
which were not sports-related.808  The patent owner argued that the 
claims were not obvious because there was “an inability to predict that 
a trading card would convey memorabilia authenticity” and “the 
trading card field contain[s] an infinite number of identified and 
unpredictable solutions.”809  The majority rejected the argument and 
held that, even though the prior art references were not sports-
related, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill to 
attach a piece of memorabilia to a sports-related item, because there 
are only a finite number of predictable inventions for trading cards, 
and the accused infringers had to show only that “it would have been 
obvious to one skilled in the art to attach a sports-related item instead 
of those items attached in the prior art references.”810   
Chief Judge Rader, however, disagreed with the majority’s opinion 
and filed a dissent.811  He claimed that the majority gave the case a 
cursory review because it did not take the subject matter seriously.812  
Chief Judge Rader would have held the invention not obvious 
because none of the references were sports-related, and the prior 
references were “distinctly different” from the claimed invention.813 
Another issue arising since KSR is the “obvious to try” rationale for 
invalidating claims.814  Contrary to the state of Federal Circuit law 
prior to KSR, a claim may be invalidated if it would have been obvious 
                                                          
 803. 626 F.3d 1361, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 804. Id. at 1369–71, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263, 1270–71. 
 805. 596 F.3d 1334, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 806. Id. at 1335, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.  
 807. Id. at 1336, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.  
 808. Id. at 1338, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.   
 809. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.   
 810. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.    
 811. Id. at 1339, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911, 1915 (Rader, C.J., dissenting). 
 812. Id. at 1340, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915. 
 813. Id. at 1341–42, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916.    
 814. See  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1385, 1397 (2007). 
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to a person of ordinary skill in the art to try a particular course of 
action.815  As the Supreme Court stated in KSR, “[w]hen there is a 
design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a 
finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of 
ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his 
or her technical grasp” and this “fact that a combination was obvious 
to try might show that it was obvious under [35 U.S.C.] § 103.”816 
In Rolls-Royce, PLC v. United Technologies Corp.,817 the court 
considered the obvious-to-try rationale.  At issue was a patent for 
aircraft engine fan blades that used a rearward sweep to reduce 
shockwaves.818  An earlier patent application claimed a forward sweep 
to reduce shockwaves.819  The defendant argued that the forward 
sweep was “an easily predictable and achievable variation” in view of 
the rearward sweep disclosure and thus it would have been obvious to 
try to change the sweep from rearward to forward.820 
The Federal Circuit disagreed.821  It reiterated that an invention 
would have been obvious to try if “the possible approaches and 
selection to solve the problem” are “known and finite.”822  Because a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would have had no reason to try a 
forward sweep, the sweep angle was not simply a matter of two 
choices—forward or rearward—but rather constituted a “broad 
selection of choices” including “any degree of sweep.”823  Such a large 
number of choices cut against a finding of “obvious to try,” and the 
court ultimately affirmed the conclusion that the claims were not 
obvious.824 
2. Other obviousness issues 
In addition to continued application and explication of KSR, the 
Federal Circuit addressed other issues in 2010 regarding obviousness.  
In Honeywell International, Inc. v. United States,825 the court emphasized 
                                                          
 815. Id. at 419–21, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.  Prior to KSR, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the “obvious to try” rationale.  See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559, 34 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 816. Id. at 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.  
 817. 603 F.3d 1325, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 818. Id. at 1327, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098. 
 819. Id. at 1329, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 820. Id. at 1338–39, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. 
 821. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107. 
 822. Id. at 1339, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, 
Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1351, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 823. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107. 
 824. Id. at 1339–41, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107. 
 825. 609 F.3d 1292, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
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the importance of claim construction to the obviousness inquiry.826  
Although the district court had correctly construed the claim, it 
deviated from that construction in comparing the claim to the prior 
art, because the prior art did not disclose that limitation.827  Reversing 
the obviousness conclusion, the Federal Circuit held that, under the 
proper claim construction, the patent would not be obvious in light 
of the prior art references.828 
In Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc.,829 the Federal Circuit reiterated its 
rule that “[a] broader independent claim cannot be nonobvious 
where a dependent claim stemming from that independent claim is 
invalid for obviousness.”830  Following that rule, the appellate court 
agreed with the district court that the verdict was inconsistent 
because the jury found the dependent claims obvious but not the 
independent claims.831  As the remedy, the court remanded the case 
for a new trial because there was sufficient evidence to support the 
jury’s verdict that the dependent claims were obvious.832 
In Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Matrix Laboratories, Ltd.,833 the Federal 
Circuit applied the obviousness inquiry for patents involving chemical 
compounds, which “frequently turns on the structural similarities and 
differences between the compounds claimed and those in the prior 
art.”834  Under that special analysis of the differences between the 
prior art and the patent (the third Graham factor) for patents 
concerning chemical compounds, the defendant must show “that a 
medicinal chemist of ordinary skill would have been motivated to 
select and then modify a prior art compound (e.g., a lead 
compound) to arrive at a claimed compound with a reasonable 
expectation that the new compound would have similar or improved 
properties compared with the old.”835  This motivation, however, does 
not have to be “explicit in the art.”836 
                                                          
 826. Id. at 1298–99, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1198.  The Federal Circuit filed an 
initial opinion in this case on February 18, 2010. Honeywell International, Inc. v. 
United States (Honeywell I), 596 F.3d 800, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1740 (Fed. Cir. 
2010).  This opinion was superseded by the cited opinion issued on May 25, 2010.  
Honeywell, 609 F.3d 1292.  However, the new opinion made no changes to the 
obviousness analysis.   
 827. Honeywell, 609 F.3d at 1299, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745. 
 828. Id. at 1301, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747. 
 829. 596 F.3d 1343, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 830. Id. at 1350, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878 (citing Callaway Golf Co. v. 
Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1344, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1714 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 831. Comaper Corp., 596 F.3d 1345, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.   
 832. Id. at 1352, 1355, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879–81.   
 833. 619 F.3d 1346, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 834. Id. at 1352, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531. 
 835. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531 (citations omitted). 
 836. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531 (citations omitted). 
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The patent in Daiichi related to a chemical compound and its use 
for treating high blood pressure.837  The defendant argued that one 
of skill in the art would have been motivated to select a lead 
compound from a prior art and modify it to create the compound 
claimed in the patent.838  The district court held that the claim was 
not invalid as obvious, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.839  
In rejecting the defendant’s argument that one of skill in the art 
would choose “the structurally closest prior art compound” as the 
lead compound, the Federal Circuit explained that prior case law 
established that identifying the lead compound “must avoid hindsight 
bias; it must look at the state of the art at the time the invention was 
made to find a motivation to select and then modify a lead compound 
to arrive at the claimed invention.”840  Selection of the lead 
compound “depends on more than just structural similarity, but also 
knowledge in the art of the functional properties and limitations of 
the prior art compounds,” so that “[p]otent and promising activity in 
the prior art trumps mere structural relationships.”841  Thus, the court 
held that the district court did not err in rejecting the defendant’s 
proposed lead compound.842 
The Federal Circuit further determined that even if one of skill in 
the art would have identified the defendant’s proposed compound as 
the lead compound, the district court properly held that one of skill 
in the art would not have been motivated to modify the compound to 
what was claimed in the patent.843  To the contrary, the prior art 
taught away from the patent.844  Because the prior art actually showed 
a preference for using other elements in the compound, a prima 
facie case of obviousness was not established, and the conclusion of 
non-obviousness was affirmed.845 
In i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.,846 addressing an issue not 
presented to the Supreme Court in its pending review of that case the 
Federal Circuit discussed the requirements for preserving for appeal 
a claimed error with respect to an obviousness determination after a 
jury trial.847  In rejecting the defendant’s argument that its pre-verdict 
                                                          
 837. Id. at 1347, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527. 
 838. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530. 
 839. Id. at 1351, 1357, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530, 1535. 
 840. Id. at 1354, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532. 
 841. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532. 
 842. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532. 
 843. Id. at 1354–55, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533. 
 844. Id. at 1354, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533. 
 845. Id. at 1357, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534–35. 
 846. 598 F.3d 831, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted,  
131 S. Ct. 647 (2010). 
 847. i4i, 598 F.3d at 845, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.  The issue regarding 
obviousness has not been appealed to the Supreme Court.  See Petition for Certiorari 
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JMOL on anticipation preserved the issue of obviousness for a post-
verdict JMOL and appeal, the court held that pre-verdict JMOL 
motions must include all theories involving prior art references that 
the party intends to challenge.”848  Although the defendant’s pre-
verdict JMOL had raised invalidity by anticipation based on the on-
sale bar, it had not raised obviousness or any of the three prior art 
references at issue for obviousness.849  Thus, the defendant waived any 
challenge of the factual findings underlying the jury’s obviousness 
determination,  and the Federal Circuit was restricted to the ultimate 
legal question of nonobviousness with no authority to reach the 
correctness of any factual findings.850  Based on that circumscribed 
review, the Federal Circuit upheld the jury verdict in favor of i4i that 
the patent was not obvious.851 
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,852 the Federal 
Circuit reiterated that the patentee’s own efforts, if performed by 
someone with greater than the defined level of ordinary skill, cannot 
support a claim that the patent is obvious.853  Affirming the district 
court’s ruling that the claims were not invalid,854 the Federal Circuit 
rejected the defendant’s arguments that statements by the patent 
owner’s inventors proved that the inventions were obvious.855  As the 
Federal Circuit explained, one could not conflate the experienced 
and advanced scientists at Eli Lilly with a person of ordinary skill in 
the art, who was defined as someone with only a bachelor’s degree in 
a scientific sphere with basic knowledge about animal studies and 
bioavailability.856 
The Federal Circuit addressed the fourth Graham factor—objective, 
secondary indications of nonobviousness—in several cases in 2010.  
Secondary indications of nonobviousness include commercial 
success, a long felt but unsolved need, the failure of others to create 
the invention, and the presence of unexpected results.857  Secondary 
considerations of nonobviousness are “not just a cumulative or 
confirmatory part of the obviousness calculus but constitute[] 
                                                          
at i Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (No. 10-290), 
2010 WL 3413088 at *ii (discussing the question presented as limited to the clear-
and-convincing standard).   
 848. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.   
 849. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.   
 850. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954. 
 851. Id. at 846, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.  
 852. 619 F.3d 1329, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 853. Id. at 1343–44, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.  
 854. Id. at 1341, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385. 
 855. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385. 
 856. Id. at 1040, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 857. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467 
(1966). 
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independent evidence of nonobviousness.”858  Indeed, “[s]econdary 
considerations ‘can be the most probative evidence of non-
obviousness in the record, and enable[] the . . . court to avert the 
trap of hindsight.’”859  They are not a discretionary consideration and 
must be considered if raised.860  On their merits, however, secondary 
considerations of nonobviousness “cannot overcome a strong prima 
facie case of obviousness.”861 
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, 
Inc.,862 provides guidance on this area of law and particularly the 
importance of secondary considerations of nonobviousness in 
deciding whether a patent is invalid.863  There, the court noted the 
importance of secondary considerations and discussed whether such 
considerations can be addressed for the first time on appeal.864  The 
district court had granted summary judgment of invalidity due to 
obviousness,865 and the Federal Circuit agreed that the prior art 
established a prima facie case of obviousness.866  The district court, 
however, failed to consider the patentee’s objective evidence of 
nonobviousness, including evidence of industry skepticism, industry 
praise, commercial success, and copying.867  The Federal Circuit 
found that to be error, although it refused to address that evidence 
for the first time on appeal.868  While certain cases may warrant 
consideration of secondary evidence by the appellate court in the first 
                                                          
 858. Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1310, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1777, 1789 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 
520 F.3d 1358, 1365, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 859. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788 (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-
Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); see also Rolls-Royce, PLC v. 
United Techs. Corp., 603 F.3d 1325, 1339, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1107 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (“In the obviousness analysis, secondary considerations are often some of 
the best ‘independent evidence of nonobviousness.’” (quoting Ortho-McNeil, 520 F.3d 
at 1365)). 
 860. Trimed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 608 F.3d 1333, 1343, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577, 1583 
(Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 861. Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525, 
1537 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also W. Union Co. v. MoneyGram Payment Sys., 626 F.3d 
1361, 1373, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1263, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[W]eak secondary 
considerations generally do not overcome a strong prima facie case of 
obviousness.”); Geo M. Martin Co. v. Alliance Mach. Sys. Int’l L.L.C., 618 F.3d 1294, 
1306, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1212, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Balancing all of the 
secondary considerations, this court agrees with the district court that, in light of the 
strong evidence of obviousness . . . [the] evidence of non-obviousness, even if fully 
credited by a jury, would fail to make a difference in this case.”). 
 862. 617 F.3d 1296, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 863. See id. at 1305, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1109. 
 864. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1109. 
 865. Id. at 1302, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107. 
 866. Id. at 1303, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108. 
 867. Id. at 1304, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1109. 
 868. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1109. 
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instance, the Federal Circuit explained that this requires a case-by-
case assessment, and suggested that initial appellate review of 
secondary considerations would be appropriate only where the 
objective evidence of nonobviousness did not overcome a “strong” 
prima facie case of obviousness.869  In Transocean, with all inferences 
resolved in favor of the patentee because it opposed summary 
judgment, the secondary evidence presented “a strong basis for 
rebutting the prima facie case.”870  As a result, the court reversed the 
grant of summary judgment of obviousness and remanded to the trial 
court for further consideration.871 
In Geo M. Martin Co. v. Alliance Machine Systems International LLC,872 
the Federal Circuit emphasized that most secondary considerations 
must have a nexus to the claimed invention.873  There, the patentee 
argued that several secondary considerations, such as commercial 
success, failure of others, and industry praise, supported a non-
obvious conclusion.874  The Federal Circuit, however, found 
insufficient evidence of a nexus between the alleged secondary 
considerations and the patent to have relevance.875   
In Geo M. Martin, the court also elaborated on the conclusion to be 
drawn from copying as a secondary consideration of obviousness..876  
The patentee claimed that copying supported non-obviousness, but 
the court reached the opposite conclusion.877  The court observed 
that “[i]ndependently made” inventions within a short of period of 
time provide evidence of obviousness.878 
C. Anticipation 
Section 102 of the Patent Act sets forth the bases on which a claim 
can be invalid because it is not novel.879  Section 102(b) governs lack 
of novelty by anticipation, because prior art—another patent or a 
printed publication—discloses all of the elements of the claim at 
issue.880  Under § 102(b), a claim is anticipated if it “was patented or 
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in 
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the 
                                                          
 869. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1109. 
 870. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1109. 
 871. Id. at 1305, 1313, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1109. 
 872. 618 F.3d 1294, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 873. Id. at 1304, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.  
 874. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219.  
 875. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1219. 
 876. Id. at 1305–06, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1220. 
 877. Id. at 1305, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1220. 
 878. Id. at 1305–06, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1220. 
 879. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 880. Id. § 102(b).   
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date of the application for patent in the United States.”881  
Determining that a claim is anticipated by prior art involves two 
analytical steps:  “the first step requires construing the claim,” and 
“[t]he second step in the analysis requires a comparison of the 
properly construed claim to the prior art.”882  A single prior reference 
must “expressly or inherently disclose each claim limitation.”883  In 
addition, “the reference must ‘enable one of ordinary skill in the art 
to make the invention without undue experimentation.’”884  The party 
asserting invalidity must prove anticipation with clear and convincing 
evidence.885   
Anticipation is a question of fact, reviewed for substantial evidence 
when tried to a jury.886  As with obviousness, which depends on 
underlying factual determinations, the factual issue of anticipation 
can be determined on summary judgment if there are no material 
facts in dispute.887  Where genuine disputes exist, however, summary 
judgment is improper.888 
Because anticipation often depends on facts specific to the case, an 
examination of each anticipation case this year is not warranted in 
this review of the state of Federal Circuit law.  Nonetheless, certain 
decisions should be discussed for their reference to more broadly 
applicable legal doctrines. 
Anticipation often involves claim construction issues.  In Marrin v. 
Griffin,889 the court noted the importance of claim construction to 
determining whether the prior art disclosed all the elements of the 
patent.890  In a split decision, the court affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment, finding the patent anticipated.891  The patent involved a 
scratch-off label to mark beverage glasses without the use of a writing 
                                                          
 881. Id.  
 882. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1332, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Power Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. v. Siemens 
AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1406, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 883. Orion IP, L.L.C. v. Hyundai Motor Am., 605 F.3d 967, 975, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1297, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc.,  
523 F.3d 1323, 1334, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 884. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302 (quoting In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334, 
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1235, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).  
 885. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302. 
 886. z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1347, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007).   
 887. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1310,  
93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489, 1505 (Fed. Cir. 2010), reh’g granted per curiam, 374 F. 
App’x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 888. Trimed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 608 F.3d 1333, 1343, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 889. 599 F.3d 1290, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 890. Id. at 1294–95, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 891. Id. at 1292, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. 
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implement.892  The issue on appeal was whether language included in 
the preamble should be read as a limitation.893  The panel majority 
affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the preamble was not 
limiting because the preamble was intended only to state the purpose 
or expected use.894  Although the preamble can be limiting if it was 
relied on during the prosecution,895 the majority found no reliance in 
this case.896  In fact, the court noted that the patent owner itself 
claimed that the language was not a claim limitation.897  With all of 
the limitations from the body of the claims disclosed in the prior art, 
the majority affirmed the judgment of anticipation.898 
Judge Newman disagreed with the majority and filed a dissent.899  
Observing that “terms appearing in a preamble may be deemed 
limitations of a claim when they give meaning to the claim and 
properly define the invention,” Judge Newman would have found the 
preamble limiting,900 and would have further found that the preamble 
differentiated the invention from known prior art.901 
In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp.,902 the Federal Circuit clarified 
that “a claim cannot be both indefinite and anticipated.”903  “If a claim 
is indefinite, the claim, by definition, cannot be construed” and thus 
the court should not proceed to an anticipation analysis if a 
conclusion of indefiniteness is reached.904   
In Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,905 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the requirement that the elements of the prior art be 
arranged in the same manner as the patent.906  The court concluded 
that the district court’s jury instruction regarding anticipation was 
erroneous, but upheld the ruling of invalidity because the jury would 
have found the patent obvious regardless of the erroneous 
instruction.907  The court held that the instruction was erroneous 
                                                          
 892. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140–41. 
 893. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. 
 894. Id. at 1294, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141–42 (quoting Bicon, Inc. v. 
Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 952, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 895. See id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142 (“Clear reliance on a preamble during 
prosecution can distinguish a claimed invention from the prior art and render the 
preamble a claim limitation.”). 
 896. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 897. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
   898.  Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 899. Id. at 1296, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 900. Id. at 1297, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144. 
 901. Id. at 1297–99, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144–46. 
 902. 599 F.3d 1325, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 903. Id. at 1332, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 904. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 905. 593 F.3d 1325, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 906. Id. at 1332, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 907. Id. at 1333, 1337, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486, 1488. 
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because “it makes sufficient, for the purposes of anticipation, a prior 
art disclosure of individual claims that ‘could have been arranged’ in 
a way that is not itself described or depicted in the anticipatory 
reference.”908  According to the court, the correct rule for 
anticipation is that the arrangement of the elements must also be 
disclosed in the prior reference.909  The court added that the doctrine 
of “inherent disclosure” does not change this requirement.910  For 
anticipation to occur, the court said, not only must each element be 
disclosed, expressly or inherently, but the claim arrangement must 
also be disclosed, expressly or inherently.911 
 In a number of anticipation cases, the court addressed the 
qualifications for prior art to be relevant to the patent at issue under 
§ 102(b).  If the prior art is a non-patent reference, it must be a 
printed publication.912  To qualify as a printed publication, the 
reference “must have been disseminated or otherwise made 
accessible to persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject 
matter to which the advertisement relates prior to the critical date,” 
which “is defined as the date one year prior to the filing date of the 
patent application.”913   
The court addressed what qualifies as prior art under § 102(b) in 
Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America.914  There, the patent owner 
argued that a catalog was not a printed publication because it was 
revised after the critical date of the patent—i.e., it was revised within 
a year of the filing date of the patent application.915  The Federal 
Circuit disagreed because the catalog was published and used before 
that critical date.916  Its later revision did not alter those facts, 
rendering it qualifying prior art under § 102(b).917 
The Federal Circuit also addressed whether the prior art qualified 
as a printed publication in ResQnet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc.918  The 
accused infringer in the case argued that certain references were 
printed publications because they were included, by the patent 
owner, in reexamination.919  The patent owner objected that this use 
made them publicly accessible, explaining that it had learned of the 
                                                          
 908. Id. at 1332, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 909. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 910. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 911. Id. at 1332–33, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 912. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 913. Orion IP, L.L.C. v. Hyundai Motor Am., 605 F.3d 967, 974, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).  
 914. 605 F.3d 967, 974, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 915. Id. at 974, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301. 
 916. Id. at 975, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.  
 917. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302. 
 918. 594 F.3d 860, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 919. Id. at 866, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557. 
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references from the accused infringer during the instant litigation.920  
The district court agreed with the patent owner, and the Federal 
Circuit affirmed.921  Reiterating that the touchstone of a printed 
publication is “public accessibility,”922 the court held that no evidence 
showed that the references were publicly accessible, and the patent 
owner did not “convert [the] manuals into printed publication prior 
art by including them” in its materials to the PTO.923 
To defeat an anticipation defense, the patent owner need not 
corroborate its expert witness’s testimony about the prior art.  In i4i 
Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.,924 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
jury’s verdict that the claims were not invalid.925  The defendant 
argued that the patent owner failed to rebut the defendant’s prima 
facie case of invalidity because the patent owner failed to corroborate 
its expert testimony.926  The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that 
the patent owner did not need corroborating testimony.927  
Corroboration is required if the witness’s testimony alone is asserted 
to prove invalidity.928  In this case, the expert’s testimony was asserted 
to prove validity and did not have to meet the clear and convincing 
standard required to prove invalidity.929  The court stated that it knew 
“of no corroboration requirement for inventor testimony asserted to 
defend against a finding of invalidity by pointing to deficiencies in 
the prior art.”930   
By contrast, as the court reiterated this year in Lazare Kaplan 
International, Inc. v. Photoscribe Technologies, Inc.,931 corroboration is 
necessary when a witness seeks to invalidate a patent with his or her 
testimony alone.932  Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit “has ‘not 
impose[d] an impossible standard of ‘independence’ on 
corroborative evidence by requiring that every point . . . be 
                                                          
 920. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557. 
 921. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557. 
 922. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557 (citing In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899, 228 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 453, 455 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 923. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557. 
 924. 598 F.3d 831, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted,  
131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).     
 925. Id. at 864, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968.  This issue is not before the 
Supreme Court on appeal.  See Petition for Certiorari at i, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i 
Limited Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (No. 10-290), 2010 WL 3413088, at *ii 
(discussing the question presented as limited to the clear-and-convincing standard). 
 926. Id. at 845–47, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955.  
 927. Id. at 847, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955.  
 928. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955. 
 929. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955.  
 930. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955. 
 931. 628 F.3d 1359, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 932. Id. at 1374, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448 (quoting TypeRight Keyboard 
Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 374 F.3d 1151, 1159, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501, 1506 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004)).  
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corroborated by evidence having a source totally independent of the 
[witness].”933  Instead, a “rule of reason” analysis is applied, asking 
whether the testimony has been sufficiently corroborated.934  Because 
there was strong support for the witness’s testimony in Lazare, the 
court did not disturb the invalidity judgment.935 
In two cases, the court engaged in statutory interpretation to 
decide priority in the anticipation context.  In Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, Inc. v. Alpine Electronics of America, Inc.,936 the court affirmed 
a district court decision invalidating two patents that were related to 
multimedia database search systems because they were anticipated by 
Britannica’s previously filed foreign application.937  The analysis 
turned on the application of § 120, which sets forth the requirements 
for benefiting from an earlier filing date than the date on which an 
application is filed.938  Section 120 provides that a patent application 
disclosed in a prior application  
shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on 
the date of the prior application, if filed before the patenting or 
abandonment of or termination of proceedings on the first 
application or on an application similarly entitled to the benefit of 
the filing date of the first application and if it contains or is 
amended to contain a specific reference to the earlier filed 
application.939   
In Encyclopaedia Britannica, the patentee claimed that, pursuant to 
§ 120, its patents, filed in 2005, pre-dated the foreign application that 
was published in 1991 and was found to anticipate the 2005 patents 
under § 102(b).940  According to the patentee, the patents at issue 
were entitled to an earlier priority date than the foreign application, 
based on a chain of patents and patent applications leading back to 
1989.941  Within that chain, however, was a patent application filed in 
1993—in other words, it was filed after the effective date of the 
allegedly anticipating 1991 foreign application—that was submitted 
without a filing fee, without a declaration signed by the inventors, 
and missing its entire first page, thus making no reference to 
                                                          
 933. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448 (quoting Knorr v. Pearson, 671 F.2d 1368, 
1374, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196, 201 (C.C.P.A. 1982)). 
 934. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448 (quoting Knorr v. Pearson, 671 F.2d 1368, 
1374, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196, 201 (C.C.P.A. 1982)) (citing Lacks Indus., Inc. v. 
McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc., 322 F.3d 1335, 1349, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1083, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 935. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448.  
 936. 609 F.3d 1345, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1660 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 937. Id. at 1347, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.   
 938. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006). 
 939. Id. 
 940. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 609 F.3d at 1347, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661. 
 941. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661. 
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previously filed patents or applications such as the 1989 application.942  
The 1993 application was later abandoned.943 
Because there was no factual dispute that the foreign application 
disclosed all of the elements of the claims in suit, the only issue on 
appeal, one of first impression for the Federal Circuit, was “whether 
35 U.S.C. § 120 requires an intermediate application in a priority 
chain to ‘contain a specific reference to the earlier filed application’” 
for the chain to continue to the earlier application.944  The patent 
owner argued that the language of § 120 allowed for “similarly 
entitled” applications to not contain a reference to a specific earlier 
filed application unless they were the final applications in the priority 
chains.945 
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the patent owner, relying on 
the plain language of the statute requiring an application to contain 
or be amended to contain “a specific reference to the earlier filed 
application.”946  Thus, the court held that each application in the 
chain of priority must refer to the prior applications under § 120.947  
Here, because the 1993 application did not include a reference to the 
1989 application, the patentee could not claim priority to 1989 
through the 1993 application.948  Without the 1989 priority date, the 
patents were anticipated by the 1991 foreign patent applications, and 
accordingly the court affirmed summary judgment of invalidity.949 
In In re Giacomini,950 the court interpreted § 102(e)(2), which 
provides that a person is entitled to a patent unless “the invention was 
described in . . . a patent granted on an application for patent by 
another filed in the United States before the invention by the 
applicant for patent . . . .”951  At issue was a patent that, although filed 
one month after the patent application at issue, claimed priority 
based on the filing date of a provisional application.952  The PTO 
granted priority to that patent, and on that basis found the 
application at issue anticipated.953   
                                                          
 942. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662.  Declarations related to priority and 
previously filed applications are generally made on the application’s first page. 
 943. Id. at 1348, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662. 
 944. Id. at 1349, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663 (citing In re Henriksen, 399 F.2d 
253, 257, 158 U.S.P.Q. 224, 227 (C.C.P.A. 1968)). 
 945. Id. at 1350, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664. 
 946. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 947. Id. at 1352, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 948. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 949. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 950. 612 F.3d 1380, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1698 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 951. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(2) (2006); Giacomini, 612 F.3d at 1383, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1700. 
 952. Giacomini, 612 F.3d at 1381–82, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699. 
 953. Id. at 1382, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699. 
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered whether § 102(e)’s 
phrase “patent granted on an application” included provisional 
applications (and non-provisional applications).954  The court held 
that it did, relying on the “encompassing rule” in § 111(b)(8) that 
provisions in Title 35 “relating to applications for patent” “shall apply 
to provisional applications.”955  Additionally, because under § 119(e) a 
non-provisional patent application receives the benefit of an earlier 
filing date of its corresponding provisional application,956  if a patent 
disclosing the same invention “was carried forward from an earlier 
U.S. provisional application or U.S. non-provisional application,” 
then a later application describing the same invention is not 
patentable.957  Accordingly, in Giacomini, the other patent was treated 
as though it was filed on the date of its earlier provisional application, 
and therefore qualified as anticipatory prior art.958   
In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the applicant’s 
argument that § 119(e) shifted that patent’s priority date but not its 
effective date for anticipation purposes.959  The patent owner relied 
on the decision in In re Hilmer,960 in which the Federal Circuit’s 
predecessor distinguished a U.S. patent’s priority date under § 119 
from its effective reference date under § 102(e), where priority was 
based on an earlier foreign application.961  The court in Giacomini 
explained that Hilmer was irrelevant because it was decided when 
§ 119 “only governed the benefit of claiming priority to an earlier 
filing date in foreign countries,” that is, before Congress added the 
provision in § 119(e) regarding provisional U.S. applications.962  
Further, § 102(e) makes plain that the reference date for a domestic 
patent is based on its priority date, because the statute governs only 
U.S. patents.963  Hilmer, which concerned an earlier foreign application, 
thus did not govern priority based on an earlier U.S. provisional 
application.964 
                                                          
 954. Id. at 1382, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699. 
 955. 35 U.S.C. § 111(b)(8) (2006) (stating that the provisions of Title 35 “relating 
to applications for patent shall apply to provisional applications for patent, except as 
otherwise provided, and except . . . [in] sections 115, 131, 135, and 157 of this title”). 
 956. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700. 
 957. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700. 
 958. Id. at 1384, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700.  
 959. Id. at 1384–85, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701. 
 960. 359 F.2d 859, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 480 (C.C.P.A. 1966). 
 961. Giacomini, 612 F.3d at 1384, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701 (citing Hilmer,  
359 F.2d at 861, 870, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 482, 489). 
 962. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701. 
 963. Id. at 1385, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) 
(2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 964. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701; see In re Klesper, 397 F.2d 882, 885,  
158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 256, 257–58 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (explaining that Hilmer clarified 
that “domestic and foreign filing dates stand on entirely different footings”). 
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Finally, the Federal Circuit’s anticipation decision in King 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eon Laboratories, Inc.,965 affirming the claims’ 
invalidity, could have broad consequences for pharmaceutical 
claims.966  The patents in King concerned methods for increasing the 
therapeutic effectiveness (bioavailability)of metaxalone, a muscle 
relaxant used to treat musculoskeletal conditions.967  In particular, the 
patents disclosed a method of “increasing the bioavailability of 
metaxalone by administration of an oral dosage form with food.”968 
As an initial matter, the court held that one claim was anticipated 
because it merely claimed a new benefit of an old process.969  The 
prior references, although not mentioning that taking metaxalone 
with food would increase the medicine’s effectiveness, all disclosed 
taking metaxalone with food to avoid gastrointestinal side effects.970  
The court held that the increased effectiveness was inherent in those 
prior art references,971 noting that “it is a general rule that merely 
discovering and claiming a new benefit of an old process cannot 
render the process again patentable.”972  Therefore, the claimed new 
benefit of increased effectiveness was anticipated because it was “the 
natural result flowing from the operation as taught” in the prior art.973   
Other claims added an “informing” step, a requirement that a 
patient be informed of the increased effectiveness of taking 
metaxalone with food.974  Thus, the question on appeal for those 
claims was “whether an otherwise anticipated method claim becomes 
patentable because it includes a step of ‘informing’ someone about 
the existence of an inherent property of that method.”975  The Federal 
Circuit held that it did not, stating that “[t]he ‘informing’ limitation 
adds no novelty to the method, which is otherwise anticipated by the 
prior art.”976  As the court explained, because the drug’s improved 
effectiveness when taken with food was not patentable, the 
instruction to do so was similarly not patentable.977   
                                                          
 965. 616 F.3d 1267, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1833 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 966. Id. at 1269–70, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835. 
 967. Id. at 1270–71, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835–36. 
 968. Id. at 1270, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835–36. 
 969. Id. at 1275–76, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839–40. 
 970. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839–40. 
 971. Id. at 1276, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839. 
 972. Id. at 1275, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839 (quoting In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 
1575, 1578, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1934, 1936 (Fed. Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 973. Id. at 1275–76, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839 (quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 
578, 581, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 323, 326 (C.C.P.A. 1981)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 974. Id. at 1277, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841. 
 975. Id. at 1278, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842. 
 976. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842. 
 977. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842. 
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In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on prior cases holding 
that a claim for printed material associated with a product, where the 
product is similar to products already in the prior art, is 
distinguishable over the prior art and patentable only if “there exists 
any new and unobvious functional relationship between the printed 
matter and the substrate.”978  This line of cases involved the addition 
of printed material to a known product.979  In finding the claims 
anticipated in King, the court extended the printed matter doctrine 
from product claims that recite written material to method claims 
that recite speech acts.980 
D. Enablement 
Under the enablement requirement of § 112, paragraph 1, the 
patent specification must describe the invention “in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms so as to enable any person skilled in the art 
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same . . . .”981  To be enabling, which is assessed as 
of the filing date, the patent specification “must teach those skilled in 
the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention 
without ‘undue experimentation.’”982  Courts consider the following 
factors in determining if a disclosure requires undue 
experimentation:  (1) the amount of experimentation that is 
necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented,  
(3) whether there are working examples, (4) the nature of the 
invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the skill of those 
practicing in the art, (7) whether the art is predicatable, and (8) the 
breadth of the claims.983  Enablement is a question of law reviewed de 
novo, based on underlying factual inquiries that are reviewed for 
clear error.984   
The Federal Circuit addressed certain aspects of the enablement 
requirement in three 2010 cases.  In Transocean Offshore Deepwater 
                                                          
 978. Id. at 1278–79, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842 (citing In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 
1381, 1386, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 401, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  
 979. Id. at 1279, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842; see In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339, 
70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1862, 1864 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (preventing the 
entitlement to patent an existing product after adding a new set of instructions). 
 980. King, 616 F.3d at 1279–80, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843. 
 981. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 982. ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1823, 1826 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 
1361, 1365, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 983. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826 (quoting Wands, 858 F.2d at 737,  
8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 984. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826. 
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Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.,985 the court made clear 
that, to satisfy the enablement requirement, the patent application 
has to enable only the invention, not the most efficient commercial 
embodiment of the invention.986  The patent in that case related to an 
apparatus for conducting offshore drilling that improved over the 
prior art by providing a more efficient system for that time-
consuming process.987  The district court granted summary judgment 
to the defendant, holding that the claims were not enabling based on 
the court’s view that the specification did not include sufficient 
description of the claimed “‘assembly . . . operable to transfer tubular 
assemblies’ or ‘means . . . for transferring tubular assemblies.’”988  
According to the district court, a person “skill[ed] in the art could 
not practice the invention without undue experimentation.”989  In 
reaching that conclusion, the court relied on evidence showing the 
patentee’s difficulty in building a commercial embodiment of the 
claimed invention, where the patentee contracted with a third party 
to build the embodiment because the inventors allegedly “did not 
know how to construct” certain equipment.990   
On appeal, the patentee argued that the district court erroneously 
required enablement of a commercial embodiment rather than the 
claimed invention itself.991  The Federal Circuit agreed with the 
patentee, stating that the patent “is not required to enable the most 
optimized configuration, unless this is an explicit part of the 
claims.”992  Because the district court also erred in determining that 
there was no genuine issue as to undue experimentation, the Federal 
Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment for lack of 
enablement.993 
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,994 the Federal 
Circuit emphasized that whether the patent specification is enabling 
depends on the view of a person of ordinary skill in the art to make 
and use the claimed invention, not someone with more advanced 
skills or experience.995  There, the patentee’s scientists had advantages 
that prevented them from relying on certain knowledge that would 
                                                          
 985. 617 F.3d 1296, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 986. Id. at 1306–07, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110 (citing Nat’l Recovery Techs., 
Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1671, 1676 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 987. Id. at 1300–02, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106–07. 
 988. Id. at 1305, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1109–10. 
 989. Id. at 1305–06, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110. 
 990. Id. at 1306, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110. 
 991. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110. 
 992. Id. at 1307, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110. 
 993. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1110–11. 
 994. 619 F.3d 1329, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 995. Id. at 1340, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
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have enabled the patent to one of ordinary skill.  Because 
enablement depends on whether a person of ordinary skill would rely 
on the disclosure, the defendant could not rely on advantages 
possessed by the patentee’s scientists whose skill exceeded that 
level. . . . .”996   
At the same time, however, a patentee cannot rely on a person of 
ordinary skill to supply information missing from the patent 
specification.  In ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, LLC,997 the 
court reiterated that, where a person of ordinary skill “would have 
been required to engage in an iterative, trial-and-error process to 
practice the claimed invention even with the help of the [] patent 
specification,” the specification could only be considered a starting 
point or direction for further research and would not be entitled to a 
patent.998  That was the case in ALZA.  The patent at issue was a 
“breakaway” from the prior art, with non-routine and difficult-to-
develop methods for delivering the drug.  Accordingly, the court 
concluded the asserted claims were not enabled and affirmed the 
judgment of invalidity.999 
E. Best Mode 
Under the best mode requirement of §112, paragraph 1, a patent 
specification must set forth the “best mode contemplated by the 
inventor of carrying out his invention.”1000  The best mode 
requirement “comprises part of the quid pro quo of the patent grant, 
prohibiting inventors from receiving the benefit of the right to 
exclude while at the same time concealing from the public preferred 
embodiments of their inventions.”1001  Compliance with the best mode 
requirement is a question of fact, but the scope of the invention to 
which the best mode applies presents a question of law.1002  
A two-pronged inquiry governs compliance with the best mode 
requirement:  Under the first, subjective prong, “the court must 
determine whether, at the time the patent application was filed, the 
inventor possessed a best mode of practicing the claimed 
invention.”1003  Under the second, objective prong, the court asks 
                                                          
 996. Id. at 1344, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 997. 603 F.3d 935, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 998. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827. 
 999. Id. at 941–43, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827–29. 
 1000. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 1001. Ajinomoto Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 597 F.3d 1267, 1272, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1055, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp.,  
299 F.3d 1313, 1330, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 1002. Id. at 1272, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060. 
 1003. Green Edge Enters., LLC v. Rubber Mulch Etc., LLC, 620 F.3d 1287, 1296, 96 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1431. 
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whether the inventor “concealed” the preferred mode from the 
public.1004 
Two significant decisions in 2010 addressed the best mode 
requirement.  In Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. International Trade 
Commission,1005 the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s determination 
that two patents related to improved methods of producing the 
amino acid lysine did not disclose the inventors’ best mode of 
carrying out the invention.1006  In reaching that conclusion, the 
Federal Circuit addressed the parties’ dispute as to whether the best 
mode concerned the overall production of lysine claimed in the 
patent, or only the claimed invention’s new innovations.1007  In 
response, the court emphasized that the entire “invention claimed” is 
the relevant disclosure, not merely the “innovative aspects” or 
“inventive features” of the invention.1008  Noting that the best mode 
requirement captures the “two way street” of the patent grant, the 
court explained:  “[i]nfringement requires all claim limitations to be 
present, not just those that distinguish the claim from the prior art.  
So too with the best mode requirement, which applies to the 
invention claimed, with all its limitations, not just the novel ones.”1009  
The court affirmed the ITC determination that the patents did not 
adequately disclose the best mode of carrying out the invention.1010 
In Green Edge Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Rubber Mulch Etc., L.L.C.,1011 the 
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s determination, rendered 
on summary judgment, that a patent for synthetic mulch colored with 
acrylic colorant to imitate natural mulch violated the best mode 
requirement.1012  It was undisputed that the inventor had a subjective 
preference for one mode, so the only issue was the second step—
whether the evidence objectively showed that the inventor concealed 
the best mode from the public.1013  That question turned on whether 
the inventor “disclosed its best mode when it disclosed a material by a 
name that did not exist and failed to identify the material that it 
actually used.”1014  Noting “that an inventor using a proprietary 
product in his preferred embodiment must, ‘at a minimum, . . . 
provide supplier/trade name information in order to satisfy the best 
                                                          
 1004. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431. 
 1005. 597 F.3d 1267, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 1006. Id. at 1277, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063. 
 1007. Id. at 1273, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.  
 1008. Id. at 1274, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
 1009. Id. at 1274–75, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
 1010. Id. at 1276–78, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063–64. 
 1011. 620 F.3d 1287, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1012. Id. at 1296–97, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431–32. 
 1013. Id. at 1296, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431. 
 1014. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431. 
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mode requirement,’” the court concluded that there was a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether the best mode had been 
disclosed.1015  The court found that the named material “would not 
have described the precise color preferred by the inventors.”1016  
When viewed in the light most favorable to the inventor, however, 
one could conclude that the material named “could have allowed a 
person to obtain a product with the best formulation.”1017  Because 
that presented a genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment 
for violation of the best mode requirement was improper.1018 
F. Written Description 
Section 112, paragraph 1, of the Patent Act provides that “[t]he 
specification shall contain a written description of the invention.”1019  
“Adequate written description requires that the applicant ‘convey 
with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the  
filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the  
[claimed] invention.’”1020  “Compliance with the written description 
requirement is a question of fact.”1021 
In March 2010, sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit issued one of its 
most important opinions to date regarding the requirement in § 112, 
paragraph 1.  Addressing whether the written description 
requirement is an independent requirement, or if it applies only to 
the enablement requirement of § 112, the court held in Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.1022 that “§ 112, first paragraph, 
contains two separate description requirements:  a ‘written 
description [i] of the invention, and [ii] of the manner and process 
of making and using [the invention’].”1023  Thus, the court confirmed 
that, to be patentable and valid, a patent must contain a written 
description of the invention, and this requirement is separate and 
unique from the written description of enablement requirement.1024  
Enablement requires a written description “of the manner and 
                                                          
 1015. Id. at 1296–97, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431. 
 1016. Id. at 1297, 96 U.S.P.Q.D.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
 1017. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
 1018. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
 1019. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 1020. Laryngeal Mask Co. v. AMBU, A/S, 618 F.3d 1367, 1373, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1757, 1762 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 
1555, 1563–64, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 1021. Id. at 1373, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1762 (quoting ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris 
Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1376, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 
2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1022. 598 F.3d 1336, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1023. Id. at 1344, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (emphasis in original) (quoting  
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)). 
 1024. § 112; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1344, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166. 
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process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or 
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.”1025  
By contrast, as the court explained, the test for satisfying the first 
requirement in § 112—the written description of the invention—”is 
whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably 
conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of 
the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”1026  “[T]he hallmark 
of written description is disclosure . . . the specification must describe 
an invention understandable to [a] skilled artisan and show that the 
inventor actually invented the invention claimed.”1027 
Of the several written description cases decided since Ariad, the 
outcomes have varied.  In some cases, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
decisions finding adequate written description,1028 and in other cases 
it affirmed findings of inadequate written description.1029  In still 
other cases, the Federal Circuit disagreed with findings of invalidity 
for lack of written description, either determining that sufficient 
written description existed,1030 or that at least genuine issues of 
material fact precluded summary judgment.1031  In these decisions, the 
court reiterated that, while the test for written description “has never 
been whether the patent includes a description of the steps that may 
be used to prove infringement,”1032 the test does not simply ask 
whether a person of skill in the art could “envision” the invention.1033  
Instead, the specification must reasonably convey to one skilled in the 
art “that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as 
of the filing date.”1034 
Beyond Ariad’s clarification, one particular issue concerning 
written description that arose in 2010 concerned the context of 
interference proceedings.  The issue concerned which disclosure 
should be used to construe the claims subject to a written description 
                                                          
 1025. § 112; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1344, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166. 
 1026. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172. 
 1027. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172. 
 1028. E.g., Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 
1305, 1320, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1640, 1652 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Yorkey v. Diab,  
605 F.3d 1297, 1305, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1029. E.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 619 F.3d 1329, 1344–45,  
96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1375, 1387–89 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1030. E.g., Goeddel v. Sugano, 617 F.3d 1350, 1356–57, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398, 
1403–04 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1292, 1301, 
95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1193, 1200–01 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1031. E.g., Laryngeal Mask Co. v. AMBU, A/S, 618 F.3d 1367, 1375, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1757, 1763 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1032. Eli Lilly, 619 F.3d at 1345, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 1033. Goeddel, 617 F.3d at 1356, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403. 
 1034. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1161, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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challenge, when the applicant copied the claims from another patent 
to provoke an interference.  In Robertson v. Timmermans1035 and 
Koninklijke Philips Electronic N.V., v. Cardiac Science Operating Co.,1036 the 
two cases in which that issue arose, the court answered that the 
originating disclosure should be used.1037  Citing prior precedent, the 
court reiterated that “when a party challenges written description 
support for an interference count or the copied claim in an 
interference, the originating disclosure provides the meaning of the 
pertinent claim language.”1038 
The issue arose because the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences held that the specification of the patent at issue was 
irrelevant to construing a claim term in the application of a 
competitor on which the interference was based.1039  That application, 
which claimed an earlier priority date than the patent at issue, had 
forced the interference by copying the claims from the patent at 
issue.1040  In refusing to consider the specification of the patent from 
which the claims originated, the Board relied on its regulation in 37 
C.F.R. § 41.200(b), which provides that “[a] claim shall be given its 
broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification or patent in 
which it appears.”1041   
Reversing and remanding in each case, the Federal Circuit faulted 
the Board and the district court for applying § 41.200(b) in the face 
of contrary and overriding judicial authority.1042  The Federal Circuit 
had previously held that “when a party challenges written description 
support for an interference count or the copied claim in an 
interference, the originating disclosure provides the meaning of the 
pertinent claim language.”1043  “[B]ecause the PTO lacks the 
substantive rulemaking authority to administratively set aside [that] 
judicial precedent,” district courts and the Board “must follow 
judicial precedent instead of 37 C.F.R. § 41.200(b) when a party 
challenges another’s written description during an interference 
                                                          
 1035. 603 F.3d 1309, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1954 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1036. 590 F.3d 1326, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1037. Robertson, 603 F.3d at 1312, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1956; Philips, 590 F.3d at 
1335–36, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
 1038. Philips, 590 F.3d at 1335, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234 (quoting Agilent 
Techs., Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 1366, 1375, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1167 
(Fed. Cir. 2009)); accord Robertson, 603 F.3d at 1313, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1956. 
 1039. Robertson, 603 F.3d at 1312–13, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954, 1956.  
 1040. Id. at 1310, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1955. 
 1041. Id. at 1311, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1956 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 41.200(b) 
(2009) (emphasis added)). 
 1042. Robertson, 603 F.3d at 1313, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957–58; Philips, 590 F.3d 
at 1338, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236. 
 1043. Philips, 590 F.3d at 1335, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234 (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Agilent, 567 F.3d at 1375, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167). 
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proceeding.”1044  In each case, the Federal Circuit reversed and 
remanded, for consideration in light of the original specification.1045 
G. Indefiniteness 
Section 112, paragraph 2 mandates a definiteness requirement:  
“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter 
which the applicant regards as his invention.”1046  The definiteness 
requirement ensures that “the claims, as interpreted in view of the 
written description, adequately perform their function of notifying 
the public of the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude.”1047  
Indefiniteness is a legal question reviewed de novo.1048 
In 2010, the Federal Circuit addressed claim definiteness rulings in 
several published cases.  Notably, while there are arguably divergent 
standards in the Federal Circuit on indefiniteness, 1049 the court in 
each case declined to find the claims indefinite,1050 at most remanding 
to the district court for further proceedings on the issue in view of a 
change in claim construction announced on appeal.1051 
                                                          
 1044. Id. at 1337, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234–35. 
 1045. Robertson, 603 F.3d at 1313, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957–58; Philips, 590 F.3d 
at 1338, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236. 
 1046. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 1047. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1338,  
68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 1048. Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 1366, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1385, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Young v. Lumenis, Inc. 492 F.3d 1336, 
1344, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 1049. Compare Exxon Research & Engr’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375, 
60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (setting forth the “insolubly 
ambiguous” standard for finding a claim indefinite); with Athletic Alternatives v. 
Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(“Where there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a 
claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that indicates that the applicant is at least 
entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning, we consider the notice function of 
the claim to be best served by adopting the narrower meaning.”). 
 1050. Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1346, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1417, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Funai Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 616 F.3d 
1357, 1372, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Telcordia Techs., Inc. 
v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 612 F.3d 1365, 1377, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1682 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); Hearing Components, Inc., 600 F.3d at 1368, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392–93; 
Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1350, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1241, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 
1332–36, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326–29 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Trading Techs. Int’l, 
Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1358, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1805, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 609 F.3d at 1292, 1302, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193, 
1202. 
 1051. Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 607 F.3d 776, 783–84,  
95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1556, 1561–62 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (remanding to the district 
court for further proceedings on the indefiniteness challenge, in light of the Federal 
Circuit’s new claim construction). 
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Beyond resting on fact-specific issues in addressing indefiniteness 
arguments, certain general principles of this area of law were 
discussed.  For instance, in Funai Electric Co. v. Daewoo Electronics 
Corp.,1052 the Federal Circuit recognized that, because of the strict 
rules governing patent applications, claim terms are not always 
written in the most elegant, straightforward language.  “The 
protocols of claim writing can lead to awkward phrasing, for the claim 
is restricted to a single sentence, no matter how complex the 
invention; and claim content is burdened by tradition”; and the 
draftsman, although necessarily writing for persons knowledgeable in 
the field of the invention, “knows that ultimately the patent must 
survive the legal scrutiny of lay judges and juries.”1053  Accordingly, 
“[a]n ungainly claim is not thereby indefinite, when its meaning can 
be understood by a person experienced in the field of the invention, 
on review of the patent documents.”1054  In emphasizing this 
approach, the court invoked Judge Learned Hand’s guidance that, 
“[a]s in any other written instrument, words [of a patent claim] are 
capable of many meanings; [the court] must translate them into the 
underlying purpose of their user.”1055 
In Telcordia Technologies, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,1056 the Federal 
Circuit addressed the definiteness requirement in the context of 
means-plus-function claims, and split on whether the requirement 
was satisfied in that case.1057  For a means-plus-function claim to satisfy 
the definiteness requirement, “the written description must clearly 
link or associate structure to the claimed function.”1058  The majority 
opinion, authored by Chief Judge Rader and joined by Judge Lourie, 
looked to the written description to see if “an ordinary artisan would 
understand [it] to clearly link or associate the controller [in 
question] with the claimed function,”1059 and concluded that “an 
ordinary artisan would know how to both interpret the specification 
and actually build a circuit.”1060  The majority thus affirmed the 
district court’s decision finding the claim language definite.1061  In her 
                                                          
 1052. 616 F.3d 1357, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1053. Id. at 1372, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340.  
 1054. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340. 
 1055. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Dorsey v. Pilot Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 211, 212, 1 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 203, 203 (2d Cir. 
1929)). 
 1056. 612 F.3d 1365, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1057. Id. at 1376, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681–82 (citing Biomedino, LLC v. 
Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1118, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 
2007)).  
 1058. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681. 
 1059. Id. at 1377, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 1060. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.  
 1061. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
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dissent, Judge Prost disagreed that the patent disclosure clearly 
linked the structure of the controller with the claimed function “to 
the extent required by this court’s precedent.”1062  According to Judge 
Prost, it was insufficient “that a skilled artisan can follow the clues in 
the patent and solve the mystery of what structure must perform the 
claimed function,” because the specification must “clearly link a 
particular structure with a claimed function.”1063 
In two other cases, the Federal Circuit addressed the definiteness 
of claim terms using words of degree.  In Hearing Components, Inc. v. 
Shure Inc.,1064 the patents were directed to hearing-aid elements and 
required the device to be configured to be “readily installed and 
replaced by a user.”1065  The district court concluded that the “readily 
installed” requirement was indefinite and, therefore, the claim was 
invalid.1066  The Federal Circuit reversed, reiterating that not all terms 
of degree are indefinite and that the test is “whether the patent’s 
specification supplies some standard for measuring the scope of the 
phrase.”1067  The patent in Hearing Components provided some standard 
for measuring the “readily installed” phrase.  The specification 
explained that one of the advantages of the patent was that it 
“requires no tools for installation or removal,” and it distinguished 
prior art that made removal and replacement difficult, particularly in 
light of the fact that many people who wear hearing aids are elderly 
and may have difficulty seeing and manipulating small parts.1068  
Based on those examples, the Federal Circuit reversed the district 
court’s indefiniteness holding.1069 
In the other case, Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp.,1070 the court 
addressed patents directed to techniques for labeling and detecting 
nucleic acids (such as DNA and RNA), and determined that the claim 
phrase “not interfering substantially” did not render the claim 
indefinite.1071  Even though a “precise numerical measurement” was 
not identified, the patent specification and prosecution history 
“provide[d] at least some guidance” to define the scope of the 
claims.1072 
                                                          
 1062. Id. at 1379, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
 1063. Id. at 1380, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1064. 600 F.3d 1357, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1065. Id. at 1366, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 
 1066. Id. at 1362, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
 1067. Id. at 1367, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1351, 75 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 1068. Id. at 1367, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392. 
 1069. Id. at 1368, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392. 
 1070. 599 F.3d 1325, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1071. Id. at 1336, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.   
 1072. Id. at 1334, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
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H. Patentable Subject Matter 
In June 2010, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bilski v. 
Kappos,1073 addressing the most basic question of patent law:  what 
constitutes patentable subject matter.1074  Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”1075  At issue in Bilski was the 
patentability of a “process,” one of the four categories identified in 
§ 101 and defined elsewhere in the Patent Act as a “process, art, or 
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, 
manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”1076  Over time, the 
Federal Circuit had settled on a “machine-or-transformation” test 
under which a process patent would be eligible only “if:  (1) it is tied 
to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular 
article into a different state or thing.”1077  This test arguably made it 
more difficult to patent business-method claims and system claims. 
Bilski held that the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation 
test, although “a useful and important clue,” was not the sole test for 
determining § 101’s patent eligibility of process claims.1078  In Bilski, 
the Supreme Court emphasized that, under § 101’s broad language, a 
subject matter is entitled to protection if it falls within “any” subject 
matter in the four independent categories and “any” improvement in 
that subject matter qualifying for protection.1079  Nonetheless finding 
the risk-management method at issue in Bilski to be unpatentable, the 
Supreme Court relied on its prior precedent on the unpatentability 
of abstract ideas.1080  Thus, the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the 
invalidity holding, but in doing so broadened the test for § 101. 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski, the Federal Circuit 
in 2010 continued to apply its machine-or-transformation test.  In 
SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,1081 the court 
affirmed an ITC ruling that certain patents related to global 
positioning systems (“GPS”) recited patentable subject matter.1082  
Relying on its then-definitive machine-or-transformation test, the 
                                                          
 1073. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (2010). 
 1074. Id. at 3223, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 1075. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 1076. Id. § 100(b). 
 1077. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954, 959–60, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1391, 
1394–95 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 1078. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226–27, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.  
 1079. Id. at 3225, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.  
 1080. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 1081. 601 F.3d 1319, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1607 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
 1082. Id. at 1333, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
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court found that a GPS receiver is a machine and that it was integral 
to the disputed claims.1083  Because the method could not be 
performed without the device, the disputed claims were properly 
directed to patentable subject matter.1084 
After Bilski, the court had an opportunity to address the patent 
eligibility of medical treatment claims.  In King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Eon Laboratories, Inc.,1085 the district court found a medical treatment 
claim invalid under § 101.1086  The claims concerned methods for 
increasing the therapeutic effectiveness of a drug used to treat 
musculoskeletal conditions by taking the drug with food.1087  Based on 
§ 101, the district court invalidated one claim that added to the 
claimed treatment method an “informing” requirement—i.e., that 
the patient be informed of the increased effectiveness of the drug if 
taken with food.1088  The Federal Circuit reversed the § 101 holding 
because, in concluding that the claim did not recite patentable 
subject matter, the district court had focused on only the “informing” 
limitation.1089  As the court explained, Supreme Court authority has 
long made clear that the § 101 “patentability analysis is directed to 
the claim as a whole, not individual limitations.”1090  By improperly 
focusing on the patentability of one limitation in isolation, the district 
court improperly applied § 101.1091  The Federal Circuit, however, did 
not itself determine whether the claim as a whole satisfied § 101.1092  
Instead, noting that “as an appellate court, we are not limited to a 
district court’s stated reasons for invalidating claims and can affirm a 
grant of summary judgment on any ground supported by the record 
and adequately raised below,” the court found the claim invalid due 
to anticipation, an argument that was raised but not decided 
below.1093 
In Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services,1094 which 
was returned to the Federal Circuit for consideration in light of Bilski, 
the Federal Circuit found that the medical treatment claims satisfied 
                                                          
 1083. Id. at 1332, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.   
 1084. Id. at 1333, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.  
 1085. 616 F.3d 1267, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1833 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1086. Id. at 1270, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.   
 1087. King, 616 F.3d at 1270, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836. 
 1088. Id. at 1271, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836. 
 1089. Id. at 1277, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841. 
 1090. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590, 
198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 (1978)). 
 1091. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841. 
 1092. See id. at 1278, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841. 
 1093. See id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841 (stating that the case “does not present 
the proper vehicle for determining whether claims covering medical treatment 
methods are eligible for patenting under § 101 because” the claim is anticipated 
under § 102). 
 1094. 628 F.3d 1347, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 17, 2010). 
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§ 101⎯the same conclusion it had reached in its original, pre-Bilski 
decision in that case.1095  The claims concerned a method for 
determining whether a patient has received a therapeutically effective 
amount of drugs used to treat inflammatory bowel diseases with 
minimum toxic side effects.1096  The court found that the claims 
containing an “administering” step recited a patent-eligible 
application of naturally occurring correlations, not merely the 
natural correlation itself which would be unpatentable, because “the 
human body necessarily undergoes a transformation” when drugs are 
administered to it, “which is itself not a natural process.”1097  The 
court reached the same conclusion even for claims requiring only a 
“determining” step of whether a certain level of toxicity existed—
without any prior “administering” step.  As the court explained, 
determining levels of toxicity “necessarily involves a transformation” 
because some “manipulation” is necessary to extract materials from 
the human body to determine their content. 1098  In reaching these 
conclusions, the Federal Circuit relied on its earlier application of its 
machine-or-transformation test, stating that Bilski “rejected the 
machine-or-transformation test only as a definitive test.”1099  
In Research Corp. Technologies v. Microsoft Corp.,1100 the court turned to 
patent eligibility of a different type of subject matter—claims for 
digital image halftoning, the process of generating electronic display 
and print images using only a small number of pixel colors while 
appearing to display a much greater number of colors and shades.1101  
The district court had held that the patents did not satisfy § 101.1102  
Reversing, the Federal Circuit reiterated, based on Supreme Court 
precedent, that there are “only three exceptions to the Patent Act’s 
broad patent-eligibility principles:  ‘laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.’”1103  In Research Corp., it was 
undisputed that “abstract ideas” was the only potentially relevant 
category.1104  Stating that Bilski “invited this court to develop ‘other 
limiting criteria that further the purpose of the Patent Act and are 
not inconsistent with its text,’” the Federal Circuit held that there was 
                                                          
 1095. Id. at 1349, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 1096. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 1097. Id. at 1356–58, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103–04. 
 1098. Id. at 1357, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104. 
 1099. Id. at 1355, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. 
 1100. 627 F.3d 859, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1101. Id. at 862–63, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276. 
 1102. Id. at 862, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276. 
 1103. Id. at 867, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279–80 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, 309, 206 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 193, 197 (1980)). 
 1104. Id. at 867–68, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.  
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nothing abstract in the processes claimed.1105  Focusing on the 
invention as a whole, the court observed that it “presents functional 
and palpable applications on the field of computer technology,” and 
that the incorporation of algorithms and formulas into such specific 
applications with physical components did not prevent patent 
eligibility under § 101.1106  In reaching this conclusion, the court held 
that it “will not presume to define ‘abstract’ beyond the recognition 
that this disqualifying characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly 
as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter 
and the statutory context that directs primary attention on the 
patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.”1107  The court 
noted, however, that the basic gatekeeper function of § 101 did not 
preclude abstractness challenges under § 112.1108  Because the 
challenge in Research Corp. rested only on § 101, the court reversed 
the district court’s summary judgment that the patents did not claim 
patent-eligible inventions and remanded.1109 
Finally, in Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd.,1110 although the majority did 
not address § 101, Judge Dyk wrote a separate opinion to discuss the 
patentability of “isolated” DNA molecules.1111  An “isolated” DNA 
molecule is generally defined as having been separated from its 
natural environment in the human body, and is often used to identify 
persons predisposed to diseases and to treat diseases.1112  The majority 
did not reach the patent eligibility of the isolated DNA molecules 
claimed in the patent because § 101 was not at issue on appeal.1113  In 
his separate opinion, Judge Dyk wrote that the court’s decision on 
other issues in the case should not be read to indicate that the claims 
satisfied § 101, and indicated his view that claims for the isolated 
DNA molecules “do in fact raise serious questions of patentable 
subject matter.”1114  Judge Dyk nonetheless observed that, although 
the court has not yet directly addressed the § 101 question for such 
“product of nature” claims, the court has “upheld the validity of 
                                                          
 1105. Id. at 868, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 
3218, 3231, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1010 (2010)). 
 1106. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280. 
 1107. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280. 
 1108. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280. 
 1109. Id. at 874, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284. 
 1110. 617 F.3d 1282, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1956 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1111. Id. at 1292, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1963–64 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part on other grounds). 
 1112. Id. at 1285, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958 (majority opinion).  
 1113. Id. at 1284, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958 (deciding issues of claim 
construction, noninfringement, and prosecution history estoppel). 
 1114. Id. at 1292, 1294, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964–65 (Dyk, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part on other grounds). 
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several gene patents.”1115  Describing the § 101 test for such “product 
of nature” claims as whether the claimed product is “qualitatively 
different from the product occurring in nature,” Judge Dyk stated 
that “[i]t is far from clear that an ‘isolated’ DNA sequence is 
qualitatively different from the product occurring in nature such that 
it would pass” that test.1116  As he stated, “[t]he mere fact that such a 
DNA molecule does not occur in isolated form in nature does not, by 
itself, answer the question.”1117  In light of Judge Dyk’s separate 
opinion in Intervet, a decision on this issue, which could have 
significant impact on the biotechnology industry if the court rejects 
such claims, will likely decide whether isolated DNA molecules are in 
fact distinct from their natural state in the human body to be patent 
eligible under § 101. 1118 
I. Double Patenting 
The doctrine of double patenting, which stems from § 101’s 
statement that an inventor may obtain “a” patent for an invention, 
prevents applicants from obtaining multiple patents for the same 
invention.1119  The doctrine has two forms—statutory double 
patenting, which prohibits applying for a second patent for the same 
invention, and the judicially-created obviousness-type double 
patenting, which prohibits patent applications for slight variations of 
the invention already patented.  
 The Federal Circuit addressed obviousness-type double 
patenting in two significant decisions this year.  In Sun Pharmaceutical 
Industries, Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Company,1120 the court addressed 
obviousness-type double patenting for pharmaceutical compounds 
and their uses.1121  Both patents in Sun related to gemcitabine, the 
active ingredient in one of the defendant’s products.1122  The earlier 
patent claimed gemcitabine itself, as well as a method of using it to 
treat viral infections.1123  Its specification, however, also disclosed 
using gemcitabine to treat cancer.1124  The later patent claimed a 
                                                          
 1115. Id. at 1293–94, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964–65. 
 1116. Id. at 1294–95, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965. 
 1117. Id. at 1295, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965. 
 1118. In fact, this issue is presented in Association of Molecular Pathology v. U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (Myriad Genetics), No. 2010-1406.  Members of Jones 
Day are counsel in that case. 
 1119. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 1120. 611 F.3d 1381, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1797 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1121. Id. at 1384, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799.  
 1122. Id. at 1383, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798.  
 1123. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798. 
 1124. Id. at 1384, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798. 
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method of using gemcitabine to treat cancer.1125  The earlier patent 
had already expired, but the later patent does not expire until 
2012.1126 
The district court held that certain claims of the later patent were 
invalid for obviousness-type double patenting.1127  Prior Federal 
Circuit precedent already established that claims of a later patent are 
invalid for obviousness-type double patenting “where an earlier 
patent claimed a compound, disclosing its utility in the specification, 
and a later patent claimed a method of using the compound for a use 
described in the specification of the earlier patent.”1128  “[A] claim to 
a method of using a composition is not patentably distinct from an 
earlier claim to the identical composition in a patent disclosing the 
identical use.”1129   
The patent owner attempted to distinguish the prior precedent, 
and thereby preclude application of the double-patenting doctrine to 
its later patent, by arguing that those cases involved earlier 
specifications that disclosed a single use for the compound, whereas 
the earlier patent in this case disclosed multiple uses, and a use other 
than the one claimed in the later patent was necessary to the earlier 
patent.1130  The Federal Circuit rejected that argument and held that 
the cases were not so limited.1131  “[O]bviousness-type double 
patenting encompasses any use for a compound that is disclosed in 
the specification of an earlier patent claiming the compound and is 
later claimed as a method of using that compound.”1132  The prior 
precedent did not limit its application based on the number of uses 
disclosed in the prior patent’s specification. 1133  Here, in determining 
that the asserted claims of the later patent were invalid for 
obviousness-type double patenting, the district court properly 
followed the Federal Circuit’s prior precedent and considered all 
uses for the compound described in the earlier patent’s 
specification.1134   
The Federal Circuit also rejected the patent owner’s argument that 
the court should consult the specification of an earlier application of 
                                                          
 1125. Id. at 1383, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798–99. 
 1126. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798. 
 1127. Id. at 1384, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799. 
 1128. Id. at 1385, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800 (citing Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. 
USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353, 1363, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
Geneva Pharms., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1385–86, 68 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1865, 1875 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 1129. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800.  
 1130. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800.  
 1131. Id. at 1386, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800. 
 1132. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1801 (emphasis added). 
 1133. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1801. 
 1134. Id. at 1387, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1801.  
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the prior patent, rather than the specification of the patent as 
issued.1135  The earlier application did not disclose the cancer use 
claimed in the later patent; that use was added in a continuation-in-
part application that resulted in the first patent.1136  Although 
acknowledging a “general rule that an earlier patent’s specification is 
not available to show obviousness-type double patenting,” the court 
stated that “there are ‘certain instances’ where the specification of an 
earlier patent may be used in the obviousness-type double patenting 
analysis.’”1137  “Specifically, the specification’s disclosure may be used 
to determine whether a claim ‘merely define[s] an obvious variation 
of what is earlier disclosed and claimed,’ ‘to learn the meaning of 
[claim] terms,’ and to ‘interpret [] the coverage of [a] claim.’”1138  
But the relevant specification to consult is that of the issued patent, 
not an earlier application of that patent.1139  This holding comported 
with the court’s claim construction precedent, which relies on the 
specification of the issued patent to determine the scope of a 
claim.1140  This holding also comported with the purpose of the 
double-patenting doctrine, which seeks to avoid continuing 
protection beyond the expiration of the first patent for essentially the 
same invention.1141  Thus, the double-patenting analysis “is concerned 
with the issued patent and the invention disclosed in that issued 
patent, not earlier drafts of the patent disclosure and claims.”1142  
Finding no error in the district court’s conclusion that the later 
patent’s claimed use was described in the earlier patent’s 
specification, the court affirmed the judgment of invalidity of the 
later patent’s claims.1143 
                                                          
 1135. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1801. 
 1136. Id. at 1388, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.  
 1137. Id. at 1387, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1801–02, (alteration in original) 
(quoting Geneva Pharms., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1385, 68 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1875 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) (citing In re Basell Poliolefine Italia 
S.P.A.,  
547 F.3d 1371, 1378, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (alterations in 
original)). 
 1138. Id. at 1387–88, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802 (quoting In re Basell, 547 F.3d at 
1378, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036) (“[W]e have expressly held that, where a patent 
claims a compound, a court performing an obviousness-type double patenting 
analysis should examine the specification to ascertain the coverage of the claim.”). 
 1139. Id. at 1388, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802. 
 1140. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802. 
 1141. Id. at 1389, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803 (quoting In re Kaplan, 789 F.3d 
1574, 1579–80 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 1142. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803. 
 1143. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.  In dissenting from the denial of the 
petition for rehearing en banc in Sun, Judge Newman, joined by Chief Judge Rader 
and Judges Lourie and Linn, interpreted the panel’s holding as contrary to the law 
of double patenting.  According to Judge Newman, the panel’s opinion in Sun 
“violates a vast body of precedent” that ignores the earlier patent’s specification in 
the double-patenting analysis “other than to guide in construing the claims.”  Sun 
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In Boehringer Ingelheim International GmbH v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.,1144 
the court confronted an attempt to avoid rejection for obviousness-
type double patenting by retroactive terminal disclaimer.1145  Terminal 
disclaimers are expressly permitted under 35 U.S.C. § 253:   
“A patentee, whether of the whole or any sectional interest therein, 
may, on payment of the fee required by law, make disclaimer of any 
complete claim, stating therein the extent of his interest in such 
patent.”1146  The patentee in Boehringer, however, made the disclaimer 
retroactively after the patent had expired.1147 
Building on the principle that “a patentee may file a disclaimer 
after issuance of the challenged patent or during litigation, even after 
a finding that the challenged patent is invalid for obviousness-type 
double patenting,” the patentee in Boehringer argued that its 
retroactive terminal disclaimer was effective to cure obviousness-type 
double patenting.1148  The court rejected the patentee’s argument, 
explaining that “when a patentee does not terminally disclaim the 
later patent before the expiration of the earlier related patent, the 
later patent purports to remain in force even after the date on which 
the patentee no longer has any right to exclude others from 
practicing the claimed subject matter.”1149  Allowing the later patent to 
remain in force would wrongly limit others from using the invention 
after the original patent period has expired, contrary to the purpose 
of the double-patenting doctrine.1150  “The patentee cannot undo this 
unjustified timewise extension by retroactively disclaiming the term 
of the later patent because it has already enjoyed rights that it seeks to 
disclaim.”1151 
The court, however, accepted the patentee’s argument that the 
safe harbor provision in § 121 protected the patent at issue from 
invalidity on the basis of double patenting.1152  Section 121 provides in 
relevant part that  
[a] patent issuing on an application with respect to which a 
requirement for restriction under this section has been made, or 
on an application filed as a result of such a requirement, shall not 
be used as a reference either in the Patent and Trademark Office 
                                                          
Pharm. Indus., Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 625 F.3d 719, 721–22, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1830, 1831–32 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 1144. 592 F.3d 1340, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1145. Id. at 1342, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418.  
 1146. 35 U.S.C. § 253 (2006). 
 1147. Boehringer, 592 F.3d at 1350, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422. 
 1148. Id. at 1347, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422. 
 1149. Id. at 1347–48, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422. 
 1150. Id. at 1348, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422. 
 1151. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423. 
 1152. Id. at 1354, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427. 
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or in the courts against a divisional application or against the 
original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the 
divisional application is filed before the issuance of the patent on 
the other application.1153   
The safe harbor, therefore, intends to protect applicants from 
“losing rights when an application is divided.”1154 
The Federal Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that § 121 
does not apply to a patent that is a “divisional of a divisional”:  
“[A]ssuming all other requirements of § 121 are met, the safe-harbor 
provision may apply to a divisional of a divisional of the application in 
which a restriction requirement was entered.”1155  Although the court 
agreed with the defendant that the statute’s “as a result of” provision 
applied to both the earlier patent and the patent at issue—i.e., that 
both the earlier patent and the patent at issue had to be filed “as a 
result of a requirement for restriction”—the court took a broad view 
of that language.1156   
 [S]o long as consonance is met, it makes no difference in terms 
of compliance with the ‘as a result of’ requirement whether the 
applicant responds to the examiner’s restriction requirement by 
filing one or more divisional applications from the original 
application, or instead files a single divisional application followed 
by successive additional divisionals.1157   
Because the patentee met all requirements of the safe harbor 
provision, the court reversed the district court’s judgment of 
invalidity for obviousness–type double patenting, and remanded for 
further proceedings.1158 
J. Recapture Doctrine 
Under § 251, a patentee, within two years of receiving a patent, 
may surrender that patent and seek reissue to enlarge the scope of 
the original claims if, “through error without any deceptive intent,” 
his original patent claimed “less than he had a right to claim.”1159  The 
right to reissue, however, is limited by the rule against recapture, 
under which reissue claims are invalid if their scope was broadened 
to reach subject matter surrendered in prosecuting the original 
                                                          
 1153. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2006). 
 1154. Boehringer, 592 F.3d at 1350, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425. 
 1155. Id. at 1352, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426. 
 1156. Id. at 1353, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426. 
 1157. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426. 
 1158. Id. at 1354, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427. 
 1159. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006). 
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claims.1160  The rule against recapture contains three steps:  (1) the 
court construes the reissued claims to determine whether and in what 
aspect they are broader than the original claims; (2) if the reissue 
claims are broader, the court determines whether the patentee 
surrendered subject matter during prosecution and whether the 
broader aspects relate to the surrendered subject matter; and (3) the 
court determines whether the material claims were sufficiently 
narrowed in other respects to avoid the recapture rule.1161 
The rule against recapture was applied this year in MBO 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Company.1162  There, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling finding a reissue patent 
disclosing a design for hypodermic safety syringes invalid for violating 
the rule against recapture.1163  The parties did not dispute the first 
and third steps of the recapture analysis, so the sole issue was 
whether, during the original prosecution of the patent, MBO “clearly 
and unmistakably surrendered claiming a guard body that moved 
relative to a fixed needle” for the safety syringe design patented.1164  
In reviewing the prosecution history, the Federal Circuit emphasized 
that it sought to “clarify that a patentee may violate the rule against 
recapture by claiming subject matter in a reissue patent that the 
patentee surrendered while prosecuting a related patent 
application,” not just the prosecution history related to the patent in 
question.1165  On the facts of that case, including the prosecution 
history of related patent applications, the court affirmed the district 
court’s holding that certain claims of the patent in question were 
invalid for violating the rule against recapture.1166  The court, 
however, reversed the district court’s decision to invalidate the entire 
patent, making clear that “when a reissue patent contains the 
unmodified original patent claims and the reissue claims, a court can 
only invalidate the reissue claims under the rule against recapture.”1167 
K. Inventorship 
 Inventorship arose in Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell International, Inc.,1168 
where the Federal Circuit reversed a district court decision 
                                                          
 1160. MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 602 F.3d 1306, 1313,  
94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1598, 1602 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Hester Indus., Inc. v. Stein, 
Inc., 142 F.3d 1472, 1480, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1647 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 1161. Id. at 1314, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603. 
 1162. 602 F.3d 1306, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1598 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1163. Id. at 1308, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599. 
 1164. Id. at 1314, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603. 
 1165. Id. at 1316, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604. 
 1166. Id. at 1319, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607. 
 1167. Id. at 1319, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606 (emphasis added). 
 1168. 622 F.3d 1367, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
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invalidating five patent claims on the view that the defendant was 
“another inventor” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2).1169  Under  
§ 102(g)(2), a person is not entitled to a patent if “before [the 
applicant’s] invention thereof, the invention was made in this 
country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed or 
concealed it.”1170  Beginning with the principle that an invention 
consists of two aspects—conception and reduction to practice—the 
threshold issue was whether the defendant had conceived of the 
invention at  issue.1171  “Conception is ‘the formation in the mind of 
the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and 
operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.’”1172   
In Solvay, the defendant had “reproduced the invention previously 
conceived and reduced to practice by [its Russian contractor] in 
Russia.”1173  On those facts, the court held that the defendant did not 
conceive of the invention and would not be considered an inventor 
under § 102(g)(2).1174  Thus, the district court erred in finding the 
claims invalid.1175  As yet another reason for rejecting the § 102(g)(2) 
defense, the Federal Circuit noted the fact that the Russian 
contractor’s “engineers first conceived the invention in Russia,” 
which failed to satisfy the requirement under the statute that the 
invention be made “in this country.”1176   
L. Inequitable Conduct 
Every patent applicant, his or her attorney, and other persons 
involved with the prosecution of a patent application “ha[ve] a duty 
of candor and good faith” in dealing with the U.S. Patent and Trade 
Office (PTO).1177  The “inequitable conduct” defense to patent 
infringement is rooted in this duty of candor.1178  If the duty is 
breached, the patent may be rendered unenforceable under the 
inequitable conduct doctrine.1179 
                                                          
 1169. Id. at 1386, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883. 
 1170. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2006). 
 1171. Solvay, 622 F.3d at 1376, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
 1172. Id. at 1377, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876 (citing Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. 
Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1919 (Fed. Cir. 
1994)). 
 1173. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
 1174. Id. at 1378, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.   
 1175. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 1176. Id. at 1375–78, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876–78. 
 1177. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2010). 
 1178. See infra text accompanying notes 1219–1312 (providing the elements of the 
inequitable conduct defense).  
 1179. See infra text accompanying notes 70–78 (discussing a court’s role in deciding 
whether the patent should be unenforceable). 
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To establish inequitable conduct, an accused infringer must 
present clear and convincing evidence that “the applicant (1) made 
an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose 
material information, or submitted false material information, and 
(2) intended to deceive” the PTO.1180  If the court finds that 
materiality and intent to deceive was proven by clear and convincing 
evidence, then the court must balance the equities to determine 
whether the conduct was sufficiently egregious to justify finding the 
patent unenforceable.1181  Mistake, negligence, or even gross 
negligence does not support an inequitable conduct conclusion.1182  
The determination is committed to the district court’s discretion and 
is subject to review for an abuse of discretion, although any 
underlying findings the district court renders on materiality and 
intent are reviewed for clear error.1183 
PTO Rule 56 provides guidance on the materiality inquiry.  It states 
that information is material to prosecution of a patent application if 
the information is not cumulative of information already before the 
PTO and the information:  (1) establishes “a prima facie case of 
unpatentability of a claim,” or (2) “refutes, or is inconsistent with” 
positions taken by the applicant during patent prosecution.1184  This 
rule was adopted in 1992; before that time, the rule used a 
“reasonable examiner” standard, defining information as material 
“where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner 
would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the 
application to issue as a patent.”1185  The reasonable examiner 
standard and other standards are also used for the judicial inquiry 
into inequitable conduct.1186 
For decades, the Federal Circuit has expressed concern about 
abuse of the inequitable conduct defense.  More than twenty years 
ago, the Federal Circuit bemoaned that “the habit of charging 
inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an 
                                                          
 1180. Lazare Kaplan Int’l, Inc. v. Photoscribe Techs., Inc., 628 F.3d 1349, 1378, 97 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437, 1451 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 2010) (quoting Star Scientific, Inc. 
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 
(Fed. Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1595 
(2009). 
 1181. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451 (quoting Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365, 88 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006). 
 1182. Aspex Eyewear Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 605 F.3d 1305, 1316, 94 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1856, 1863 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1183. Lazare, 628 F.3d at 1381, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451 (citing Star Scientific, 
537 F.3d at 1365, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006). 
 1184. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2010). 
 1185. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1991). 
 1186. Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315–16, 77 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1828  (Fed. Cir. 2006) (observing that “several different 
standards of materiality,” including the “reasonable examiner” test, have emerged). 
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absolute plague.”1187  In many inequitable conduct decisions, 
continuing into 2010, panels frequently issue divided opinions with 
sharp disputes, and various judges have individually criticized the 
state of the doctrine and called for en banc review.1188   
This year, the court responded to the internally and externally 
criticized inequitable conduct doctrine by granting en banc review in 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.1189  Indeed, in upholding the 
inequitable conduct ruling in a 2-1 decision in Therasense, the panel 
majority in that case acknowledged that inequitable conduct rulings 
should be uncommon, describing that case as one of the rare 
instances in which a finding of inequitable conduct is justified.”1190  
The en banc proceedings in Therasense include the fundamental 
question whether “the materiality-intent-balancing framework for 
inequitable conduct should be modified or replaced, and if so, what 
standard should be used.”1191 
Oral argument was heard in November, and a decision is expected 
in 2011.  In the meantime, the Federal Circuit has continued to 
address inequitable conduct.  This section discusses those cases in 
chronological order. 
In Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc.,1192 the district 
court found no inequitable conduct, and the Federal Circuit 
affirmed.1193  The patents at issue claimed “software for displaying the 
market for a commodity traded in an electronic exchange.”1194  The 
inequitable conduct charge was based on the lack of disclosure of the 
inventor’s use of certain custom software both before and after the 
date he believed to be the relevant priority date.1195  As for the later 
use, the record showed that the inventor relied on the priority date in 
good faith, the examiner never questioned that priority date, and the 
inventor’s use of the software after that date would not have 
materially changed the examiner’s analysis.1196  On those facts, the 
Federal Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in 
                                                          
 1187. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 1188. See infra text accompanying notes 1219–1312 (highlighting various judges’ 
criticisms of the inequitable conduct doctrine).  
 1189. 593 F.3d 1289, 1300, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489, 1498 (Fed. Cir. 2010), reh’g 
en banc granted, 374 F. App’x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1190. Id. at 1300, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.   
 1191. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 374 F. App’x 35, 35–36 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted) (granting a rehearing en banc and requesting 
that the parties file briefs addressing six specific issues).  
 1192. 595 F.3d 1340, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1805 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1193. Id. at 1345, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808. 
 1194. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808. 
 1195. Id. at 1350, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812. 
 1196. Id. at 1362, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
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finding the software’s use after that priority date immaterial.1197  The 
court further held that there was no clear error in ruling that any pre-
priority date activities not disclosed were also not relevant.1198  While 
“[e]xperimental uses of the patented invention may in some 
instances give rise to an issue of patentability . . . [the inventor] tested 
the software for his own confidential, personal purposes,” and, thus, 
the district court did not err in ruling that such use was immaterial.1199 
In Avid Identification Systems, Inc. v. Crystal Import Corp.,1200 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the ruling that the patent was unenforceable 
because the patentee’s founder had failed to disclose prior art to the 
PTO.1201  Avid addressed for the first time who constitutes an 
individual “substantively involved” in a patent’s prosecution such that 
he or she owes a duty of candor to the PTO.1202  The patent 
concerned a chip implanted in animals to aid their identification and 
recovery when lost.1203  In finding inequitable conduct, the district 
court faulted as material the founder’s failure to disclose his sales 
demonstrations of products that constituted “the closest prior art” to 
the claims in suit.1204  The critical issue for the ultimate inequitable 
conduct judgment was whether the founder fell within the category 
of individuals who owe a duty of candor to the PTO.1205   
Under PTO Rule 56, individuals owing a duty include “(1) each 
named inventor; (2) [e]ach attorney or agent who prepares or 
prosecutes the application; and (3) ‘[e]very other person who is 
substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the 
application and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee 
or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the 
application.’”1206  The founder was not an inventor or an attorney or 
agent who prepared the patent application, so resolution of the issue 
depended on whether he was otherwise “substantively involved” in 
the patent’s prosecution.1207  The Federal Circuit agreed that the 
                                                          
 1197. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 1198. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 1199. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 1200. 603 F.3d 967, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1845 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 909 (2011). 
 1201. Id. at 973, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850. 
 1202. Id. at 969, 973, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847, 1850. 
 1203. Id. at 969, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847. 
 1204. Id. at 977, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853. 
 1205. Id. at 973, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.  “Each individual associated with the 
filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in 
dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all 
information known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this 
section.”  37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2010).   
 1206. Avid, 603 F.3d at 977, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.  
 1207. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c); see also Avid, 603 F.3d at 974, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)  
at 1850. 
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founder was “substantially involved” because he was involved in the 
corporation’s research and development and in the preparation of 
the patent application relating to that research.1208  Recognizing that 
Avid presented the first opportunity for the court to define the 
“substantively involved” category, the court also explained that, in 
deciding the issue, courts may consider “a variety of factors, such as 
the individual’s position within the company, role in developing or 
marketing the patented idea, contact with the inventors or 
prosecutors, and representations to the PTO.”1209  Because the 
founder fell within Rule 56 and the court agreed that he acted with 
intent to deceive the PTO by withholding material information, the 
court affirmed the unenforceability judgment.1210 
Judge Linn both concurred and dissented.1211  He would have 
excluded from Rule 56’s duty of candor “corporate officers, 
managers, employees, and all other individuals who are neither aware 
of the technical details or legal merits of the application nor engaged 
in the preparation or prosecution thereof.”1212 
In Optium Corp. v. Emcore Corp.,1213 the Federal Circuit again 
affirmed the district court’s ruling, this time finding the absence of 
inequitable conduct.1214  The patents related to improvements in an 
optical communication system that uses lasers to transmit signals.1215  
The patentee failed to disclose a prior art article that the inventors 
had cited to their employer (the patent owner) in an internal 
research report and in an invention disclosure form.1216  In agreeing 
that inequitable conduct was not shown, the court reiterated that 
intent to deceive is a separate inquiry from materiality.1217  On the 
facts of that case, a special master determined that, even assuming 
that the article was material, intent could not be inferred merely on 
that basis, and there was no other evidence of intent to deceive.1218  
The district court adopted the special master’s recommendation and 
granted summary judgment based on inequitable conduct.1219  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the decision, reiterating that materiality 
                                                          
 1208. Avid, 603 F.3d at 974–75, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851–52. 
 1209. Id. at 976 n.3, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853 n.3. 
 1210. Id. at 977, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853. 
 1211. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 1212. Id. at 978, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854. 
 1213. 603 F.3d 1313, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1925 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1214. Id. at 1313, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1925. 
 1215. Id. at 1315, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926. 
 1216. Id. at 1318, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928. 
 1217. Id. at 1321, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930–31. 
 1218. Id. at 1319, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1929. 
 1219. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1929. 
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alone is insufficient to prove intent.1220  Judge Prost wrote a 
concurring opinion to prevent the majority opinion from being 
interpreted as holding “that a high level of materiality is entirely 
irrelevant to an inference of intent.”1221  As Judge Prost explained, 
“[w]ithin that balancing test, the more material the omission or the 
misrepresentation, the lower the level of intent required to establish 
inequitable conduct, and vice versa.”1222 
In Taltech Ltd. v. Esquel Enterprises Ltd.,1223 the Federal Circuit, in a 
highly fact-specific split decision, affirmed the ruling of inequitable 
conduct and the resulting fee award under § 285.1224  There, the 
patentee had failed to disclose two references.1225  The majority and 
the dissent disputed the references’ materiality and cumulativeness 
and also disagreed on whether intent and materiality should be 
analyzed as separate inquiries.1226  According to the majority opinion, 
authored by Judge Mayer, “the dissent’s belief that intent requires 
facts wholly distinct from those establishing materiality is 
incorrect.”1227  Judge Gajarsa, in dissent, countered that the majority’s 
analysis conflated materiality and intent.1228   
In Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America,1229 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling of no inequitable conduct.1230  The 
patent concerned a method for enabling salespersons to use a 
computerized system to select the appropriate parts for a customer’s 
particular needs.1231  The inequitable conduct charge was based on 
alleged on-sale bar activities that, before the critical date for 
patentability and validity, the patentee had used a commercial 
embodiment of the patent and licensed the invention for 
development of the commercial embodiment.1232  Allegedly 
contradicting those activities, the patentee had submitted to the PTO 
that “the invention had not been in public use or on sale before the 
critical date.”1233  The district court, however, rejected those activities 
                                                          
 1220. Id. at 1321–22, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930–31. 
 1221. Id. at 1322, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931 (Prost, J., concurring). 
 1222. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932 (citing Akzo N.V. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 
808 F.2d 1471, 1481–82 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 1223. 604 F.3d 1324, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1224. Id. at 1327, 1335, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257; see also 35 U.S.C. § 285 
(2006) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party.”). 
 1225. Taltech Ltd., 604 F.3d at 1337, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266.   
 1226. See id. at 1332–34, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262–65. 
 1227. Id. at 1334, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263–64. 
 1228. Id. at 1341, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting). 
 1229. 605 F.3d 967, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1230. Id. at 967, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297. 
 1231. Id. at 970, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298. 
 1232. Id. at 978, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304. 
 1233. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304. 
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as immaterial, and, in a short analysis, the Federal Circuit agreed, 
emphasizing that the evidence showed “that the invention was not 
ready for patenting until after the critical date.”1234 
In Aspex Eyewear Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc.,1235 the Federal Circuit 
considered whether the district court had erred in not fully 
developing the record on inequitable conduct before ruling that the 
case was not sufficiently exceptional to warrant § 285 fees.1236  The 
inequitable conduct charges in Aspex were based on a patent 
application, of which the inventor was aware but did not bring to the 
PTO’s attention, that the PTO later considered in granting 
reexamination of the patent in suit.1237  Further, the assignee of the 
patent at issue had purchased the assets of the company that owned 
that patent application and, therefore, the defendant argued that the 
assignee “should have required disclosure of the [patent] application 
to the examiner.”1238  The defendant claimed materiality based on the 
inventor’s concern that the patent applicant had used some of the 
inventor’s drawings in the application.1239 
The Federal Circuit held that the district court did not err in 
deciding the inequitable conduct issue without holding a full trial.1240  
The Federal Circuit agreed that the threshold requirements of 
showing materiality and intent by clear and convincing evidence were 
not met because “[n]o evidence of deceptive intent was presented”; 
the inventor’s “concern about [the applicant’s] possible use of his 
information does not impart materiality”; and there was no evidence 
the inventor or his assignee saw the application or was aware of its 
contents while his application was pending.1241  Further, the district 
court had already decided, on summary judgment, that the assignee 
was equitably estopped from pursuing its infringement claims against 
the defendant.1242  In those circumstances, the district court did not 
err in declining to hold a full trial on inequitable conduct, and the 
ruling of no inequitable conduct was affirmed.1243 
In Leviton Manufacturing Co. v. Universal Security Instruments, Inc.,1244 
the court, in another split decision, vacated the district court’s award, 
on summary judgment, of attorneys’ fees and costs to the accused 
                                                          
 1234. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (emphasis added). 
 1235. 605 F.3d 1305, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1236. Id. at 1315, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
 1237. Id. at 1315, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
 1238. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
 1239. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
 1240. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
 1241. Id. at 1315–16, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 1242. Id. at 1316, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 1243. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 1244. 606 F.3d 1353, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1432 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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infringer based on inequitable conduct and vexatious litigation of 
lawyers for the patentee.1245  The panel majority found “genuine issues 
of material fact” that required remand for an evidentiary hearing on 
the inequitable conduct charge.1246  Although agreeing that another 
patent application and related litigation were material, the panel 
majority ruled that the district court improperly “inferred an intent 
to deceive based on [an attorney’s] failure to advise the PTO of the 
[patent] application and related litigation, which is an omission, not 
an affirmative misrepresentation.”1247  In reaching this conclusion, the 
panel majority noted that the Federal Circuit “rarely affirm[s] a grant 
of summary judgment of inequitable conduct, and in those cases 
where we have affirmed, the applicants did something other than fail 
to disclose a commonly owned application or related litigation.”1248  
The lawyer had a plausible explanation for failing to disclose the 
application, and his failure to explain non-disclosure of the related 
litigation was insufficient alone to find that he intended to deceive 
the PTO.1249  With genuine issues remaining, the court remanded for 
a bench trial.1250   
In Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fastener Corp.,1251 the court 
reviewed a district court ruling that a patent for a magnetic snap 
fastener commonly used in purses was unenforceable due to 
inequitable conduct based on a false claim of inventorship.1252   
The court discerned no clear error in the district court’s finding that 
the inventor had falsely claimed to the PTO that he was the sole 
inventor without listing his employee as at least a co-inventor.1253  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the inequitable conduct ruling.1254   
In Ring Plus, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless Corp.,1255 the court reversed a 
determination based on alleged misrepresentations to the PTO about 
two prior art references.1256  The patent at issue “disclose[d] a 
software based algorithm and method for generating and delivering 
messages over a phone line during a ‘ringing signal’ period.”1257  In 
                                                          
 1245. Id. at 1353, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
 1246. Id. at 1363, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440. 
 1247. Id. at 1360–63, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.  
 1248. Id. at 1363, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.  “We have not previously affirmed a 
grant of summary judgment based on a failure to disclose a commonly owned 
application or related litigation, and we decline to do so on the facts of this case.”  
Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.   
 1249. Id. at 1363–64, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440. 
 1250. Id. at 1364, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440. 
 1251. 607 F.3d 817, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1252. Id. at 822, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513, 1515. 
 1253. Id. at 831–32, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521–22. 
 1254. Id. at 834, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.   
 1255. 614 F.3d 1354, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1256. Id. at 1354, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022. 
 1257. Id. at 1357, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1024. 
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the Background section of its patent, the applicant stated that, unlike 
that software-based patent, the two references “propose[d] hardware 
based systems, but no software to operate those systems,” and the district 
court found that this was a material misrepresentation.1258  The 
Federal Circuit identified no error in that finding, but disagreed on 
intent to deceive.1259  The district court had “premised its finding of 
intent almost entirely on its view that the references unambiguously 
disclose software” for operating telephone systems (like the software 
systems at issue in the patent in suit), and the Federal Circuit held 
that the references’ disclosure of software was not “so plain” or 
unambiguous.1260  Because the evidence “gives rise to the inference 
that applicants believed that [the references] did not disclose 
software for operating a telephone system,” the district court clearly 
erred in finding intent to deceive, and the Federal Circuit reversed 
the determination of inequitable conduct.1261 
In Golden Hour Data Systems, Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc.,1262 the Federal 
Circuit vacated the inequitable conduct ruling and remanded for 
further proceedings on the issue.1263  The patent disclosed systems for 
integrating data used in emergency medical transport, which is often 
conducted by helicopter.1264  The inequitable conduct determination 
was based on a brochure that was not disclosed to the PTO.1265  
Although agreeing that the brochure was material even if it was not 
prior art,1266 the court held that there was insufficient evidence of 
deceptive intent because it contradicted the patentee’s 
submissions.1267  “The key question” on intent was whether the 
patentee’s CEO or patent agent had actually read the brochure to 
recognize that the brochure was inconsistent with the patentee’s 
representations to the PTO.1268  On that issue, “the district court did 
not actually find that either [the CEO] or [the patent agent] was 
aware of the inside contents of the brochure.”1269  The Federal Circuit 
noted that it would be inappropriate to make factual findings in the 
                                                          
 1258. Id. at 1359–60, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025. 
 1259. Id. at 1361–62, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1026. 
 1260. Id. at 1361, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027. 
 1261. Id. at 1362–63, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028. 
 1262. Id. at 1367, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065. 
 1263. Id. at 1369, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065. 
 1264. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066. 
 1265. Id. at 1372, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 1266. Id. at 1374, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.  The court explained that its prior 
case law, the PTO Rules, and the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure “make 
clear that information may be material even if it does not qualify as prior art.”  Id.,  
96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070. 
 1267. Id. at 1375–77, 380, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070–72, 1074. 
 1268. Id. at 1378, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 1269. Id. at 1379, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073. 
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first instance, so it remanded the case to the district court to make 
that determination.1270 
Judge Newman dissented, writing that materiality was reasonably 
disputed and that it was “inappropriate for this court to remand for 
another shot at it” because “deceptive intent was not established at 
the trial of this issue.”1271   
In Cancer Research Technology Ltd. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.,1272 the 
court reviewed a ruling of inequitable conduct in the prosecution of 
a patent for compounds forming the active ingredient in a cancer 
treatment drug.1273  The district court ruled that the patent was 
unenforceable for inequitable conduct because the inventor failed to 
disclose information about human testing showing that some of the 
compounds were ineffective, which directly contradicted the patent 
regarding the drug’s broad utility in treating cancers.1274  The Federal 
Circuit held that the inequitable conduct ruling was erroneous 
because the district court based its decision on nothing more than 
the withholding of highly material information.1275  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court reiterated that “materiality and intent are 
separate requirements, and intent to deceive cannot be found based 
on materiality alone.”1276  The court is not permitted to infer that the 
applicant “should have known” that the information was material, to 
show an intent to deceive, simply because the applicant knew about 
the information and it was material. 1277  There must be some 
evidence that the applicant understood that the information was 
material.1278 
In dissent, Judge Prost wrote that the panel opinion “veers from 
our precedent” in two respects.1279  First, it “creates a new evidentiary 
standard for establishing inequitable conduct” by “[r]equiring 
separate evidence for each prong”—a requirement that “has no basis 
in [the court’s] precedent.”1280  Second, the majority decision 
“inexplicably rejects the district court’s unassailable credibility 
                                                          
 1270. Id. at 1380, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074. 
 1271. Id. at 1381, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 1272. 625 F.3d 724, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1937 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1273. Id. at 726, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937. 
 1274. Id. at 728, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 1275. Id. at 733, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944. 
 1276. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944 (citing Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v. 
Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1340, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257, 1272 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009)). 
 1277. Id. at 733–34, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944. 
 1278. Id. at 734, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944 (citing Critikon, Inc. v. Becton 
Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666, 
1668 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 1279. Id. at 737, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
 1280. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946–47. 
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determinations”—determinations that “are virtually unreviewable by 
this court.”1281 
In Lazare Kaplan International, Inc. v. Photoscribe Technologies, Inc.,1282 
the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling of inequitable 
conduct and, therefore, vacated an award of attorney’s fees based on 
the inequitable conduct determination.1283  The patents disclosed 
systems for marking gemstones with microscopic spots for 
authentication and tracking purposes.1284  In a very brief analysis, the 
court held that, even if the omitted information was material, “the 
district court clearly erred by inferring that [the patentee’s] counsel 
intended to deceive the PTO by withholding the information.”1285 
As these decisions show, inequitable conduct issues continue to 
arise in the Federal Circuit, and their resolution is often by a divided 
panel.  Clarification of the proper legal standard in the en banc 
decision to issue in Therasense is thus eagerly awaited by the bar. 
IV. INFRINGEMENT 
In 2010, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed many basic aspects of 
infringement analysis.  For example, the Federal Circuit had 
opportunities to confirm the importance of plain language as a 
source of meaning, as well as highlighting the role that other claims 
and the specification can play in construing claims.  More generally, 
the Court continued its efforts to refine the rules regarding what 
sources the courts should consider in a claim construction analysis 
and how much weight those sources should receive.   
In one of the bigger developments for infringement jurisprudence 
this year, the Federal Circuit attempted to clarify the showing of 
knowledge that is necessary to prove intent for an induced 
infringement claim.  Specifically, in SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & 
Co.,1286 the Federal Circuit held that the “knowledge of the patent” 
requirement can be satisfied by showing that the accused infringer 
manifested a “deliberate indifference to” or “knew of and 
disregarded” a risk that its activities were covered by a patent.1287  On 
                                                          
 1281. Id. at 737–38, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946–47. 
 1282. 628 F.3d 1359, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 1283. Id. at 1363–64, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1440. 
 1284. Id. at 1364, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1440. 
 1285. Id. at 1378, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1452; see also id. at 1380, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1453. 
 1286. 594 F.3d 1360, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub 
nom., Global-Tech Appliances Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 458 (2010). 
 1287. Id. at 1376, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627–28 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 840 (1994)). 
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October 12, 2010, though, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in the case, so the final word on this issue is yet to come.1288   
Two other developments also merit special mention.  First, in 
Akamai Technologies v. Limelight Networks, the court clarified the test for 
joint patent infringement, holding that the test is met only if the joint 
defendants have either an agency relationship or a contractual 
obligation to perform the acts necessary to establish infringement.1289  
Second, the Federal Circuit provided further insight on the question 
of determining design patent infringement in view of its 2008 
Egyptian Goddess decision.1290   
A. Claim Construction  
An infringement analysis requires two steps.  First, the court 
construes the claims at issue, and, second, the court or jury compares 
those claims to the accused product.1291  In its 1998 en banc decision 
in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit confirmed 
that issues of claim construction–the first step–are reviewed de novo 
without deference to the decision below.1292  Since then, however, 
various judges of the Federal Circuit have engaged in an ongoing 
debate about whether that is the proper standard.  In Trading 
Technologies International, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., now-Chief Judge Rader 
included in his opinion for the panel a lengthy analysis of the law 
leading up to Cybor Corp., including Supreme Court authority 
recognizing that claim construction is not a purely legal issue.1293  
Addressing the claim-construction issues before the panel in that 
case, Chief Judge Rader observed that the district court’s 
construction included factual findings, such as findings about the 
technical background of the claimed invention and the 
understanding of a person of skill in the art.1294  Strongly suggesting 
that review “without the slightest iota of deference” is improper, he 
acknowledged that the court’s en banc decision in Cybor Corp. tied his 
hands, requiring him to conduct a non-deferential review.1295  Adding 
to Chief Judge Rader’s comments, Judge Ron Clark, sitting by 
                                                          
 1288. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 458. 
 1289. 629 F.3d 1311, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
 1290. Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293–94, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1937, 1939–40 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 
543 F.3d 665, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658 (Fed. Cir. 2008).   
 1291. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1350, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1805, 1812 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1288, 90 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1769, 1773 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 1292. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 1293. Id. at 1350. 
 1294. Id. at 1351. 
 1295. Id. 
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designation in Trading Technologies, joined the debate and provided a 
district court judge’s perspective.  In a concurring opinion, he 
explained that the Cybor Corp. standard had undesirable influences—
it could discourage settlement and increase the likelihood of 
appeal.1296  As he explained, parties receiving an unfavorable claim 
construction often conclude that their own view of complicated 
patent claims will fare better on appeal, where no deference is given 
to those findings, when that view may unnecessarily extend 
proceedings.1297  Noting that the patent application process provides 
applicants the opportunity to clearly delineate their claims in the 
specification, he rhetorically asked “[w]hat public policy is advanced 
by a rule requiring the determination of underlying facts by more 
than one court, especially when the likely result is that another group 
of citizens will be required to ‘volunteer’ for lengthy jury duty on 
remand?”1298 
Trading Technologies, of course, did not settle the debate.  In that 
case and others, the court was bound by the Cybor Corp. standard.  
Turning to the Federal Circuit’s application of that standard in its 
claim construction jurisprudence, much of it was unremarkable.  The 
court continued to hold that the analysis must start (and sometimes 
ends) with the plain language of the claims.  The court also provided 
additional guidance as to what other sources courts may review, and 
how to weigh those sources.  Rather than being discarding or 
radically developing its claim construction jurisprudence in 2010, the 
court followed or provided minor elaborations on prior doctrines 
and rules. 
1. Claim construction starts with claim language 
Claim construction starts with the claim language.1299  The Court 
must ascertain the “ordinary and customary meaning” of those words 
to “a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the 
invention.”1300  In addition, “other claims of the patent . . . can also be 
valuable sources of enlightenment as to the meaning of a claim 
term.”1301  
                                                          
 1296. 595 F.3d at 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Clark, J., sitting by designation from the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, concurring). 
 1297. Id. 
 1298. Id. 
 1299. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 1300. Id. at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). 
 1301. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). 
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a. Cases relying on the plain language of the claims 
During the past year, the Court had multiple cases in which it 
reaffirmed the importance of the plain meaning of claim language.  
For example in i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.,1302 the Federal 
Circuit conducted a plain language analysis of the term “distinct 
storage files,” and held that this term did not require that the files be 
subject to “independent manipulation,” (the ability to change one 
file independent of another).1303 
In arriving at this result, the Court noted that none of the claims 
mentioned “independent manipulation,” an omission that the Court 
found significant.1304  “Had the inventors intended this limitation, 
they could have drafted the claims to expressly include it.”1305   
In In re Suitco Surface, Inc.,1306 the Federal Circuit used the plain 
language of a claim term to overturn the Board’s construction of “an 
improved material for finishing the top surface of the floor . . . 
[comprising]:  at least one elongated sheet including a uniform flexible 
film of clear plastic material.”1307 
During a reexamination of the patent, the Board had construed 
“material for finishing the top surface of the floor” to mean 
“requiring a material that is structurally suitable for placement on the 
top surface of a floor,” which could include any layer above the floor 
regardless of whether it was the top or final layer.1308   
The Federal Circuit found the Board’s construction to be 
unreasonable based on the plain language of the claim.1309   
“A material cannot be finishing any surface unless it is the final layer 
on that surface.”1310  The court found that the PTO’s construction 
“ignored reality” by allowing the finishing material to fall anywhere 
above the surface being finished, regardless of whether it actually 
“finishes” the surface.1311 
b. Cases noting that claim construction should track ordinary and 
 customary meanings 
The Court also confirmed that in performing a plain language 
analysis, the goal is to use the ordinary and customary meaning of a 
                                                          
 1302. 598 F.3d 831, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted,  
131 S. Ct. 647 (2010). 
 1303. Id. at 842, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 1304. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952. 
 1305. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952. 
 1306. F.3d 1255, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1640 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1307. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1641. 
 1308. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643. 
 1309. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644. 
 1310. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643. 
 1311. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643. 
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term to one of ordinary skill in the art.  In Comaper Corp. v. Antec, 
Inc.,1312 for example, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s 
claim constructions.1313  The lower court had construed the terms 
“case,” “drive bay slot,” and “second opening” in a patent involving a 
cooling device for computer drives.1314 
As to the last of these three, the court had construed “second 
opening” to mean “a separate opening that is exposed to the drive 
bay region.”1315  Antec, by contrast, argued that “second opening’ 
must mean “a separate opening in the case located so as to pull or 
exhaust air from the central area of the drive bay region.”1316 
On appeal, the court affirmed the district court, finding that “the 
district court’s construction faithfully tracks the ordinary and 
customary meaning of the term in light of the intrinsic evidence.”1317  
c. Cases relying on other claims to shed light on the meaning of claim  
 terms 
The Federal Circuit also had the opportunity to confirm that, in 
construing language in one claim, courts are free to consider how 
other claims in the same patent use the same term, or otherwise 
impact meaning.  For example, in Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis 
Elevator Co.1318 the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in 
its construction of the terms “information transmitter” and 
“recognition device” in claim 1 of the patent.  In doing so, the court 
specifically noted that “[o]ther claims of the patent in question, both 
asserted and unasserted, can . . . be valuable sources of 
enlightenment as to the meaning of a claim term.”1319  In particular, 
the court noted that the way in which “recognition device” was used 
in a dependent claim supported a specific understanding of the term 
in that dependent claim, and, by extension, that same construction 
should apply to the independent claim at issue.1320   
Similarly, in Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp.,1321 the court relied 
on the principle that “claim terms are normally used consistently 
                                                          
 1312. 596 F.3d 1343, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1313. Id. at 1345, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 1314. Id. at 1347–49, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876–78. 
 1315. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.  
 1316. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877. 
 1317. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877–78. 
 1318. 593 F.3d 1275, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1319. Id. at 1283, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
415 F.3d 1303, 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 1320. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267. 
 1321. 599 F.3d 1325, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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throughout the patent” to select between competing constructions of 
a disputed claim term.1322   
However, in Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. 1323 
(discussed in further detail in section IV(A)(1)(f)), this was not the 
case.  In this decision, the Federal Circuit held that internal claim 
syntax trumps the principal that claim terms are used consistently 
throughout a patent.  The preamble of the relevant independent 
claim denoted that the phrase “centrifugal unit” encompassed both a 
centrifugal component and a plurality of tubes. 1324  The specification 
and other independent claims indicated that the centrifugal unit did 
not include the tubes. 1325  The court ruled that “[t]he patentee’s 
inconsistent use of identical height and radius limitations for two 
different embodiments thus indicates that ‘the centrifugal unit’’ in 
the context of the dimensional limitations must have different 
meanings in the context of different claims.” 1326 
d. A case on incorporating structural limitations into method claims 
In Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,1327 the Federal 
Circuit rejected the argument that it is improper to incorporate 
structural limitations into a method claim.1328  The district court had 
construed method claims related to the delivery of web content by 
requiring that the claimed “given name server” to be selected was the 
“alternative domain name system.”1329  On appeal, the patent holder 
argued that the construction “improperly incorporated a structural 
limitation” into the method claims.1330  The Federal Circuit disagreed, 
nothing that method claims commonly recite structural details, and 
those can be “properly included” in the claim.1331  Accordingly, the 
Court affirmed the construction.1332 
e. The impact of the preamble on the construction of claim language 
One often recurring question is the extent to which the preamble 
to a claim acts as a separate claim limitation.  The court considered 
that question in a number of cases in 2010.   
                                                          
 1322. Id. at 1342, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
415 F.3d 1303, 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). 
 1323. 607 F.3d 776, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1556 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1324. Id. at 782, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560.  
 1325. Id. at 782, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560.  
 1326. Id. at 782, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560.  
 1327. 629 F.3d 1311, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
 1328. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
 1329. Id. at 1329, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333. 
 1330. Id. at 1329, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334. 
 1331. Id. at 1329–30, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334. 
 1332. Id. at 1331, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335. 
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In Marrin v. Griffin,1333 the Federal Circuit found that the preamble 
did not act as a limitation.1334  The patent described a scratch-off label 
used to mark beverage containers and cups so that, when attending a 
party, guests can keep track of their cups.1335  On appeal, the 
defendants argued that the district court erred in failing to treat the 
preamble language—”[a] scratch-off label for permitting a user to 
write thereon without the use of a marking implement”—as a 
separate limitation.1336   
The Federal Circuit admitted that “clear reliance on a preamble 
during prosecution can distinguish a claimed invention from the 
prior art and render the preamble a claim limitation,” but found no 
such reliance in the prosecution history.1337  To the contrary, the 
original version of the claims included the limitation “in legible lines, 
thereby providing a writing means whereby a person can mark on the 
label without the need for a writing implement.”1338  The applicants 
told the examiner during prosecution that “writing means is not an 
element of Applicant’s claims, and does not appear in the new 
claims.”1339  “Because the [applicants] expressly attested that the 
‘writing means’ language was not a claim limitation, they cannot now 
assert that it was such a limitation.”1340   
In dissent, Judge Newman wrote that “precedent establishes that 
the preamble limits the claims when it distinguishes the use of the 
claimed article from the prior art, . . . as well as when it contains 
language that is essential to the description of the invention.”1341  And 
she asserted that the patentees had relied on the preamble language 
to distinguish prior art during the prosecution.1342   
Similarly, in American Medical Systems, Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc.,1343 the 
Federal Circuit found that a disputed preamble term did not limit the 
asserted claims.1344  There, the preamble to each of the asserted claims 
contained one of two phrases, either “[a] method for photoselective 
                                                          
 1333. 599 F.3d 1290, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1334. Id. at 1292, 1294, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140–42. 
 1335. Id. at 1292, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140 (citation omitted). 
 1336. Id. at 1292–94, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140–41 (emphasis added). 
 1337. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 1338. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 1339. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142 (citation and omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 1340. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 1341. Id. at 1296, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing 
Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1323–24, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1340, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bulloch, 604 F.2d 1362, 1365, 203 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 171, 174 (C.C.P.A. 1979)). 
 1342. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143. 
 1343. 618 F.3d 1354, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1344. Id. at 1355, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
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vaporization of the tissue” or “[a]n apparatus for photoselective 
vaporization of tissue.”1345   
The Federal Circuit concluded that “photoselective vaporization” 
was not a claim limitation.1346  In reaching that determination, the 
court noted that nothing in the prosecution history suggested that 
the inventors included the preamble language to distinguish their 
invention from prior art systems.1347  Moreover, the preamble term is 
not “a necessary antecedent basis” for interpreting the claim 
language, and it provides no “context essential to understanding” to 
meaning of the body of the claim.1348  Nor does the use of 
“photoselective” in the preamble embody an essential component of 
the invention.1349  Rather, it “is simply a descriptive name for the 
invention that is fully set forth in the bodies of the claims.”1350   
The court also noted that some of the apparatus claims identified 
preferred laser wavelengths, and others did not.1351  In light of this 
inconsistency, if “photoselective” were independently limiting, then it 
would either be redundant or in conflict with the specific wavelength 
range set forth in the body of those claims.1352  Likewise, the claim 
language of the asserted method claims made clear that no particular 
wavelength was required by the claims.1353In short, “the language in 
the body of the claims recites a complete invention for achieving the 
stated purpose of applying laser radiation in a high volumetric power 
density.”1354   
Finally, the court looked to the specification and found that it 
further confirmed that “photoselective vaporization” is a label “for 
the overall invention and not a limitation on the claims.”1355  More 
specifically, the court held that the specification shows that, while 
wavelength is one of the variable employed in the invention, the 
claims are not limited to particular wavelengths exhibiting particular 
levels of differential absorption in tissue and water.1356 
In dissent, Judge Dyk observed that the jurisprudence on when a 
preamble is a limitation is confusing, and he argued for a clear rule:  
“[I]t seems to me that a rule recognizing that all preambles are 
                                                          
 1345. Id. at 1357, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1346. Id.,  96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
 1347. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656 (citing Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-COR, Inc., 
413 F.3d 1361, 1376, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1394–95 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).   
 1348. 618 F.3d at 1359, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
 1349. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.   
 1350. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.   
 1351. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
 1352. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.   
 1353. Id. at 1360, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.   
 1354. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.   
 1355. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 1356. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
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limiting would make better sense and would better serve the interests 
of all concerned.”1357  He further stated that the time has come for the 
Federal Circuit to sit en banc to finally resolve the ambiguity in the 
rule.1358  
In contrast to these first two cases, in Vizio, Inc. v. ITC,1359 the court 
did conclude that the preamble limited the scope of the claims.  In 
particular, the court noted that the preambles of two of the claims 
provided that the claims were directed to “an apparatus for decoding 
a datastream” and “a method for decoding MPEG compatible 
packetized program information,” respectively.1360  The court held 
that this preamble language is properly construed as a claim 
limitation, because “‘decoding’ is the essence or a fundamental 
characteristic of the claimed invention.”1361  Without the preambles’ 
limiting language describing the intent to decode, “the apparatus of 
claim 1 and the method of claim 23 would have little meaning.”1362   
Finally, in Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure, Inc.,1363 the court again 
found preamble language to impose a claim limitation.  In particular, 
the patent which was directed to a hearing aid earpiece with 
disposable wax guard, included the preamble language providing 
that  “said wax guard being readily installed and replaced by a user.”   
Looking to the prosecution history, the Federal Circuit held that 
the patent applicant had clearly relied on the “readily” statement in 
the preamble in distinguishing the patent from the prior art.1364  
Moreover, the claim recites a membrane that permits a user to 
position a guard over an outlet port, but the “readily installed” phrase 
refers to the entire wax guard and “therefore is more limiting.”1365  
Based on these factors, the Federal Circuit concluded that the 
“readily installed” phrase was a claim limitation.1366 
                                                          
 1357. Id. at 1363, 1364, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 1358. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660. 
 1359. 605 F.3d 1330, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1360. Id. at 1339–40, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1361. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)at 1361 (citing Poly-Amer., L.P. v. GSE Lining Tech., 
Inc., 383 F.3d 1303, 1310, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1689–90 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 342 F.3d 1329, 1333, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1154, 
1157–58 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Griffin v. Bertina, 285 F.3d 1029, 1033, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1431, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Manning v. Paradis, 296 F.3d 1098, 1103, 63 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681, 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 1362. Id. at 1341, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361.   
 1363. 600 F.3d 1357, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1364. Id. at 1366, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391 (citation omitted).   
 1365. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 
 1366. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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f. Cases noting the importance of giving effect to all claim language 
In Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,1367 the Federal Circuit 
reaffirmed the importance of giving effect to all of the language in 
the claims.  There, the claim language called for “[a] centrifugal unit 
comprising a centrifugal component and a plurality of tubes . . . with the 
centrifugal unit having a radius between 25 and 50 mm and a height 
between 75 and 125% of the radius.”1368  The dispute between the 
parties was whether the reference to the radius of the “centrifugal 
unit” included the tubes or only the vessel itself.   
The Federal Circuit emphasized that it must “construe claims with 
an eye toward giving effect to all their terms . . . even if it renders the 
claims inoperable or invalid.”1369  The court held that the preamble’s 
use of “A centrifugal unit comprising a centrifugal component and a 
plurality of tubes” “unambiguously defines ‘centrifugal unit’ as 
‘comprising’ two structural components:  a centrifugal component 
and a plurality of tubes . . . [and] then recites, not the centrifugal 
component and not a centrifugal unit, but ‘the centrifugal unit’ as 
‘having a radius between 25 and 50 mm and a height between 75 and 
125% of the radius.’”1370  The court found that failing to include the 
tubes in the radius calculation would impermissibly “fail to give effect 
to the claim language ‘comprising a centrifugal component.’”1371   
g. Effect of listing claim elements separately 
In Becton, Dickinson & Co v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP,1372 the Federal 
Circuit discussed the implications for claim construction when a 
claim lists multiple elements.  There, the relevant claim language 
referred to “[a] shieldable needle assembly comprising:  a needle 
cannula . . . ; a guard . . . ; a hinged arm . . . ; spring means connected to 
said hinged arm for urging said guard along said needle cannula.”1373  
In construing this language, the district court held that the claim “did 
not require a spring means that was a distinct structural element from 
the hinged arm.”1374   
                                                          
 1367. 607 F.3d 776, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1556 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1368. Id. at 780, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559 (citation and omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 1369. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560 (citing Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, 
Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857, 1859–60 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1309, 54 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).   
 1370. Id. at 781–82, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560. 
 1371. Id. at 782, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560 (citing Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 
441 F.3d 945, 950, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 1372. 616 F.3d 1249, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1752 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1373. Id. at 1254, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756 (citation omitted).   
 1374. Id. at 1254, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756 (citation omitted). 
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The Federal Circuit reversed the trial court.  According to the 
Court,  “where a claim lists elements separately, ‘the clear implication 
of the claim language’ is that those elements are ‘distinct 
component[s]’ of the patented invention.”1375  The court also noted 
that if the two separate phrases were understood to refer to a single 
structure, then the claims would become nonsensical.1376  “A claim 
construction that renders asserted claims facially nonsensical ‘cannot 
be correct.’”1377 
2. The specification as a tool for claim construction 
The Federal Circuit has long held that claims “must be read in view 
of the specification, of which they are a part.”1378  Indeed, the court 
has indicated that the specification is often the single best guide to 
the meaning of a disputed term.1379  The court’s decisions in 2010 
showed that this principle remains alive and well. 
a. Using the specification to clarify ambiguous claim language 
In Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co.,1380 the Federal Circuit 
looked to the specification to confirm its understanding of claim 
language in a patent involving a device for calling an elevator.1381  In 
particular, the claim called for an “information transmitter” and a 
“recognition device.”  The dispute surrounded the extent to which 
these were required to work automatically (i.e., without user input).  
The court relied heavily on language in the specification to resolve 
the dispute.  The court noted that the specification called for 
information to be “communicated automatically,” and for this to 
occur “without any personal action” by the elevator user.  But, the 
court further noted that the way in which “personal action” was used 
in the specification made it clear that not all user action (e.g., walking 
into the lobby) was “personal action.”  Rather, automatically or 
                                                          
 1375. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756–57 (quoting Gaus v. Conair Corp., 363 F.3d 
1284, 1288, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Engel Indus., Inc. v. 
Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1404–05 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 1376. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757 (quoting Schoenhaus v. Genesco, Inc.,  
440 F.3d 1354, 1357, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).   
 1377. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1757 (quoting Schoenhaus v. Genesco, Inc.,  
440 F.3d 1354, 1357, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).   
 1378. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing Autogiro Co. of Am. V. United 
States, 384 F.2d 391, 397, 155 U.S.P.Q. 697, 702 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Winans v. Denmead, 
56 U.S. 330, 338 (1853); Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38–39 (1878)), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 
(1996)). 
 1379. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 
39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 1380. 593 F.3d 1275, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1381. Id. at 1282–86, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267–70. 
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without personal action merely meant that the user did not manually 
call the elevator.1382 
Likewise, in Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc.,1383 the court was 
required to interpret the phrase “point-of-load regulators” (POL 
regulators) in a patent claiming a power control system that includes 
a plurality of POL regulators connected to a “system controller” by a 
serial data bus.1384  The patent did not expressly define the term “POL 
regulator,” but the lower court construed the claim language to 
require that the POL regulator be, inter alia, “near” the devices being 
powered.1385 
On appeal, Artesyn challenged the district court’s construction, 
claiming that “near” was facially vague and subjective.1386  The Federal 
Circuit, however, rejected this argument.  The court held that relative 
terms like “near” are “insolubly ambiguous only if they provide no 
guidance to those skilled in the art as to the scope of that 
requirement.”1387  The court found that specification language 
provided such guidance.  It stated that the POL regulator would be 
located “just upstream from the load being powered,” and also 
provided that “[i]deally, the POL regulator would be physically 
located adjacent to the corresponding electronic circuit so as to 
minimize the length of the low voltage, high current lines through 
the electronic system.”1388  According to the court, this provided 
sufficient guidance that “a skilled artisan in distributed power systems 
would know where to place the regulator to accomplish that stated 
objective.”1389 
The Federal Circuit turned to the specification to construe two 
disputed claim terms in Rolls-Royce, PLC v. United Technologies Corp.1390  
The case involved patents related to turbofan jet engines that used 
swept fan blades to reduce noise and increase efficiency.1391   
                                                          
 1382. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268. 
 1383. 599 F.3d 1343, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1384. Id. at 1347, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243. 
 1385. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243. 
 1386. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.   
 1387. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244 (citing Datamize, L.L.C. v. Plumtree 
Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1804–05 (Fed. Cir. 
2005); Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1346, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191, 
1196–97 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Cent. Admixture Pharm. Sevs., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac 
Solutions, 482 F.3d 1347, 1356, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 
Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1801, 1804–05 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Verve, L.L.C. v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 
1120, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).   
 1388. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.   
 1389. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.   
 1390. 603 F.3d 1325, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
 1391. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098. 
986 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:845 
The key issue on appeal was the extent to which the patents 
covered fan blades that were swept forward.1392  The Rolls-Royce patent 
clearly did—it claimed a fan structure for use in a turbofan jet engine 
featuring individual blades with leading edges that, at the outer edge, 
“defin[e] a forward sweep angle.”1393  The question, though, was 
whether the United Technologies patent also claimed such a fan 
structure.  In that patent, the relevant claim called for the fan blade’s 
leading edge to be “translated forward relative to a leading edge with 
the same sweep angle as an outward boundary of the intermediate 
region to provide a sweep angle that causes the blade to intercept the 
shock.”1394  “Translated forward” and “a sweep angle that causes the 
blade to intercept the shock” were the contested terms.1395   
The BPAI had construed “a sweep angle that causes the blade to 
intercept the shock” as “broad enough to cover fan blades with an 
outer region that has a rearward sweep angle or a forward sweep 
angle.”1396  Rolls-Royce appealed, and the district court reversed.1397  
According to the court, the relevant language included blades with 
an outer region which is moved axially forward and has a rearward 
sweep angle.1398   
The Federal Circuit construed “translated forward” and “a sweep 
angle that causes the blade to intercept the shock” in the patent 
application by looking at the plain language of the terms, the 
specification, and the prosecution history.1399  When the plain 
language of the terms was inconclusive, the Federal Circuit turned to 
the specification.1400 
Based on the specification, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
“translated forward” meant “moved forward toward the axial 
direction.”1401  In reaching that result, the court relied on figures in 
the specification and their accompanying text.  In this text, the 
patentee used the term “translated forward” in that manner, and the 
court “honor[ed] the applicant’s choice to define that term with 
reference to the axial direction.”1402   
                                                          
 1392. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099–1100. 
 1393. Id. at 1329, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100 (emphasis omitted) (citation and 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1394. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099–1100. 
 1395. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 1396. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1397. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 1398. Id. at 1329–30, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 1399. Id. at 1330–37, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101–05. 
 1400. Id. at 1331, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101. 
 1401. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 1402. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101. 
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Additionally, based on the specification the court constructed the 
term to mean “a rearward sweep angle in the outer region that is 
constant or decreasing.”1403  The text of the specification states that 
the sweep angle is “nonincreasing (decreases, or at least does not 
increase) with increasing radius.”1404  Based on this language and the 
embodiments described in the specification, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that the patent did not contemplate forward sweep in the 
outer region.1405   
In Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc.,1406 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s construction of “static” in 
view of the specification.1407  The case involved a patent for displaying 
commodity prices, and called for transactions to be displayed on a 
grid comprised of “static” price levels.  TTI argued for a construction 
of “static” that allowed for some changes in price levels based on the 
specification, which reads “[t]he values in the price column are static; 
that is, they do not normally change positions unless a re-centering 
command is received.”  The district court, however, said that static 
meant that the prices could not change at all, absent a manual re-
centering command.  In the patentee’s view, this made two important 
changes to the claim—adding “manual” in front of command (thus 
not allowing for automatic re-centering commands) and deleting 
“normally” (i.e., the prices could not change at all absent a re-
centering command).  
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court based on its review 
of the specification.  It noted that after raising “re-centering 
commands,” “from that point forward, the specification only discusses 
manual re-centering commands” and contains no reference to any 
kind of automatic re-centering command.  The specification also 
referred to improving the prior art through the present invention by 
adopting “a one click centering feature.”1408  The court read “one 
click” to require manual input.1409  
With respect to the district court’s deletion of “normally” from the 
specification definition, the court held that allowing automatic 
changes to the price axis in response to market changes would “defy 
the invention’s goal to ‘ensure[] fast and accurate execution of 
                                                          
 1403. Id. at 1336, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1404. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.  
 1405. Id.   
 1406. 595 F.3d 1340, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1805 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1407. Id. at 1353, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814.   
 1408. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814 (citation omitted). 
 1409. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815 (citing Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., 
452 F.3d 1312, 1318, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
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trades.’”1410  If the display was only “normally” static, the prices could 
change just as the trader was getting ready to execute a trade, causing 
him to make a trade he did not intend to make.1411   
The specification also played a critical role in the Federal Circuit’s 
construction of three disputed claim terms in Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. 
ATI Technologies, Inc.1412  This case involved a patent relating to 
computer graphics systems such as the type used to animate the Pixar 
Animation Studios movies Toy Story and Wall-E.1413  In relevant part, 
the patent describes “[a] computer system comprising . . . a 
rasterization circuit coupled to the process that rasterizes the 
primitive according to a rasterization process which operates on a 
floating point format; . . . wherein the rasterization circuit performs 
scan conversion on verticies having floating point color values.”1414   
On appeal, Silicon Graphics (“SG”) challenged the district court’s 
construction of three claim terms:  “a rasterization process,” “scan 
conversion,” and “s10e5.”1415  The district court construed 
“rasterization” to mean “a graphics operations that translates three-
dimensional primitives into a set of corresponding fragments or 
pixels or both and fills them in.”1416  The district court noted that this 
encompassed “two specific aspects:  (1) translating three-dimensional 
primitives into a set of corresponding pixels and fragments and (2) 
filling in those pixels or fragments” and that the “process as a whole 
operates on a floating point format.”1417   
On appeal, SG argued that the relevant claims in the patent 
referred to one or more rasterization processes, not a single process, 
and that not all of the separate processes need be floating point.  
Instead, SG argued that “a rasterization process” should be construed 
to mean that “‘one or more’ of the rasterization processes (e.g., scan 
conversion, color, texture, fog, shading) operate in floating point 
format.”1418   
Relying heavily on the language in the specification, the Federal 
Circuit agreed with SG. The court found that the patent specification 
explicitly teaches that rasterization “consists of multiple processes:  
‘The processes pertaining to scan converting, assigning colors, depth 
buffering, texturing, lighting, and anti-aliasing are collectively known 
                                                          
 1410. Id. at 1354, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 1411. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 1412. 607 F.3d 784, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1413. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1419. 
 1414. Id. at 788, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421. 
 1415. Id. at 789, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422. 
 1416. Id. at 790, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422 (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted). 
 1417. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422. 
 1418. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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as rasterization.’”1419  Thus, the claim reference to “a rasterization 
process,” actually refers to “one of the subsets of rasterization.”1420  
Accordingly, the limitation “a rasterization process which operates on 
a floating point format” means “one or more of the rasterization 
processes operate on a floating point format.”1421  In addition to the 
specification, the claim language supported this construction.  As 
such, the court reversed the district court’s construction. 
As for “scan conversion,” the dispute again centered around 
whether the conversion must be done in floating point format, with 
SG contending that it need not be.1422  Here, however, the Federal 
Circuit disagreed with SG.  The court noted that the Summary of 
Invention states that “[s]pecifically, the scan conversion process is 
now handled entirely on a floating point basis.”1423  While other parts 
of the specification state that “one or several” rasterization operations 
can be performed in fixed point without departing from the scope of 
the invention, the “specification never states that scan conversion is 
one of those operations.”1424  To the contrary, “when the specification 
refers to the specific process of ‘converting a projected point, line, or 
polygon, or the pixels of a bitmap or image, to fragments, each 
corresponding to a pixel in the frame buffer,’ it also teaches that ‘this 
rasterization process is performed exclusively in a floating point 
format.’”1425   
As for the final term, “s10e5,” the district court had construed the 
term to mean “a 16 bit floating point format composed of one sign 
bit, ten mantissa bits, and five exponent bits, with an exponent bias of 
16.”1426  In reaching that result, the district court had relied on 
specification language that “the 16-bit floating point format utilized 
in one embodiment of the present invention is designated using the 
nomenclature, ‘s10e5,’ where ‘s’ specifies one (1) sign bit, ‘10’ 
specifies ten (10) mantissa bits, and ‘e5’ specifies five (5) exponent 
bits, with an exponent bias of 16.”1427  SG, however, argued that the 
construction should not have included the exponent bias.   
After reviewing the specification, the Federal Circuit agreed with 
SG.  The court found nothing in the specification to suggest the 
                                                          
 1419. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422.   
 1420. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422.     
 1421. Id. at 790–791, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422.     
 1422. Id. at 791, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423.   
 1423. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423.   
 1424. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.   
 1425. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.   
 1426. Id. at 792, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.   
 1427. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.   
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patentee intended to make that particular embodiment of s10e5 
coextensive with the claims.1428   
In Becton, Dickinson & Co v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP, the Federal 
Circuit also looked at the specification in addition to the language of 
the claims.  Based on the specification, the court discovered that “the 
only elements disclosed in the specification as ‘spring means’ for 
urging the guard forward are separate structures from the hinged 
arm and its hinges.”1429  The court held that “the specification 
comports with the plain language of the claims, fully supporting the 
conclusion that the spring means is a separate structural component 
of the patented invention.”1430   
In Spansion, Inc. v. ITC,1431 the court relied on the specification to 
confirm the common and ordinary understanding in the art of 
certain claim language.  The patent-at-issue involved a semiconductor 
assembly, and it called for “bonding wires” that extend “downwardly 
alongside” the edges of the chip.1432  The particular question was 
whether the bonding wires could first extend up and away before 
moving downward and still meet the claim limitation.  The 
Commission had held that “downwardly alongside” meant “along the 
side of the semiconductor chip”1433 based on the specification 
describing “bonding wires as conventional and the understanding of 
one of skill in the art that the conventional wire bonding process may 
cause bonding wires to extend up, out, and then down.”1434 
The Federal Circuit rejected appellants’ argument that this 
construction renders “alongside” superfluous because it does not 
specify how far from the semiconductor chip edge the bonding wires 
are allowed to fan out.1435  Looking at the specification, the court 
noted that the figures use conventional bonding, in which wires may 
extend up and outward before moving downward.  Further, 
Appellants concede “all accused products use [such] conventional 
wire bonding” and failed to “point to any language in the 
specification that discloses wires bonded in a different manner.”1436  
In Lazare Kaplan International, Inc. v. Photoscribe Technologies, Inc.,1437 
the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s claim construction in 
a case involving an invention for using a fixed laser for 
                                                          
 1428. Id. at 793, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.   
 1429. 616 F.3d 1249, 1254, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1752, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1430. Id. at 1255, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1757. 
 1431. 629 F.3d 1331, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1432. Id. at 1339, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1421. 
 1433. Id. at 1346, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1427. 
 1434. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1427. 
 1435. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1427. 
 1436. Id. at 1347, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1427.   
 1437. 628 F.3d 1359, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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microinscription of gemstones based on the language of the claims 
and the specification.1438  The patent called for “controlling the 
directing of the focused laser energy based on the marking 
instructions and the imaging, to selectively generate a marking on the 
gemstone based on the instructions.”1439  Based on plain meaning and 
two passages in the specification, the district court had construed this 
term to mean that the user generated the marking instructions, but 
that only automatic feedback could be use to control the laser once 
the burn process started. 
On appeal, Lazare argued that the specification makes clear that 
the language “encompasses control based on both automated and 
manual feedback that occurs either before or during the laser burn 
process.”1440  The court agreed with Lazare, finding nothing in the 
language of the claims precluded manual feedback during the 
marking process.1441  Turning to the specification, the court noted the 
language cited above.  As for the specification language on which the 
district court relied, the court acknowledged “this sentence ‘does not 
talk about those operations being done by a human operator,’ but 
neither does the sentence foreclose a role for a human in the optical 
feedback process.”1442  Moreover, the next sentence in the 
specification did contemplate a human role, and throughout the rest 
of the specification there are multiple references to things the “user” 
can do.1443  The court considered the statements together to find that 
“one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would 
have understood the term ‘controlling the directing . . . based on . . . 
the imaging’ to include control based on either automated or manual 
feedback derived from optical images of a gemstone . . . .”1444   
In Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd.,1445 the Federal Circuit similarly relied 
on the patent specification in reversing the district court’s claim 
construction, albeit in a split decision.1446  The patent related to 
isolation of pathogenic strains of Postweaning Multisystemic Wasting 
Syndrome (“PMWS”), a disease affecting livestock pigs.1447  Merial 
isolated certain strains of porcine circovirus, previously believed to be 
nonpathogenic, that were pathogenic and associated with PMWS.1448  
                                                          
 1438. Id. at 1370, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445. 
 1439. Id. at 1367, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1442. 
 1440. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1442. 
 1441. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443. 
 1442. Id. at 1368, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444. 
 1443. Id. at 1369, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444. 
 1444. Id. at 1367, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443. 
 1445. 617 F.3d 1282, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1956 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1446. Id. at 1291, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1963.  
 1447. Id. at 1285, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958. 
 1448. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958. 
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Merial dubbed this type of circovirus “PCV-2.”1449  The patent 
categorizes previously known, nonpathogenic circoviruses as 
belonging to category “PCV-1,” and the patent identifies five 
pathogenic porcine circovirus strains as being representative of the 
new PCV-2.1450  In relevant part, the patent claims “[a] vector 
comprising an isolated DNA molecule comprising a sequence 
selected from the group consisting of ORFs1451 1 to 13 of porcine 
circovirus type II.”1452  Following a Markman hearing where the district 
court construed “porcine circovirus type II” and “ORFs 1-13”, the 
district court entered summary judgment of non-infringement.1453   
On appeal, Merial challenged the district court’s claim 
construction on each of these terms.1454  As to the first, the district 
court had limited “porcine circovirus type II” to the five examples 
disclosed in the specification.1455  The Federal Circuit, however, 
rejected that reading.1456  In doing so, the court looked to the 
specification, which described the five deposited strains as 
“representative of” a “type of porcine circovirus.”1457  According to the 
court, “[s]equences [will be] representative of the scope of broader 
genus claims if they indicate that the patentee has invented species 
sufficient to constitute the genera.”1458  “Claims properly directed to a 
genus may be adequately supported by the patent disclosure if a 
sufficient number of species is disclosed so as to properly identify the 
scope of the genus.”1459  The court found that test met here.1460   
The Federal Circuit likewise rejected the district court construction 
of “ORFs 1-13,” which had limited the term to only exact copies of 
the specific ORFs enumerated in an example disclosed in the patent 
specification.1461  The Federal Circuit observed that the specification 
“explains that the ORFs listed in the table are representative, and one 
of skill in the art would understand that slight natural variation is to 
                                                          
 1449. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958. 
 1450. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958. 
 1451. ORF or open reading frame is “a commonly used term in molecular genetics 
that has a standard textbook meaning.  An ORF is a portion of a gene that contains a 
sequence of nucleotide bases that may be translated into a protein.”  Id., 95 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958.  
 1452. Id. at 1286, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959.   
 1453. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959.   
 1454. Id. at 1286–87, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959.  
 1455. Id. at 1287, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960. 
 1456. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960. 
 1457. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960. 
 1458. Id. (citing Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 967,  
63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1615 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1383 
(C.C.P.A. 1973)). 
 1459. Intervet, 617 F.3d at 1287, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960. 
 1460. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1961. 
 1461. Id. at 1288, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1961. 
2011] 2010 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 993 
be expected.”1462  The court further noted that limiting the term as 
the district court had would “exclude from the claimed ORFs two of 
the four sequenced strains of PCV-2, the ORF variations for which 
sequences are expressly disclosed following the table in Example 
13.”1463   
Judge Dyk, in dissent, endorsed the district court’s construction of 
“ORFs 1-13.”1464  Looking at the specification, he noted that the patent 
contains an assertion that the “13 ORFs are the following” and then 
provides a description of the 13 ORFs.1465  According to Judge Dyk, 
because the patentee had acted as his ‘own lexicographer and clearly 
set forth a definition of the disputed claim term,’ the definition in 
the specification controls.”1466  
b. Using the specification to limit claims 
While the court can rely on the specification as an interpretive tool, 
the court generally should not read the specification as adding claim 
limitations.  In Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Technologies, Inc.,1467 for 
example, the court reversed a district court claim construction for 
improperly using the specification to impose claim limitations:  “A 
construing court’s reliance on the specification must not go so far as 
to ‘import limitations into claims from examples or embodiments 
appearing only in a patent’s written description . . . unless the 
specification makes clear that ‘the patentee . . . intends for the claims 
and the embodiments in the specification to be strictly 
coextensive.”1468  In that case, the Federal Circuit found nothing in 
the specification to suggest the patentee intended to make that 
particular embodiment coextensive with the claim term at issue.1469   
In Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,1470 by contrast, 
the court did find that the specification language limited the 
claims.1471  There, the patent involved methods to improve the 
delivery of content from internet sites to individual users.1472  The 
dispute involved the claim language “associated with an 
                                                          
 1462. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1961. 
 1463. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1961. 
 1464. Id. at 1295, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part, 
concurring in part). 
 1465. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966. 
 1466. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966 (citing Edward Lifesciences LLC v. Cook 
Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 1467. 607 F.3d 784, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1468. Id. at 792, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424 (citing JVW Enters., Inc. v. Interact 
Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).   
 1469. Id. at 793, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424. 
 1470. 629 F.3d 1311, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1471. Id. at 1326, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.  
 1472. Id. at 1315–1316, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323–1324. 
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alphanumeric string.”1473  The district court construed the limitation 
to require “that the alphanumeric string include the embedded 
object’s original URL (the URL including the hostname of the 
computer on which the actual object resided within the content 
provider’s domain).”1474  The district court found that “[t]he 
specification discloses no other way [except the original URL] that an 
object is associated with an alphanumeric string, nor is there any 
suggestion or teaching that an association which did not include the 
URL for the embedded object could be used in an embodiment of 
the invention.”1475   
On appeal, Akamai argued that the district court improperly 
“imported a limitation from the specification into the claims and 
thereby limited the scope of the claims to the specification’s 
preferred embodiment.”1476  The Federal Circuit, however, rejected 
that argument, noting that including the original URL in the 
alphanumeric strings was “not merely discussed as a preferred 
embodiment.1477  “Instead, the written description specifically refers to 
strings including the object’s original URL as ‘the invention.’”1478  The 
court then listed five additional quotes from the specification 
confirming that conclusion.1479  According to the court, “the 
specification as a whole makes clear that including the object’s 
original URL is the only method to achieve the claimed association 
between an alphanumeric string and the embedded object.  Indeed it 
is the only method described.”1480 
c. Claims generally should not be construed to exclude preferred 
 embodiments 
The court also reaffirmed its oft-stated principle that generally a 
claim construction should not be read to exclude the preferred 
embodiment.  In SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,1481 the court held 
that “[a] construction that would not read on the preferred 
embodiment would rarely if ever be correct and would require highly 
persuasive evidentiary support.”1482  Accordingly, the court found that 
                                                          
 1473. Id. at 1325, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331. 
 1474. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331. 
 1475. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331. 
 1476. Id. at 1326, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331. 
 1477. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. 
 1478. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. 
 1479. Id. at 1326–27, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. 
 1480. Id. at 1327, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. 
 1481. 594 F.3d 1360, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1482. Id. at 1369, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623. 
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the limitation at issue in that case “cannot be read so broadly as to 
exclude th[e] preferred embodiment.”1483   
On the other hand, the court also noted that there are exceptions 
to that principle.  In Baran v. Medical Device Technology,1484 Baran filed 
suit alleging infringement of two patents directed to automated 
biopsy instruments.1485  The dispute on appeal centered on the 
meaning of “detachable” and “releasably engaging.”1486  One asserted 
claim required that the “stylet means” be “detachable” from the 
“cannula means,” and required the “biopsy actuator” to have a means 
for “releasably and fixedly” engaging another claimed element.1487  
The district court had construed those terms as requiring the ability 
to remove the parts without loss or damage to other parts.1488   
On appeal, the patentee proposed a definition for the terms 
“detachable” and “releasably” that did not include the “without loss 
or damage” condition.1489  He claimed that imposing that condition 
would exclude one of the disclosed embodiments.1490 
The Federal Circuit was not persuaded.1491  It noted that there is no 
reason that every patent claim must read on every embodiment.1492  In 
this instance, a different claim of the patent-in-suit read on the 
embodiment on which the patentee relied.1493  Thus, there was no 
need to construe the asserted claim to also read on that 
embodiment.1494  
3. Prosecution history 
It is well settled that in performing claim construction, the court 
should also take into account the patent’s prosecution history.1495  
“[T]he prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the 
claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the 
invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the 
course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it 
                                                          
 1483. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623. 
 1484. 616 F.3d 1309, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
 1485. Id. at 1311, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058.   
 1486. Id. at 1312, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059–60.   
 1487. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059–60.   
 1488. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060.   
 1489. Id. at 1313, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061.   
 1490. Id. at 1316, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063.   
 1491. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063.   
 1492. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063. 
 1493. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063. 
 1494. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063. 
 1495. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980, 
34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
996 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:845 
would otherwise be.”1496  In 2010, the Federal Circuit considered the 
impact of prosecution history on claim meaning in several decisions.   
a. Using prosecution history to construe ambiguous terms 
In i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., the court found strong 
evidence in the prosecution history that i4i did not intend the claim 
term “distinct” to require separate files.1497  In particular, in 
distinguishing its invention from the Mizuta prior art patent, i4i 
described Mizuta as “stor[ing] ‘all document information . . . in one 
file . . . the document file.’ . . . i4i, and then explained that Mizuta 
‘lacked any notion of . . . ‘distinct storage means.”1498  The court read 
this evidence as support for construing distinct to mean separate. 1499  
In Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit was faced with the question of whether a “static price display” 
did not move, or normally did not move.1500  In addition to 
information that the court gleaned from the specification, the court 
also found that the patentees had jettisoned the word “normally” 
during patent prosecution.1501  The examiner initially rejected the 
claims because “static display was vague and indefinite.”1502  The 
examiner asked the applicants “to claim ‘to what extent,’ ‘to what 
degree,’ and ‘on what basis’ the displays ‘change.’”1503  In response, 
the applicants explained “the values in the price column . . . do not 
change (unless a re-centering command is received).”1504  According to 
the court, this disclaimed the idea of “normally.”1505 
b. Role of the prosecution history of other patent applications 
In Rolls-Royce, PLC v. United Technologies Corp., involving an 
interference proceeding, UTC attempted to point to the prosecution 
history of a related application to support its claim construction for 
“translated forward.”1506  In particular, UTC referred the court to the 
                                                          
 1496. Id., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 
90 F.3d 1576, 1582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 1497. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 842–43, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1943, 1952 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1498. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.    
 1499. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.    
 1500. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1805, 1814 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1501. Id. at 1355, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. 
 1502. Id. at 1354, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 1503. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 1504. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 1505. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815.   
 1506. Rolls-Royce, PLC v. United Techs. Corp., 603 F.3d 1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (arguing that “translated forward” means “moved forward toward the direction 
of the relative velocity vector”).   
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prosecution history of its related patent in which “translated” was 
used in connection with the embodiments disclosed in two figures 
that also appeared in the patent-in-issue.1507  The court rejected this 
evidence, not because prosecution history from related patents can 
never be considered, but because here the related patent prosecution 
history addressed only the term “translation,” while the court’s 
construction of “translated forward” was primarily focused on 
identifying the direction indicated by “forward.”1508  Ultimately, the 
court declined to unreasonably broaden a specific claim term based 
on “questionable prosecution history when the specification requires 
a particular construction.”1509  
Similarly, in Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, the court was again asked to 
consider the prosecution history of a related patent, but concluded 
that it did not provide relevant information.1510  More specifically, in 
construing the claim term “downwardly alongside,” the court looked 
first to the specification, but then also considered the prosecution 
history of the patent-in-suit.1511  During prosecution of that patent, the 
applicant argued that it had disclaimed certain subject matter during 
the prosecution of a related patent.1512  The court reviewed the 
prosecution history for the related patent, however, and found that 
the disclaimers involved subject matter outside the patent-in-suit and 
thus did not apply.1513 
c. Prosecution disclaimer 
Consistent with its previous jurisprudence, in Schindler Elevator Corp. 
v. Otis Elevator Co., the Federal Circuit again noted that actions during 
prosecution can constitute a disclaimer, thereby “narrow[ing] the 
scope of a claim.”1514  The court also noted, however, that “[a]n 
argument made to an examiner constitutes a disclaimer only if it is 
‘clear and unmistakable.’”1515  In Schindler, the court reversed a lower 
                                                          
 1507. Id.   
 1508. Id. at 1335.  
 1509. Id. 
 1510. Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting 
appellants’ argument that a figure in a related patent specification and the 
corresponding description should limit the court’s construction of the claim 
limitation and citing cases for the proposition that purported disclaimers directed to 
specific claim terms omitted or materially altered in subsequent applications do not 
apply).   
 1511. Id. at 1347–48.  
 1512. Id. at 1347–48 (discussing appellants’ argument that during the prosecution 
of the ‘159 patent, the parent of the patent-in-suit, “the inventors expressly 
distinguished their invention”  from a prior invention). 
 1513. Id. at 1347.   
 1514. Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Corp., 593 F.3d 1275, 1285, 93 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1262, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1515.  Id. 
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court claim construction that had relied on a prosecution disclaimer, 
finding that the patentee had not unambiguously disavowed the 
subject matter.1516 
In Vizio, Inc. v. ITC, the Federal Circuit also addressed the issue of 
disclaimer.1517  There, during prosecution the examiner had rejected 
the claims that were later asserted in the suit as anticipated by a 
particular prior art reference.1518  The patentees had argued over the 
objection making assertions about both the patented invention and 
the prior art reference.1519  The court held that the arguments 
constituted a limited disclaimer, narrowing the patent claims, 
although not to the extent that the alleged infringer desired.1520   
In ERBE Electromedizin GmbH v. Canady Technology LLC, the court 
relied on the prosecution history to confirm the construction that it 
adopted based on claim language.1521  The patent in ERBE related to 
argon gas enhanced electrosurgical products for electrosurgery.1522  
The question was the meaning of the claim term “low flow rate.”1523  
Following a Markman hearing, the district court construed “low flow 
rate” to mean “a rate of flow less than about 1 liter/minute and 
producing flow velocities less than 19 km/hour such that the gas 
exiting through the distal end opening forms a non-laminar inert gas 
temperature.”1524 
In upholding the district court’s construction, the Federal Circuit 
began with the claim language, noting that one of the claims 
describes “low flow rate” as being “less than about 1 liter/minute,”1525 
while another explains that “low flow rate” is “a not directed, non-
laminar stream.”1526  Likewise, the specification stated that the 
patented invention sought to overcome the problems caused by 
directed gas flow by claiming “low argon gas flows that produce a low, 
not directed, non-laminar stream of gas exiting the tube.”1527  The 
specification provides an exemplary flow rate of less than 1 liter per 
minute.1528   
                                                          
 1516.  Id. at 1285–86, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269–70. 
 1517.  Vizio, Inc. v. ITC, 605 F.3d 1330, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1353 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
 1518. Id. at 1339, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360.  
 1519. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360. 
 1520. Id. at 1340–41, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361–62. 
 1521. ERBE Electromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC, 629 F.3d 1278,  
97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 1522. Id. at 1280, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.  
 1523. Id. at 1282, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052. 
 1524. Id. at 1284, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053. 
 1525. Id. at 1285, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053. 
 1526. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053. 
 1527. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053. 
 1528. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053. 
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The court then looked to the prosecution history to confirm this 
understanding.1529  In particular, during prosecution, the applicant 
had distinguished a prior art reference by focusing on the fact that 
the new invention used “very low flow rates (i.e. about 1 liter per 
minute),” while in the prior art reference “the specific flow rate may 
be adjusted from 1-12 liters per minute.”1530  Although ERBE argued 
that this language in the prosecution history should not be treated as 
a limitation because there was no express disclaimer, the court noted 
that “the examiner had rejected the pending claims with a low flow 
rate in light of the prior art until the applicants distinguished their 
invention.”1531 
d. The effect of amendments 
In Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc.,1532 the Federal Circuit addressed the 
effect of amendments to claim language that occur during 
prosecution.1533  During prosecution, the application, which was 
directed to a cooling device for a computer drive, was repeatedly 
rejected as anticipated by a particular prior art reference.1534  To 
distinguish the prior art reference, the applicants and the examiner 
agreed to add a claim limitation stating that the “case occupies 
substantially the entire drive bay slot.”1535  “Because the phrase . . . was 
added to distinguish [a prior art reference], the use of the term ‘slot’ 
in [that reference] is significant.”1536  The reference had defined 
“slot” as the two-dimensional opening in the computer housing, 
which the court adopted as the meaning for the patent as well.1537   
Arguments based on amendments during prosecution history may 
not be enough, however, to overcome other sources of evidence.  In 
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., discussed above, Akamai 
attempted to use the prosecution history to support its claim 
construction for “associated with an alphanumeric string.”1538    
As noted above, the district court construed the limitation to require 
that the alphanumeric string include a URL.  On appeal, Akamai 
urged the court to look at the prosecution history.  During an 
examiner interview in connection with a preliminary amendment the 
patentee had asserted that “alphanumeric string” could be comprised 
                                                          
 1529. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054. 
 1530. Id. 
 1531. Id. at 1286, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054. 
 1532. 596 F.3d at 1343, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
 1533. Id. at 1349, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879. 
 1534. Id. at 1349, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879. 
 1535. Id. at 1349, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879. 
 1536. Id. at 1349, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879. 
 1537. Id. at 1349, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879. 
 1538. 629 F.3d 1311, 1328, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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of just the host name.1539  The court, however, was not persuaded:  
“Even if we agreed with Akamai that the patentee indicated in the 
prosecution history that the alphanumeric string associated with an 
object could include only a hostname, this is not enough to overcome 
the clear description of the invention in the specification.” 1540  
4. Extrinsic evidence 
All materials used to interpret a claim term that is extrinsic to the 
patent—i.e., materials other than the claims, specification, written 
description, and prosecution history—are collectively referred to as 
“extrinsic evidence.”  Examples include expert and inventor 
testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.1541  Extrinsic evidence 
generally carries less weight than evidence in the intrinsic record.   
While not breaking new ground on the use of extrinsic evidence, 
the Court did address the issue in a few cases in 2010. 
a. Using dictionaries to construe a claim 
In Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc.,1542 the Federal Circuit confirmed that 
it is appropriate to consult a dictionary for guidance when the 
specification does not suggestion a particular construction for a claim 
term.  The district court had construed “case” to mean “a structure 
for containing and holding something,”1543 rejecting a narrower 
reading urged by the patent holder.1544  In reaching its decision, the 
district court consulted a general dictionary definition for 
guidance.1545  The Federal Circuit approved of that use and affirmed 
the district court’s construction.1546   
b. Using other extrinsic evidence to construe a claim 
In Rolls-Royce, PLC v. United Technologies Corp.,1547 the Court 
considered claim terms in a patent for aircraft engine fan blades that 
used a rearward sweep to reduce shockwaves.1548  For the construction 
of “a sweep angle that causes the blade to intercept the shock,” the 
defendant, in addition to relying on the specification, presented 
                                                          
 1539. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896. 
 1540. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896. 
 1541. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1340 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 
967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 1542. 596 F.3d 1343, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
 1543. Id. at 1348, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.   
 1544. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.   
 1545. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.   
 1546. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 1547. 603 F.3d at 1330, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1548. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097. 
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expert testimony on the various simulations he conducted, to support 
its proposed construction that certain forward sweeps fell within the 
term.1549  The Federal Circuit rejected that proposed construction, 
and in doing so rejected the defendant’s argument that a person of 
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention conducting the 
expert’s simulations would not have concluded that a forward sweep 
is sometimes required to practice the invention.1550  The Court also 
reiterated the less weight that extrinsic evidence carries, holding that 
“this extrinsic evidence in no way overcomes the intrinsic evidence in 
the specification that excludes” the very interpretation offered by the 
expert.1551 
In AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc.,1552 the defendants appealed from a 
preliminary injunction barring them from launching a generic 
version of a drug made and distributed under FDA approval by 
AstraZeneca, the patent holder.1553  The defendants were seeking FDA 
approval to manufacture and sell a generic version of the drug for a 
twice-daily use not claimed in the patents.1554 
In addressing the defendants’ argument that the claims were 
invalid, the Federal Circuit reiterated that questions of validity often 
turn on claim construction.1555  And in construing the claims, the 
Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the specification 
supported the patent holder’s proposed construction.1556   In doing 
so, the Federal Circuit held that the district court properly relied on 
the testimony of the patent holder’s expert to understand how the 
claimed invention worked and to construe the disputed term in a 
manner consistent with that understanding.1557  Especially where the 
defendants did not take issue with the district court’s reliance on 
expert testimony, did not seriously dispute the expert’s explanation 
of how the claimed invention worked, and did not provide contrary 
testimony, the Federal Circuit saw no error in relying on the expert 
testimony.1558  That testimony, in combination with the intrinsic 
                                                          
 1549. Id. at 133, 795 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 2004.   
 1550. Id., 795 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2004.   
 1551.  Id., 795 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2004.   
 1552. 633 F.3d 1042, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1553. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029. 
 1554. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029. 
 1555. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029 (“There is no serious dispute that the ‘528 
Patent would anticipate the majority of the asserted method claims if the term 
“budesonide composition” is interpreted to include the liposome embodiments 
disclosed in the ‘528 Patent and would not anticipate the method claims if the 
district court’s construction was correct. Thus, the question before us is whether the 
district court correctly construed the term to exclude these embodiments.”). 
 1556. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029. 
 1557. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029. 
 1558. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029. 
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evidence, supported the district court’s construction of the term in 
dispute.1559 
5. Construing means-plus-function claims 
Construction of a means-plus-function claim is a two step process 
where the court first determines the claimed function and then 
identifies the corresponding structure in the written description that 
performs that function.1560  While it is well accepted that the “means 
for” phrase in a claim gives rise to a presumption that the claim is a 
means-plus-function claim, the question arose in Baran v. Medical 
Device Technology1561 regarding the placement of that phrase in the 
claim.  The patent was directed to a biopsy needle.1562  In construing a 
means-plus-function claim, the district court identified two 
functions—a “release” function and a “retention” function.1563 The 
patent holder argued that no “release” function could be found 
because the word “release” preceded the “means for” clause and 
therefore merely modified the claim as “releasable,” rather than 
expressing a function.1564  Agreeing with the district court that both 
functions were recited, the Court rejected the patent holder’s 
argument regarding the placement of the term “release.”1565  The 
relevant inquiry was whether the term is purely functional, which 
“release” was.  It was not “an idle description” but instead performed 
the important function of producing a spring-loaded release on the 
instrument.1566  Accordingly, its placement before the “means for” 
phrase did not eliminate it from the claim’s functional scope.1567 
6. Claim differentiation 
The doctrine of claim differentiation creates a presumption that 
different terms have different meanings.1568  The doctrine serves to 
ensure that limitations of a dependent claim are not read into the 
parent claim so that the two claims would cover the same invention.  
The presumption, however, can be overcome by intrinsic evidence 
                                                          
 1559. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029. 
 1560. See Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1332, 478 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing JVW Enters. v. Interact 
Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324, 1330, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)). 
 1561. 616 F.3d 1309, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1562. Id. at 1311, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059. 
 1563. Id. at 1316–17, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
 1564. Id. at 1316–17, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
 1565. Id. at 1316–17, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
 1566. Id. at 1316–17, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
 1567. Id. at 1316–17, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
 1568. See Bradford Co. v. ConTeyor N. Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1262, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
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showing that the patentee irrefutably used the terms to mean the 
same thing.  The presumption is strongest when a different 
interpretation would be the only way to make a dependent claim 
more limiting than the independent claim on which it depends.1569 
The Federal Circuit addressed claim differentiation in a number of 
its 2010 cases.  In Bradford Co. v. ConTeyor North America, Inc.,1570 the 
patents related to certain shipping containers including “dunnage,” 
which is a collection of collapsible pouches that hold parts that are 
designed to be easily re-erected and reused multiple times.1571  All of 
the asserted claims required that the dunnage be “coupled to” the 
container in certain respects, which the district court construed to 
require a direct attachment.1572  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the plaintiff that the 
district court had erroneously construed the phrase too narrowly to 
require a direct attachment.1573  The Court held that, because a 
dependent claim clearly recited a dunnage with an indirect 
attachment, the doctrine of claim differentiation established the 
presumption that the independent claim used the phrase in a 
broader manner, so that the claims would in fact have different 
scopes.1574  Although admonishing the patent bar to not improperly 
represent claim differentiation as a “conclusive basis” for construing a 
claim, the Federal Circuit concluded that nothing in the intrinsic 
evidence overcame the presumption.1575 
In ERBE Electromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC, the Federal 
Circuit reiterated that claim differentiation is not controlling.  While 
the doctrine “may be helpful in some cases,” it is merely “one of many 
tools used by courts in the analysis of claim terms.”  Because the 
intrinsic evidence in that case established a particular construction, 
the doctrine of claim differentiation could not compel a different 
construction, even if the result was that surplusage may have existed 
in some claims.1576   
In Pressure Products Medical Supplies v. Greatbatch Ltd., the Federal 
Circuit addressed the relevance, if any, of claim differentiation to 
                                                          
 1569. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1801, 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp., 
336 F.3d 1298, 1302–03, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1441–42 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 
Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating Machinery Mach. Sys., Inc., 239 F.3d 1225, 1233, 57 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1679, 1684–85 (Fed. Cir. 2001); D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 
F.2d 1570, 1574, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236, 238–39 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 1570. 603 F.3d a1262, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1917 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1571. Id. at 1263–64, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA), at 1919.     
 1572. Id. at 1265, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA), at 1920. 
 1573. Id. at 1270, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA), at 1924.  
 1574. Id. at 1271. 
 1575. Id. 
 1576. Id.  
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means-plus-functions claims.  The patent at issue concerned a 
medical device known as an “introducer,” which allows a surgeon, 
during the performance of a surgical procedure, to place and remove 
catheters or pacemaker leads in blood vessels.1577  The invention 
claimed a way to remove the valve of the device in a manner that 
would not cause significant blood loss.1578  At issue was a means-plus-
function claim with corresponding structure of a “score line.”  
Although ultimately rejecting the district court’s construction on 
other grounds,1579 it did not rely on the doctrine of claim 
differentiation.  As the Court explained, it is not necessary to broadly 
construe a term in a means-plus-function claim to satisfy the doctrine, 
because such claims inherently include structures other than the 
corresponding structure expressly identified in the specification.  
Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, a means-plus-function claim “shall be 
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts 
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 
B. Infringement 
1. Literal infringement 
After a claim is properly construed, the patentee has the burden of 
showing that each and every element recited in the claim is found in 
the accused product or process in order to establish that the claim is 
literally infringed.1580  The absence of any one claim element in the 
accused product or process is sufficient to preclude a finding of 
literal infringement since each element is material and essential.1581 
The Federal Circuit’s claim construction determination often 
resolves literal infringement through summary judgment.  For 
instance, where the district court’s construction was correct, the 
Federal Circuit has affirmed summary judgment on the issue of 
infringement, based on the claim construction.1582  Likewise, the 
                                                          
 1577. 599 F.3d at 1311. 
 1578. Id. 
 1579. The Federal Circuit found error in the broad definition of the term “score 
line” to include structures not disclosed in the specifications.  Id. at 1316–17,  
94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266–67. 
 1580. Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1673, 1678 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 
922 F.2d 792, 796, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).   
 1581. Wolverine World Wide, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 38 F.3d 1192, 1199, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
 1582. See, e.g., Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment of non-infringement based on 
claim construction); Bid for Position, LLC v. AOL, LLC, 601 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (same); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(same); Baran v. Med. Device Techs., Inc., 2010 WL 3178377 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
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Federal Circuit has reversed claim construction and, because that 
controlled the infringement analysis, entered judgment for the 
appealing party.1583 
In cases where the Federal Circuit’s claim construction did not 
resolve the infringement issues and cases that reached the jury, 
various issues concerning infringement arose. 
2. Infringement of a claim reciting capability and not actual operation 
In Finjan v. Secure Computing, the Federal Circuit held that software 
sold in locked or inactivated form can directly infringe apparatus 
claims because the claims recited only a capability, not actual 
operation.1584  The asserted patents related to computer security 
software.1585  Defendants argued that the claims required actual 
operability, and therefore they did not directly infringe because their 
products were disabled when sold.1586 
The jury found direct infringement of apparatus claims.1587  On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that, to infringe a claim that 
recites capability rather than actual operation, the accused device 
only has to be capable of the claimed operation.1588  Because that was 
the case with the defendants’ products, the court affirmed the 
infringement verdict on those claims.1589 
3. Infringement of a method claim 
A basic requirement of infringement of a method claim is that 
every step must be performed.  A contract to perform a step does not 
satisfy that requirement.  In Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. 
Transamerica Life Insurance Co.,1590 the court held that a contract to 
perform a step in a method claim did not establish that the step was 
                                                          
(same); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311,  
97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same); ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. 
Canady Tech., 629 F.3d 1278, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same); 
Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 622 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding no error 
in claim constructions and, on that basis, affirming summary judgment that certain 
claims were infringed and others were not). 
 1583. See, e.g., Vizio, Inc. v. ITC, 605 F.3d 1330, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1353 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010); Becton, Dickinson and Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, 616 F.3d 1249, 95 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1752 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1584. 626 F.3d 1197, 1205, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1585. Id. at 1201, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
 1586. Id. at 1204, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
 1587. Id. at 1202, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165. 
 1588. Id. at 1204–05, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167–68. 
 1589. Id. at 1213, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174. 
 1590. Id. 
1006 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:845 
actually being carried out.  The court required actual proof that the 
defendant was performing the step in question.1591 
4. Infringement of a design patent 
In 2010 the court addressed infringement of design patents, the 
test of which it had changed two years earlier in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. 
v. Swisa, Inc.1592  In that 2008 decision, the Federal Circuit eliminated 
the “point of novelty” requirement for infringement of a design 
patent, leaving the patent holder with the burden of proving 
infringement under only the “ordinary observer” test.1593  Under that 
test, the patent holder must show that an ordinary observer would 
think the accused infringing design and the patented design were 
substantially the same.1594 
In Crocs,1595 the Federal Circuit set out in detail the “ordinary 
observer” approach.  In determining whether a design patent for 
footwear was infringed, it emphasized that the “ordinary observer” 
test requires attention to the overall appearance.1596  As the court 
cautioned, “the concentration on small differences in isolation” could 
improperly distract from the overall appearance of the design.1597  In 
conducting that analysis in Crocs, the court considered such 
ornamental elements as the curves in the design, the strap assembly, 
and the base of the footwear item, all of which would lead an 
ordinary observer to believe the products were the same.1598  Thus, the 
court concluded that infringement was shown. 
In Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., the owner of a patent for the 
design of a multi-function carpentry tool appealed decision that its 
patent was not infringed by the defendant’s line of tools. 1599  After a 
bench trial, the district court entered judgment of non-
infringement.1600  In reaching that conclusion, it did not consider the 
functional aspects of the design, considering only whether the 
ornamental aspects would deceive an ordinary observer into thinking 
the tools were the same.1601  The Federal Circuit upheld the non-
                                                          
 1591. “The law of this circuit is axiomatic that a method claim is directly infringed 
only if each step of the claimed method is performed.”  Id. (citing Muniauction, 532 
F.3d at 1328). 
 1592. 543 F.3d 665, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1568 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 1593. Id. at 678, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571. 
 1594. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571. 
 1595. 598 F.3d 1294, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1777 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1596. Id. at 1303, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783. 
 1597. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783. 
 1598. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783. 
 1599. 597 F.3d 1288, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1937 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1600. Id. at 1291, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940. 
 1601. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940. 
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infringement judgment.1602  Although the district court had recited 
the ornamental features, its non-infringement determination did not 
engage in an improper element-by-element comparison but instead 
applied an overall comparison to find that an ordinary observer 
would not think the two tools were the same.1603 
5. Sale and offer for sale in the United States 
Section 271(a) of Title 35 defines an infringer as one who “without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, 
within the United States.”1604  In Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, 
Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.,1605 the defendant challenged both 
that an “offer to sell” and a “sale” had occurred within the scope of 
the statute.1606 
The case concerned Transocean’s patents related to an “improved 
apparatus for conducting offshore drilling.”1607  There was no dispute 
that the defendant had offered its accused product for sale for 
performance in the United States, but it contended that because the 
negotiations were conducted in Norway, not the United States, the 
offer did not fall within the geographic scope of § 271(a).1608  The 
district court agreed on summary judgment, but the Federal Circuit 
vacated that judgment.1609  The court explained that the “focus should 
be not on the location of the offer, but rather the location of the 
future sale that would occur pursuant to the offer.”1610  In reaching 
this conclusion, the court relied on the statute itself, which precludes 
“offers to sell . . . within the United States.”1611  The court found no 
support for reading that language as “offers within the United States 
to sell” or “offers made within the United States to sell within the 
United States.”1612 
Regarding whether the defendant could face liability for a “sale” 
within the scope of § 271(a), the Federal Circuit vacated the grant of 
summary judgment of non-infringement on that issue as well.  As it 
had with the “offer for sale” issue, the defendant argued that the 
contractual negotiation and execution in Norway precluded § 271(a) 
liability, which the Federal Circuit rejected for the same reason.  It 
                                                          
 1602. Id. at 1295, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944. 
 1603. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944. 
 1604. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 1605. 617 F.3d 1296, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1606. Id. at 1308, 1310, 96 U.W.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112–13.  
 1607. Id. at 1301–02, 96 U.W.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. 
 1608. Id. at 1308, 96 U.W.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1111.   
 1609. Id. at 1309, 96 U.W.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112. 
 1610. Id.  
 1611. Id. at 1308, 96 U.W.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1111. 
 1612. Id. 
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held “that a contract between two U.S. companies for the sale of the 
patented invention with delivery and performance in the U.S. 
constitutes a sale under § 271(a) as a matter of law.”1613  The court 
also rejected the defendant’s argument that, because its rig was not 
completely constructed, it did not qualify as a sale.1614  The court 
reiterated that a sale “is not limited to the transfer of tangible 
property; a sale may also be the agreement by which a transfer takes 
place.”1615 
6. Joint infringement 
In 2010, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of joint 
infringement, which provides a theory of direct infringement where 
one entity does not actually perform each and every step of the claim.  
Most notably, at the end of the year, it held in Akamai v. Limelight1616 
that joint infringement requires an agency relationship or a 
contractual obligation, further limiting the instances in which joint 
infringement is likely to be found.1617   
In prior decisions, the Federal Circuit restricted direct 
infringement based on joint liability to instances where “one party 
exercises ‘control or direction’ over the entire process such that every 
step is attributable to the controlling party.”1618  It emphasized, 
however, that one cannot avoid liability for infringement “simply by 
contracting out steps of a patented process to another entity.”1619   
In Akamai, the Federal Circuit elaborated on those decisions.   
At issue in Akamai were patents directed to a method for efficiently 
delivering web content.1620  The defendant performed all of the steps 
of the method except for the step of “tagging” the chosen content to 
be delivered, which was performed by its customers.1621 The patent 
holder, therefore, relied on a theory of joint infringement, arguing 
that the defendant controlled or directed the activities of its 
customers.1622  After a jury verdict finding infringement, the district 
court granted the defendant’ motion for JMOL of non-
infringement.1623  Relying on Miniauction, the district court in Akamai 
                                                          
 1613. Id. at 1309, 96 U.W.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1112. 
 1614. Id. 
 1615. Id. 
 1616. 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1617. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1319. 
 1618. Miniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see 
also BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
 1619. BMC  Resources, 498 F.3d at 1381. 
 1620. 629 F.3d 1311, 1315, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1621. Id. at 1316, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323. 
 1622. Id. at 1316–17, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324. 
 1623. Id. at 1318, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325. 
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found that there was “no material difference” between the 
defendant’s interaction with its customers in that case and the 
interactions of the defendant in Muniauction, where the defendant 
had merely provided instructions on how to use the web system at 
issue in that case.1624 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of non-
infringement.  After describing BMC Resources and Miniauction as 
setting forth “a foundational basis” for its joint infringement 
jurisprudence, the Akamai court further explained that “what is 
essential is not merely the exercise of control or the providing of 
instructions, but whether the relationship between the parties is such 
that acts of one may be attributed to the other.”1625  For such a 
relationship to exist, an agency or contractual relationship must exist.  
As the court held, “as a matter of Federal Circuit law that there can 
only be joint infringement when there is an agency relationship 
between the parties who perform the method steps or when one party 
is contractually obligated to the other to perform the steps.”1626 
Applying that test to the facts of the case, the Federal Circuit held 
that no evidence showed that the defendant’s customers were acting 
as its agents in performing the “tagging” step.1627  Nor did a 
contractual relationship exist.  While the customers contracted with 
the defendant for authority to use the defendant’s system, nothing 
obligated the customer to actually use that service and, in that 
process, select and “tag” material for delivery.1628 
7. Doctrine of equivalents 
If an accused device does not literally infringe a claim, it may still 
infringe under the “doctrine of equivalents.”1629  Under the doctrine, 
“[i]f two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and 
accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even 
though they differ in name, form, or shape.”1630  This method of 
determining equivalence is known as the “function-way-result” test. 
In 2010, the Federal Circuit addressed certain legal principles that 
can preclude a finding of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents. 
                                                          
 1624. Id.; Miniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1328–30 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 1625. 629 F.3d at 1319,  97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 1626. Id. at 1320, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326–27. 
 1627. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 1628. Id.  
 1629. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 1630. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U. S. 605, 608 (1950). 
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a. Prosecution history estoppel 
The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel provides an 
important limitation on the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents.  Under the doctrine, “[w]here an amendment narrows 
the scope of the claims, and that amendment is adopted for a 
substantial reason related to patentability, the amendment gives rise 
to a presumption of surrender for all equivalents” that fall between 
the original claim and the amended claim.1631  Thus, statements and 
claim amendments made during prosecution can “prevent[] 
recapture of subject matter surrendered during prosecution of the 
patent.”1632  Prosecution history estoppel is an issue of law.1633  
Prosecution history estoppel, however, is only a presumption that can 
be overcome by showing that one skilled in the art at the time of the 
amendment would not have been expected to draft a claim to 
include the alleged equivalent.1634 
In Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit agreed with the district court that prosecution history 
estoppel precluded the plaintiff from relying on the doctrine of 
equivalents to prove infringement.1635  The patents concerned 
software for displaying the market for commodities traded 
electronically, and a term at issue was “static display of prices.”1636  
During prosecution, the applicant amended the claims to include 
additional language that the static price display does not move 
automatically.1637  While a proper claim construction would not have 
limited the claims to manual re-centering, the patent owner’s 
amendments surrendered coverage for any subject matter that moved 
automatically.1638  Because the accused system’s price level 
automatically drifted towards the center of the display after every 
change in the inside market, Trading Technologies was prevented 
from asserting the system was an equivalent.1639 
In Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 1640  the 
Federal Circuit held that prosecution history estoppel barred Spine 
Solutions from arguing that the accused product’s two anchors for an 
intervertebral implant, used to replace disks in the spinal column, 
                                                          
 1631. Intervet Inc. v. Merial Limited, 617 F.3d 1282, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2010),  
95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1956, 1962 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1632. Southwall, 54 F.3d at 1579; see also Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30–34. 
 1633. Id. 
 1634. Intervet, 617 F.3d at 1291, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1962. 
 1635. 595 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1636. Id. at 1345, 1352. 
 1637. Id. at 1354. 
 1638. Id. 
 1639. Id. at 1355. 
 1640. 620 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1640 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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were equivalent to the claimed “single anchor,” and held as a matter 
of law that the accused product did not infringe under the doctrine 
of equivalents.1641  In addition to asserting that the district court erred 
in granting summary judgment of literal infringement, Medtronic 
argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment of 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.1642  With respect to 
that issue, Medtronic contended that the patent applicant had made 
a clear surrender of any designs containing more than one anchor 
during prosecution.1643  The Federal Circuit agreed, ruling that the 
applicants had expressly distinguished the claimed invention over 
another patent by asserting that “a reference disclosing two anchors 
does not disclose a device affirmatively claiming a single anchor” and 
that “reciting a negative limitation in the form of a single element is 
not disclosed by prior art which teaches more than one element.”1644  
Prosecution history estoppel therefore barred Spine Solutions from 
arguing that a two-anchor device was equivalent to the claimed 
implant.1645 
In Funai Electric Co. v. Daewoo Electronics Corp., 1646 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the issue of prosecution history estoppel and whether a 
patentee lost its range of equivalents with regard to a claim term 
when it cancelled the relevant claim after it was rejected during 
prosecution.1647  The patentee had cancelled two claims and then 
added the limitations from those claims into a dependant claim.1648  
The district court determined that no estoppel existed, and the 
Federal Circuit agreed.1649  In reaching that conclusion, the Federal 
Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s authority in Festo, which 
recognized that there are some cases where an amendment cannot 
reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent.1650  In 
particular, the Festo Court stated:  “[T]he rationale underlying the 
amendment may bear no more than a tangential relation to the 
equivalent in question”; “[i]n those cases the patentee can overcome 
the presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of 
equivalence.”1651  Applying the principles set out in Festo, the Federal 
                                                          
 1641. Id. at 1320, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 1642. Id. at 1310, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.   
 1643. Id. at 1317, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.   
 1644. Id.   
 1645. Id. 
 1646. 616 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1647. Id. at 1369, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338. 
 1648. Id. at *9. 
 1649. Id. at *8. 
 1650. Id. at *8 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,  
535 U.S. 722, 741 (2002)). 
 1651. Festo, 535 U.S. at 741. 
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Circuit in Funai held that the basis for the defendant’s prosecution 
estoppel theory was “merely tangential” to the prosecution.  Thus, the 
claims were properly sent to the jury, and because the defendant did 
not challenge the jury verdict, the judgment of infringement was 
affirmed.1652 
b. The all-elements / anti-violation rule 
Under the “all-elements rule,” a patentee may not assert 
equivalence under a theory that would entirely vitiate a claim 
element.1653  Claim vitiation occurs when there is a “clear, substantial 
difference or a difference in kind” between the claim limitation and 
the accused product, not when there is only a subtle difference.1654 
In Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co., the Federal 
Circuit addressed whether claims containing specific numeric ranges 
could be infringed under the doctrine of equivalents or if that would 
violate the all-elements rule by rendering irrelevant the numeric 
range set forth in the claims.1655  The patents concerned certain 
formulations of a drug to treat congestion.1656  A dependent claim at 
issue included the limitation that the medication contain “at least” a 
certain specified amount of the drug.1657  The district court held that 
the “at least” term indicated an absolute lower limit of the range and 
held that allowing the plaintiff to show infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents would vitiate the quantity limitation.1658 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Federal Circuit had 
previously concluded that infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents could apply to claims requiring a specific numeric 
range.1659  Citing numerous authorities, the Federal Circuit agreed.1660  
The court held that “[t]he recitation of a specific numerical value 
does not by itself foreclose the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents,” and that the “addition of ‘at least’ in this case does not 
change this analysis.”1661  Thus, the court vacated the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment of non-infringement on the doctrine of 
equivalents. 
                                                          
 1652. Id. at *9. 
 1653. 595 F.3d 1340. 
 1654. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (quoting Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. 
Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 1655. 616 F.3d 1283, 1291–92 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1656. Id. at 1284. 
 1657. Id. at 1291. 
 1658. Id. 
 1659. Id. 
 1660. Id. 
 1661. Id. 
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C. Other Infringement Doctrines 
1. Induced infringement 
Under § 271(b) of Title 35, “[w]hoever actively induces 
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”   
In SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., the Federal Circuit 
addressed the knowledge requirement for induced infringement.1662 
The patents related to deep fryers that the defendant had 
manufactured overseas and sold to retailers in the United States, after 
basing its design on a reverse-engineering of the plaintiff’s deep 
fryers.1663  On appeal, the defendant, which had been found by the 
jury to be liable for induced infringement, argued that it could not 
be liable for induced infringement because it had no actual 
knowledge of the patent.1664 
The Federal Circuit affirmed.1665  Although its prior decision in DSU 
Medical Corp. v. JMS Co. had stated that “[t]he requirement that the 
alleged infringer knew or should have known his actions would 
induce actual infringement necessarily includes the requirement that 
he or she knew of the patent,”1666 in SEB, where the defendant had 
not known of the patent, the court limited that statement, explaining 
that DSU  did not “set out the metes and bounds of the knowledge of 
the patent requirement.”1667  SEB described the standard as whether 
the accused infringer was deliberately indifferent to a known risk.1668  
On that standard, the court affirmed.  “[H]ighly suggestive” of such 
deliberate indifference was the defendant’s failure to inform its 
counsel that it had copied the plaintiff’s products.1669 
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in SEB to address the 
standard for inducing infringement.  The case presents this question:  
“Whether the legal standard for the state of mind element of a claim 
for actively inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) is 
‘deliberate indifference of a known risk’ that an infringement may 
occur, as the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held, or 
‘purposeful, culpable expression and conduct’ to encourage an 
infringement, as this Court taught in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd.”?  The case was argued in February 2011, and a decision is 
expected by June 2011. 
                                                          
 1662. 594 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1663. Id. 
 1664. Id. at 1376. 
 1665. Id. at 1378. 
 1666. 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part).   
 1667. 594 F.3d at 1376. 
 1668. Id. 
 1669. Id. at 1377. 
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The Federal Circuit’s induced infringement cases also addressed 
whether product instructions, and user support resources, may 
support a finding of inducement.  In i4i LP v. Microsoft Corp.,  the 
Federal Circuit held that based on the evidence presented at trial, a 
reasonable jury could have concluded that Microsoft had the 
“affirmative intent to cause direct infringement.”1670  Microsoft had 
marketed the accused product along with online training and user 
support resources, which provided customers with detailed 
instructions on how to use the accused product.1671 
In AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex Inc.,1672 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
injunction of the defendant’s launch of a generic version of a 
corticosteroid treatment for asthma patients.1673  AstraZeneca’s 
method patent related to once-daily dosing of the drug. On its 
product label, Apotex omitted all references to once-daily dosages.  
However, the FDA required Apotex to include “downward titration” 
language that encouraged patients to reduce their daily intake of the 
drug to the lowest dose that provides a beneficial effect. AstraZeneca 
asserted that the “downward titration” statements effectively 
instructed consumers to use the drug once daily and induced them to 
infringe its patent.   
Apotex contended that it lacked the requisite specific intent to 
induce infringement because it was the FDA that had required 
Apotex to include the downward-titration statements.  Additionally it 
argued that its product label allowed for non-infringing use of the 
drug.  The Federal Circuit was not persuaded by Apotex’s arguments 
and agreed with AstraZeneca.  The court held that the downward 
titration would necessarily result in some users engaging in the 
patented method.  Moreover, the court ruled that redesigning the 
label around the infringing use showed that Apotex had the requisite 
knowledge and intent to induce infringement. 
2. Contributory infringement 
A party is liable for contributory infringement if it “offers to sell or 
sells within the United States or imports into the United States a 
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or 
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a 
patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, 
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use 
                                                          
 1670. Id. at 851, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958 (citing DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 
471 F.3d 1293, 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in 
relevant part)). 
 1671. Id. 
 1672. 633 F.3d 1042, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1673. Id. at 1044, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032. 
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in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing 
use.”1674 
A party can overcome a claim on contributory infringement if it 
can show that the accused product has a substantial non-infringing 
use.  In i4i LLP v. Microsoft Corp.,1675 Microsoft was unsuccessful in 
trying to do so.  Despite Microsoft’s evidence of some noninfringing 
uses for its XML editor, the Federal Circuit held that the contributory 
infringement verdict was not unreasonable.1676  In particular, 
Microsoft presented evidence at trial that some users save XML 
documents in non-infringing binary formats. 1677  Despite this 
evidence, the court held that the noninfringing use was not a 
practical or worthwhile use and not one that the accused product was 
designed and marketed to accomplish.1678 
3. Piercing the corporate veil to find individual liability 
In Wordtech Systems Inc. v. Integrated Networks Solutions Inc., the 
Federal Circuit addressed the issue of employee liability for all three 
bases of infringement—direct, induced, and contributory 
infringement.1679  The patents concerned compact disc duplication 
devices that copied files from computer memory to multiple discs.1680  
The plaintiff sued the corporation and two individual employees.1681  
All three parties were found liable on all three grounds of 
infringement, but only the individual defendants appealed the 
infringement verdicts.1682  On each ground, they argued that their 
corporation was valid and that they acted as officers of the 
corporation; therefore, the plaintiff could not pierce the corporate 
veil to hold them individually liable.1683  The Federal Circuit accepted 
the argument for direct infringement, but rejected it for induced and 
contributory infringement. 
Citing prior precedent, the Federal Circuit explained that the 
corporate veil shields a company’s officers from individual liability for 
direct infringement committed by the officers in the name of the 
corporation, unless the corporation is not valid or is merely the 
                                                          
 1674. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
 1675. 598 F.3d 831, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1676. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958. 
 1677. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958. 
 1678. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958. 
 1679. 609 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1680. Id. at 1310. 
 1681. Id. at 1311. 
 1682. Id. at 1312. 
 1683. Id. at 1312–18. 
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officers’ “alter ego.”1684  That analysis is governed by ordinary 
principles on piercing the corporate veil.1685  In Wordtech, however, the 
jury was never instructed on those principles or asked to determine 
whether the alleged corporation was valid.1686  Because “a correctly 
instructed jury could have concluded” that the corporation validly 
existed and did not serve as the individuals’ alter ego, the direct 
infringement verdict could not stand, and a new trial was required.1687 
On induced and contributory infringement, however, the 
corporate veil cannot shield individuals from liability.  As long as the 
patent holder can show that that the corporate officers “actively 
assist[ed] with their corporation’s infringement,” they may be 
personally liable for inducement.1688  Likewise, if the patent holder 
can show that the officers directed or participated in the infringing 
conduct, they may be personally liable for contributory 
infringement.1689 
4. Willful infringement 
In 2007, the Federal Circuit’s Seagate en banc decision set out a new 
test for willful infringement.1690  It overruled the “due care” standard 
for avoiding a willfulness finding, under which “a potential infringer 
has an affirmative duty of due care not to infringe a known patent.”1691  
Under Seagate, to establish willfulness, the patentee must first show 
“that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its 
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.”1692  If this 
threshold showing is made, the patentee must also establish that “this 
objectively-defined risk (determined by the record developed in the 
infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it 
should have been known to the accused infringer.”1693 
                                                          
 1684. Id. at 1313 (citing Wechsler v. Macke Int’l Trade, Inc., 486 F.3d 1286, 1295 
(Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 1685. Id. 
 1686. Id. at 1314. 
 1687. Id. at 1315. 
 1688. Id. at 1316 (quoting Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1578–79).  Notwithstanding this 
holding, the Federal Circuit ruled that a new trial on induced infringement may be 
necessary because the jury had not been properly instructed on the legal test for 
inducement.  See id. at 1316. 
 1689. Id. at 1316 (citing Hoover, 84 F.3d at 1411).  Notwithstanding this holding, 
the Federal Circuit ruled that a new trial on contributory infringement may be 
necessary because the jury verdict on that issue was confusing and because the 
plaintiff could not point to evidence establishing proof of all of the elements of 
contributory infringement.  See id. at 1317. 
 1690. In re Seagate, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).   
 1691. Id. (overruling Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 
1380, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 1692. Id. 
 1693. Id. at 1371. 
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As a practical matter, the threshold objective showing not only 
allows for more summary judgments on willfulness, it may also 
require consideration of all trial defenses.  For example, based on a 
review of available patent dockets, 40 percent of summary judgments 
of no willfulness have been granted since the Seagate holding. 1694  
And, in these cases courts have, in fact, focused on the threshold 
objective showing and the reasonableness of the defenses to 
infringement. 1695 
In SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,  the Federal Circuit 
thoroughly examined Seagate.1696  The district court had initially 
granted SEB’s motion for enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees 
based on the jury’s finding of willfulness; however, after the Federal 
Circuit issued Seagate, the district court vacated its ruling.1697  The 
court emphasized that, although there was record evidence that 
could satisfy the Seagate standard for willfulness, the evidence was “not 
so one-sided or overwhelming to allow the Court to conclude that a 
jury, properly instructed under the new Seagate standard, was 
required to find, by clear and convincing evidence, willful 
infringement.”1698 
The Federal Circuit affirmed, concluding that there was no 
reversible error in the district court’s analysis.1699  The result for SEB, 
however, might have been different if it had asked for a new trial 
under Seagate.  The Federal Circuit stated that it “might have granted 
[such a] request in light of the district court’s conclusion that the 
willfulness verdict could have gone either way under the Seagate 
test.”1700 
Under the Seagate standard, defenses to infringement, even if 
unsuccessful, may be sufficient to defeat a willful infringement 
finding.  In Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sophamor Danek USA, Inc., 
the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s determination that 
the defendant had willfully infringed the patent.1701  The defendant 
argued that its infringement defenses and its reliance on them were 
reasonable, and thus its manufacture of the infringing products was 
not objectively reckless to warrant a willful infringement 
determination.  The Federal Circuit agreed, holding that “[t]his 
                                                          
 1694. Robert M. Masters, Elizabeth L. Brann & Jeffrey D. Comeau, That's Your 
Opinion Letter, LAW 360 (April 6, 2011) http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/235173. 
 1695. Id. 
 1696. 594 F.3d 1360, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2010) cert. granted sub 
nom. Global Tech. Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 458 (2010). 
 1697. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631. 
 1698. Id. 
 1699. Id. at 1380. 
 1700. Id. at 1381. 
 1701. 620 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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‘objective’ prong of Seagate tends not to be met where an accused 
infringer relies on a reasonable defense to a charge of 
infringement.”1702  Even though the jury disagreed on the merits of 
that defense (regarding the obviousness of the asserted patent), the 
defendant had raised a substantial question.1703  As such, the 
defendant was not objectively reckless in relying on its obviousness 
defense. 
Prompt redesign efforts may also defeat a willful infringement 
claim.  In Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. eSpeed International, 
Ltd., the Federal Circuit stated that “[p]rompt redesign efforts and 
complete removal of infringing products in a span of a few months 
suggest that eSpeed was not objectively reckless.”1704  In particular, 
neither party disputed that eSpeed began redesigning the accused 
product immediately after Trading Technologies commenced the 
infringement suit, replacing the accused product with the redesigned 
product within four months.1705  Because that evidence and the record 
as a whole showed no objective recklessness, the Federal Circuit 
agreed with the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law 
that no reasonable jury could have found eSpeed willfully infringed 
the asserted patents. 
Redesign efforts were also central to a finding of no willfulness in 
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, 
Inc.1706  The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that no 
showing of willfulness could be made, given that the defendant had 
modified its rig to conform to an injunction entered against another 
party found to have infringed Transocean’s patents.1707  The Federal 
Circuit held that this conduct “show[ed] intent to avoid 
infringement.”1708  Accordingly, the Court affirmed summary 
judgment of no willfulness.1709 
Finally, in i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corporation, the Federal 
Circuit reiterated that a challenge to the jury’s willfulness finding is 
distinct from a challenge to the district court’s determination  
to award enhanced damages based on that finding.1710  Because 
                                                          
 1702. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651 (citing i4i Ltd P’ship v. Microsoft Corp.,  
598 F.3d 831, 860, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943, 1965 (Fed. Cir. 2010); DePuy Spine, 
Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1336–37, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865, 1880–81 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 1703. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651 (citing In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d at 
1360, 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 1704. 595 F.3d 1340, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
 1705. Id. at 1358. 
 1706. 617 F.3d 1296, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1707. Id. 
 1708. Id. at 1313. 
 1709. Id. 
 1710. 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted on other grounds. 
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Microsoft’s opening brief focused on the district court’s rationale for 
awarding enhanced damages, Microsoft’s “passing reference” to its 
post-verdict JMOL motion challenging the legal sufficiency of the 
jury’s finding of willfulness was insufficient to raise the argument on 
appeal.1711  In any event, the court held that even if Microsoft had 
raised the issue, the verdict would remain.1712  A reasonable jury could 
have found willful infringement based on evidence including the 
attendance of Microsoft employees at demonstrations of the patented 
software, receiving sales kits that identified the patentee’s software as 
patented, and designing Microsoft’s software to perform in the same 
manner as the patented software.1713 
V.  REMEDIES AND LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY 
A. Damages 
1. General damages 
a. Reasonable royalties 
Title 35 U.S.C. § 284 provides that, once patent infringement is 
found, “a patentee is entitled to ‘damages adequate to compensate 
for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty 
for the use made of the invention by the infringer.’”1714  A reasonable 
royalty rate can be determined by three means:  (1) an established 
royalty rate; (2) “the infringer’s profit projections for infringing 
sales”; or (3) “a hypothetical negotiation between the patentee and 
infringer based on the factors in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood 
Corp.”1715  
In 2010, the Federal Circuit decided several cases pertaining to 
reasonable royalty rates determined by the hypothetical negotiation 
approach, most of which discuss and expand upon the court’s recent 
decision in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.1716  In Lucent, the 
Federal Circuit refused to allow a patentee to rely on certain licenses 
to determine a royalty rate because the licenses were “radically 
different from the hypothetical agreement under consideration” and 
the district court was not presented with evidence regarding the 
                                                          
 1711. Id. 
 1712. Id. 
 1713. Id. 
 1714. ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 954 F.3d 860, 868 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1553 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284). 
 1715. Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 
1319, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. 
U.S. Plywood, 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).   
 1716. 580 F.3d 1301 at 1308, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1555 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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subject matter of the licenses.1717  The relevant consideration is 
whether the license is sufficiently linked to the patent in suit.1718   
In ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc.,1719 ResQNet.com sued Lansa for 
infringement of five patents pertaining to screen recognition and 
terminal emulation processes for local personal computers.1720  After a 
bench trial, the district court found infringement and ordered Lansa 
to pay $506,305 in damages.1721  The 12.5% royalty rate underlying the 
damages award was based on the testimony of ResQNet’s expert, who 
relied on seven existing licenses issued by the patentee.   
On appeal, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit vacated the 
damages award.1722  In a per curiam opinion, Judge Lourie and Judge 
Rader concluded that the district court “relied on speculative and 
unreliable evidence divorced from proof of economic harm linked to 
the claimed invention,” a practice “inconsistent with sound damages 
jurisprudence.”1723  In support of this conclusion, the court noted:  
“[A] reasonable royalty analysis requires a court to hypothesize, not 
to speculate.  At all times, the damages inquiry must concentrate on 
compensation for the economic harm caused by the infringement of 
the claimed invention.”1724   
Considering the first Georgia-Pacific factor, the majority determined 
that five of the seven licenses “had no relationship to the claimed 
invention.”1725  Moreover, the rates of those licenses were not 
consistent with the rate for the other two licenses, which “arose out of 
litigation over the patents in suit.”1726   
The majority then analogized this case with the court’s recent 
decision in Lucent.1727  Like Lucent, the district court had “made no 
effort to link certain licenses to the infringed patent.”1728 
                                                          
 1717. Lucent Techs. Inc., v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1327–28, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1555, 1574. (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1718. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560 (emphasis added) (quoting Ga.-Pac. Corp., 
318 F. Supp. at 1120, 116 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 238). 
 1719. 594 F.3d 860, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1720. Id. at 864, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.  Two of these patents, U.S. Patent 
No. 5,812,127 and U.S. Patent No. 5,792,659, were removed from the action via a 
consent judgment.  Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.  The district court issued Rule 
11 sanctions based on the ‘127 patent and U.S. Patent No. 5,831,608.  Id., 93 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.  For a discussion of these sanctions, see supra notes 543–53 
and accompanying text.   
 1721. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555. 
 1722. Id. at 873, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1562. 
 1723. Id. at 868, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559. 
 1724. Id. at 869, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560 (citation omitted) (citing Fromson v. 
W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1606, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964)). 
 1725. Id. at 870, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560. 
 1726. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560.  
 1727. 580 F.3d at 1301, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1555 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1728. ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 871, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560. 
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The court also relied on its prior decision in Trell v. Marlee 
Electronics Corp.1729  In Trell, the Federal Circuit vacated a 6% royalty 
rate because the district court failed to consider the differences 
between a prior license and the patent in suit.1730  When comparing 
the two cases, the ResQNet.com majority concluded that the case 
before the court was “far more egregious” than Trell because the 
parties in Trell never disputed that the license at issue related to the 
patent in suit.1731  In ResQNet.com, the issue was hotly disputed.1732 
The majority also chastised the district court for being influenced 
by the defendant’s decision not to offer expert testimony on 
damages.1733  The majority emphasized that ResQNet had the burden 
of persuasion on the issue; not until ResQNet met this burden “with 
reliable and sufficient evidence,” did the defendant have any 
obligation to rebut ResQNet’s expert.1734   
Judge Newman vigorously dissented.1735  In her view, the majority 
had “create[d] a new rule” that excluded from royalty considerations 
licenses that do not directly license the patent in suit or “licenses 
[that] include subject matter in addition to that which was 
infringed.”1736  According to Judge Newman, neither Lucent nor any 
other case requires this “blanket exclusion of relevant evidence.”1737 
ResQNet.com and Lucent were also analyzed in Wordtech Systems, Inc. 
v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc.1738  Wordtech involved three patents 
related to systems for self-operating compact disc duplication.1739  A 
jury found infringement and awarded Wordtech several hundred 
thousands of dollars in damages.1740 
Applying regional circuit law requiring a court to “uphold the 
jury’s finding unless the amount is grossly excessive or monstrous, 
clearly not supported by the evidence, or based only on speculation 
or guesswork,”1741  the Federal Circuit reversed the damages award as 
excessive.1742  Analyzing the first Georgia-Pacific factor and Lucent, the 
                                                          
 1729. 912 F.2d 1443, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 1730. Id. at 1447, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062. 
 1731. ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 871, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1561. 
 1732. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1561.  
 1733. Id. at 872, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1562. 
 1734. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1562 (citing Lucent Techs. Inc., v. Gateway, Inc., 
580 F.3d at 1301, 1329, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d at (BNA) 1555, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1735. Id. at 876, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565 (Newman, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 1736. Id. at 876, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565–66. 
 1737. Id. at 877, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. 
 1738. 609 F.3d 1308, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1739. Id. at 1310–11, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622. 
 1740. Id. at 1312, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623. 
 1741. Id. at 1318–19, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628 (quoting Del Monte Dunes at 
Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1435 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 1742. Id. at 1322, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631. 
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Federal Circuit emphasized that, under Lucent, courts should pay 
attention to whether the license provides a lump-sum or running 
royalty.1743  The panel also discussed ResQNet.com’s1744 holding “that 
comparisons of past patent licenses to the infringement must account 
for ‘the technological and economic differences’ between them.’”1745 
Like Lucent and ResQNet.com, Wordtech’s licenses were not 
sufficiently comparable.1746  Specifically, only two of Wordtech’s 
licenses were lump-sum licenses, neither of which provided a basis for 
comparison with the defendants’ infringing sales because “[n]either 
license describes how the parties calculated each lump sum, the 
licensees’ intended products, or how many products each licensee 
expected to produce.”1747  Moreover, the eleven running-royalty 
licenses were not relevant because they did not reveal a basis for 
comparison between the running royalty and the lump-sum award.1748   
In Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,1749 the Federal Circuit 
upheld a jury damages award in the face of ResQNet.com analysis.1750  A 
jury found that the defendants infringed all of Finjan’s patents,1751 
and awarded Finjan over $9 million in damages.   
The Federal Circuit affirmed the damages award.1752  Although 
Finjan’s expert had improperly included sales to the United States 
government in his calculations, this error did not require a new trial 
because the district court properly instructed the jury not to include 
sales to the United States government in its damages calculation.1753  
Because “[j]urors are ‘presumed to have followed’ the instructions 
they were given”1754 and the defendants had not rebutted this 
presumption, the award was upheld.1755 
The panel also walked through the defendants’ arguments 
regarding Georgia-Pacific factors 1, 10, 11, and 13,1756 rejecting each 
                                                          
 1743. Id. at 1319, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629. 
 1744. 594 F.3d 860, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1745. Wordtech, 609 F.3d at 1319–20, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629 (quoting 
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d at 860, 873, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553, 
1563). (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
 1746. Id. at 1320, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629–30. 
 1747. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629–30. 
 1748. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630 (citing Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1330, 92 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575). 
 1749. 626 F.3d 1197, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1750. Id. at 1212, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173. 
 1751. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
 1752. Id. at 1200, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
 1753. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006)). 
 1754. Id. at 1208–09, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170 (quoting Jones v. United States, 
527 U.S. 373, 394 (1999)). 
 1755. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.   
 1756.  The Georgia-Pacific factors evaluated by the court are as follows:  “(1) The 
royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or 
tending to prove an established royalty . . . (10) The nature of the patented 
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one.1757  The panel disagreed with the defendants’ characterization of 
factor 11 as focusing on use by the customer, rather than use by the 
infringer.1758  Once sold, the defendants were using the infringing 
product, regardless of whether customers activated the infringing 
features.1759  Turning to factors 10 and 13, the panel noted that record 
evidence supported a jury finding that the patented inventions were 
more than “tiny features in the accused products,” contrary to the 
defendants’ argument.1760 
Finally, the panel noted that its recent decision in ResQNet.com1761 
held that past patent licenses must account for differences in the 
technologies and economic circumstances of the contracting 
parties.1762  In this case, Finjan’s expert explained the “multiple 
differences” between the Finjan-Microsoft license introduced at trial 
and a hypothetical negotiated license between Finjan and the 
defendants, such that the jury could discount the license.1763 
In evaluating the Georgia-Pacific factors, the panel admitted that 
Finjan’s damages theory had “potential flaws,” but it reiterated that it 
was for the jury to “decide for itself what to accept or reject.”1764  
Because the panel concluded that the jury award was within the range 
supported by the record, and that the defendants failed to show that 
the award “[was] bereft of ‘a reasonable basis’ in the record,” the 
panel affirmed the award.1765 
Lucent was also discussed by the Federal Circuit in i4i Ltd. 
Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.1766  There, the jury found infringement 
and awarded $200 million in damages.1767  Microsoft appealed the 
                                                          
invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and 
produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention . . . 
(11) The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any 
evidence probative of the value of that use . . . (13) The portion of the realizable 
profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented 
elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or 
improvements added by the infringer.” Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. 
Supp. 1116, 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
 1757. Id. at 1211–12, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172–73. 
 1758. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172. 
 1759. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.  
 1760. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172–73.  
 1761. 594 F.3d 860, 870–73, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553, 1560–63 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(per curium). 
 1762. Finjan, 626 F.3d at 1211–12 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173.  
 1763. Id. at 1212, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173. 
 1764. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (quoting i4i L.P.Ltd P’ship v. Microsoft 
Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 856, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943, 1962 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).   
 1765. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (quoting Motter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 
883 F.2d 1223, 1230 (3d Cir. 1989)).  
 1766. 598 F.3d 831, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1767. Id. at 839, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949.  
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damages award on several grounds, including that the award was not 
a reasonable royalty rate under Lucent.1768   
The Federal Circuit disagreed.  Relevant to that decision was the 
procedural posture of the case.  In Lucent, the defendant had filed a 
pre-verdict JMOL motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
on damages.1769  Microsoft filed no such motion, and this failure 
required the Federal Circuit to review the award under the narrow 
standard of review applicable to denials of motions for new trial—a 
clear showing that the damages award was excessive.1770  Under this 
deferential standard, even though the damages award was high, it was 
supported by the evidence in the record, including expert testimony 
that a reasonable royalty would be between $200 and $207 million.1771  
Because “any reasonable royalty analysis necessarily involves an 
element of approximation, and uncertainty,” the panel, applying its 
deferential standard of review, upheld the damages award.1772 
The Federal Circuit also upheld a reasonable royalty award in SEB 
S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.1773  There, the jury found 
infringement and awarded $4,650,000 in damages.1774  After the 
verdict, the defendant—Pentalpha—sought to offset its damages by 
the $2,000,000 that the plaintiff had received in a settlement with 
another defendant.1775 
One issue before the Federal Circuit was Pentalpha’s motion for a 
new trial, which the district court denied, that was based on SEB’s 
allegedly improper closing arguments that SEB made a “substantial 
profit” and “got something close to [its] list prices.”1776  Pentalpha 
objected because, during trial, an SEB executive testified that, even 
though “he thought SEB made a profit, SEB did not always sell its 
deep fryers at list prices.”1777  As a result, the district court granted 
                                                          
 1768. Id. at 852, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1962. 
 1769. Id. at 857, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1962 (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. 
Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1309, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1555, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 
2009)).  
 1770. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1962–63 (citing Duff v. Werner Enters., Inc., 489 
F.3d 727, 730 (5th Cir. 2007); Carlton v. H.C. Price Co., 640 F.2d 573, 579 (5th Cir. 
1981)). 
 1771. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1963.  
 1772. Id. at 857–58, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1963 (citing Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325; 
Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 1773. 594 F.3d 1360, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub 
nom. Global Tech. Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 458 (2010). 
 1774. Id. at 1368, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.  Of the $4.65 million, $3.6 million 
was attributed to Sunbeam’s sales of Pentalpha fryers, $540,000 to Fingerhut’s sales 
of Pentalpha’s fryers, and $510,000 to Montgomery Ward’s sales.  Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1622.   
 1775. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.    
 1776. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630. 
 1777. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.  
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Pentalpha’s JMOL motion regarding lost profits at the close of 
evidence, determining that there was nothing in the record to 
support a jury finding that SEB’s fryers sold for a specific price.1778  
Pentalpha argued that SEB’s summation was inappropriate because 
of the district court’s earlier ruling.1779  The district court denied the 
motion, determining that its lost profits ruling “d[id] not mean that 
the jury could not consider SEB’s expectations of profits as part of a 
hypothetical negotiation.”1780 
The Federal Circuit agreed.1781  The court noted that the 
reasonable royalty inquiry is a “hypothetical construct” for which 
expectation of success can be considered.  Moreover, Pentalpha had 
the opportunity to highlight to the jury that SEB’s calculation was 
only an expectation, not an actual price.  The court found no abuse 
of discretion in the denial of a new trial.1782 
In Fujifilm Corp. v. Benun,1783 the Federal Circuit also affirmed a 
damages award, finding that the award of $2.00 per infringing sale 
running royalty and a lump sum royalty of $2,500,000 was not clearly 
excessive.1784  The court recounted the evidence that Fuji presented 
regarding damages, including expert testimony regarding the “strong 
bargaining position” Fuji would have enjoyed, the Georgia-Pacific 
factors that affected the rate, and the acceptability of the 
methodology used by the expert, ultimately settling on a forty cent 
royalty rate.1785  The panel put great weight on the expert’s testimony 
that the royalty amount would remain consistent even if there were 
changes in the royalty-base size.1786  This testimony provided the jury 
with sufficient information to reach Fuji’s proposed royalty 
amount.1787   
The panel rejected defendants’ argument that, in light of the forty-
cent royalty rate to which Fuji’s expert testified, the two-dollar rate 
was excessive.1788  In the defendants’ view, the jury could only consider 
the infringing products.  The panel, however, determined that the 
jury was entitled to take into account collateral sales of products even 
                                                          
 1778. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.  
 1779. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.  
 1780. Id. at 1380, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630 (emphasis omitted) (citation 
omitted). 
 1781. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630.  
 1782. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631.   
 1783. 605 F.3d 1366, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 1784. Id. at 1368, 1372–73, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1986, 1989–90.  
 1785. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989.   
 1786. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989. 
 1787. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989.   
 1788. Id. at 1373, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989. 
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if they did not infringe, as a hypothetical negotiation would likely 
take such information into account.1789  
b. Ongoing royalties 
In Telcordia Technologies, Inc.. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,1790 the Federal 
Circuit reiterated that it is not an abuse of discretion to award 
ongoing royalties in lieu of an injunction when the record supports a 
finding that a patent holder has not been compensated for 
continuing infringement.1791  In such cases, the district court may 
direct the parties to first attempt to negotiate the terms of the 
ongoing royalty.1792  In Telcordia, the district court denied Telcordia’s 
motion for a permanent injunction, then ordered the parties to 
negotiate an ongoing royalty rate.1793  The Federal Circuit remanded 
the case for the negotiations to continue.1794  As the court noted, the 
district court retained the authority to decide the issue if the parties 
could not agree, and the parties retained the right to appeal that 
determination.1795 
c. Notice 
In Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear, Inc.,1796 the Federal Circuit addressed the 
notice provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 287, which require that “any patented 
article” be marked in order for the patentee to recover damages in an 
infringement action, except for any portion of infringement in which 
the infringer was on notice and nonetheless continued to infringe.  
The court held that the notice provisions “do not apply where the 
patent is directed to a process or method.”1797   
In Funai Electric Co. v. Daewoo Electronics Corp., the court discussed 
the interplay of (i) actual notice and jury instructions and (ii) 
constructive notice and Original Equipment Manufacturer (“OEM”) 
sales.1798   
                                                          
 1789. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989 (citing Deere & Co. v. Int’l Harvester Co., 
710 F.2d 1551, 1559, 218 U.S.P.Q. 481, 487 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  
 1790. 612 F.3d 1365, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1791. Id. at 1378, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1792. Id. at 1379, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.  
 1793. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.  
 1794. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1795. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1796. 620 F.3d 1321, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1797. Id. at 1332, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751 (quoting Crown Packaging Tech., 
Inc. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 559 F.3d 1308, 1316, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1186, 
1192 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 1798. 616 F.3d 1357, 1372–75, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329, 1340–43 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
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i. Actual notice 
In Funai, which concerned VCRs, Funai sent defendants a letter on 
April 3, 2003, citing six patents and noting specific VCR models that 
Funai believed infringed its patents.1799  This letter was followed by 
claim charts in June 2003.1800  Defendants admitted that the letter 
provided actual notice for the specific VCR models listed in the letter, 
but asserted that the letter was “legally insufficient” to show actual 
notice of any other VCR models, thereby limiting the damages period 
at least as to those non-listed models.1801 
The Federal Circuit disagreed.1802  The court acknowledged that 
actual notice requires a letter that is “sufficiently specific to support 
an objective understanding that the recipient may be an infringer”1803 
and “communicate[s] a charge of infringement of specific patents by 
a specific product or group of products.”1804  According to the panel, 
however, once this threshold specificity is met, ensuing discovery can 
bring other models and related products within the scope of the 
notice.1805  Because the jury was instructed on the threshold notice 
requirements and defendants failed to show failure by the jury to 
implement this instruction, the court found no reason to reverse on 
this ground.1806 
ii. Constructive notice 
In Funai, the Federal Circuit also addressed—for the first time—
the applicability of § 287(a) and products sold through Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (“OEM”) customers for resale.1807  Section 
287(a) applies to “[p]atentees, and persons making, offering for sale, 
or selling within the United States any patented article for or under 
them or importing any patented article into the United States.”1808  
The evidence at trial established that, until 2003 when Funai sent a 
letter to defendants regarding infringement, about 90% of Funai’s 
products were sold as Funai products and marked with its patents, 
                                                          
 1799. Id. at 1372–73, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340–41. 
 1800. Id. at 1373, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (citation omitted). 
 1801. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341. 
 1802. See id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (affirming the notice instructions given 
to the jury).  
 1803. Id. at 1373, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (citing Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 
F.3d 1334, 1346, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 1804. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (citing Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Steel 
Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1462, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 1805. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341. 
 1806. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341. 
 1807. Id. at 1374, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.  
 1808. Id. at 1374, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006)). 
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while the remaining products, sold to OEM customers, were not so 
marked. 1809   
On appeal, the panel held that, “when others than the patentee are 
involved in sales to the public, a ‘rule of reason’ is applied, 
‘consistent with the purpose of the constructive notice provision—to 
encourage patentees to mark their products,” thereby giving the 
public notice of the patents and preventing infringement by innocent 
parties.1810  Accordingly, the court affirmed the ruling that the jury’s 
application of the constructive notice to Funai’s OEM sales was 
supported by substantial evidence.1811 
In a concurrence, Judge Linn joined the majority’s result, but 
applied a different rationale.1812  He stressed that the Federal Circuit 
“heretofore has not directly addressed the applicability of 
constructive notice to OEM sales” and that the instant case was not 
the proper forum to address the issue because the record on it was 
not fully developed.1813  Judge Linn would have affirmed that district 
court based solely on the Funai sales, which provided substantial 
evidence to fully support the verdict.1814 
d. Lost profits 
This year, the Federal Circuit upheld a jury award of lost profits as 
supported by substantial evidence in Funai Electric Co. v. Daewoo 
Electronics Corp.1815  At trial, Funai presented evidence of lost profits 
based on (i) Funai’s loss of a long-time large customer to defendants, 
and (ii) expert testimony and evidence that the VCR market “was 
essentially a two-supplier market.”1816  Funai’s expert also established 
that Funai’s market share during the pertinent time period was 30%, 
and that Funai lost $1,698,262 in profits.1817  Defendants failed to 
introduce any contrary evidence.1818  Instead, defendants raised 
various complaints about Funai’s evidence, including that Funai 
failed to establish its 30% market share and that “Funai’s patented 
technology was not the basis for demand for the [defendants’] 
products.”1819  The Federal Circuit rejected the defendants’ 
                                                          
 1809. Id.,  96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342. 
 1810. Id. at 1375, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342 (quoting Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 
86 F.3d 1098, 1111–12, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).  
 1811. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342–43. 
 1812. Id. at 1382, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348 (Linn, J., concurring). 
 1813. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348. 
 1814. Id. at 1383, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349. 
 1815. 616 F.3d 1357, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1816. Id. at 1375, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343. 
 1817. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343. 
 1818. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343.  
 1819. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343. 
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arguments, holding that the lost profits award was based on 
substantial evidence.1820   
e. Accounting 
In Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,1821 the Federal Circuit held 
that Finjan was entitled to an accounting of damages for the 
seventeen-month period between the time that the district court 
entered judgment—March 28, 2008—and the date the court entered 
a permanent injunction—August 28, 2009.1822  The district court 
awarded additional damages up to March 28, but no further.1823  The 
Federal Circuit held that, under 35 U.S.C. § 284, “[w]hen damages 
are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them.”1824  Moreover, “a 
patentee is ‘not fully compensated’ if ‘the damages award did not 
include future lost sales.’”1825  Thus, the Federal Circuit determined 
that Finjan was entitled to compensation for any infringing sales that 
occurred before the injunction’s effective date.1826   
The panel also rejected the defendants’ argument that Finjan 
waived its right to these damages because its complaint only sought 
damages that were proven at trial.  As the Federal Circuit observed, 
the complaint “also sought [s]uch further and other relief as the 
Court and/or jury may deem proper and just.”1827 
2. Enhanced damages 
The Federal Circuit considered enhanced damages in two cases 
this year.  In i4i Limited Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.,1828 the district 
court enhanced a damages award under 35 U.S.C. § 284, a statute 
that allows the court to “increase damages up to three times the 
amount found or assessed by the jury” if a jury has found willful 
infringement.1829  The jury was given an instruction on the willful 
infringement standard—an instruction to which Microsoft did not 
object—and it expressly found that “i4i prove[d] by clear and 
                                                          
 1820. Id. at 1376, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343. 
 1821. 626 F.3d 1197, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1822. Id. at 1212–13, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173–74.  
 1823. Id. at 1212, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173. 
 1824. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 1825. Id. at 1213, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (quoting Carborundum Co. v. 
Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 882, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1169, 1175 
(Fed. Cir. 1995)).  
 1826. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.  
 1827. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 1828. 598 F.3d 831, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
 1829. 598 F.3d at 858, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1963 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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convincing evidence that Microsoft’s infringement was willful.”1830  
The jury awarded i4i $200,000,000 in damages, and i4i made a 
motion for enhanced damages based on the willfulness finding.1831  
The district court applied the factors outlined in Read Corp. v. Portec, 
Inc.,1832 and enhanced the jury damages by $40,000,000.1833 
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court’s 
enhancement, although higher than awards in other cases, was not 
an abuse of discretion.1834  The court explained that the district court 
“made detailed factual findings which, taken together, support its 
award.”1835  Additionally, the district court correctly refused to reapply 
the Seagate willfulness test because “the standard for deciding 
whether—and by how much—to enhance damages is set forth in 
Read, not Seagate. . . . The test for willfulness is distinct and separate 
from the factors guiding a district court’s discretion regarding 
enhancing damages.”1836   
According to the Federal Circuit, a prerequisite to enhancing 
damages under § 284 is a determination of willfulness, but the jury 
considered and determined willfulness prior to the district court’s 
Read analysis.1837  Microsoft did not dispute the content of the Seagate 
jury instruction, only the district court’s analysis on enhanced 
damages.1838  While the panel did agree with Microsoft that an 
                                                          
 1830. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1963 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 1831. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1963.  
 1832. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826–27, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1426, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (articulating a nine-factor balancing test to assist in 
established enhanced damages), abrogated in part on other grounds by Markman v.  
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996). 
 1833. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964. With respect to its Read factor analysis, the 
district court concluded that factors two, four, six, seven, and eight all supported 
enhancing the damages award, while factors one and nine weighed against 
enhancement. i4i, 598 F.3d at 858, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1963–64.  The district 
court determined that no evidence supported factor one－”whether the infringer 
deliberately copied the ideas or design of another.”  Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1963.  On the other hand, the evidence surrounding factor two, which pertains to 
the infringer’s knowledge of the patent scope and good faith belief of 
noninfringement, weighed heavily in favor of enhancement.  Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1963–64.  The district court found that Microsoft’s size and financial 
condition, factor four, weighed in favor of enhancement because the jury award was 
“only a small fraction of Microsoft’s profits from the sale of Word products.”  Id.,  
93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964.  With regard to factors six, seven, and eight, “the 
district court found that Microsoft had started using the infringing products more 
than five years ago (in 2002), failed to conduct an infringement analysis after being 
notified of the ‘449 patent again in 2003, and implemented the infringing custom 
XML editor with the purpose of rendering i4i’s products obsolete. “  Id., 93 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964. 
 1834. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964.  
 1835. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964. 
 1836. Id. at 859, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964 (citations omitted). 
 1837. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964. 
 1838. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964. 
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enhancement based solely on litigation misconduct would be 
improper, the district court considered litigation misconduct only 
after it concluded that the Read factors supported enhancement.1839 
The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the damages award. 
The Federal Circuit upheld a district court’s decision not to 
enhance damages in Funai Electronic Co. v. Daewoo Electronics Corp.1840 
In that case, the jury found that defendants infringed Funai’s patents 
willfully.1841  After Funai requested enhanced damages based on 
willfulness, the district court analyzed the nine Read factors, and 
found that three favored enhancement, one supported enhancement 
“weakly,” and five factors did not favor enhancement.1842  Stating that 
it was a “close call,” the court denied Funai’s request.1843 
The Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to enhance damages.1844  The court 
disagreed with the district court’s approach to one Read factor⎯the 
duration of the defendant’s knowing infringement⎯holding the that 
district court’s statement that “the focus of this factor is whether or 
not the infringer has continued to infringe after there has been a 
judicial finding that a particular device infringes the asserted patent” 
was “too rigid.”1845  However, that finding was not dispositive because 
enhancement decisions were “‘informed by the totality of the 
circumstances.’”1846  The overall circumstances in Funai did not 
warrant reversal.1847 
B. Attorneys’ Fees 
The Federal Circuit decided seven cases involving attorneys’ fees in 
2010, several of which provided the historically rare sight of the 
Federal Circuit reversing district courts with regard to discretionary 
fee awards.1848  The Patent Act provides that “[t]he court in 
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
                                                          
 1839. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964. 
 1840. 616 F.3d 1357, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1841. Id. at 1376, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333. 
 1842. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333–34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1843. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1844. Id. at 1377, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1344. 
 1845. Id. at 1376, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 1846. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334 (quoting Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. 
Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1274, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 1847. Id. at 1377, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1344. 
 1848. Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fastener Corp., 607 F.3d 817, 95 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Universal Sec. 
Instruments, Inc., 606 F.3d 1353, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1432 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische ComputerSysteme GMBH, 603 
F.3d 943, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Lazare Kaplan International, 
Inc. v. Photoscribe Technologies, Inc, 628 F.3d 1329, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 
(Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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prevailing party.”1849  An “exceptional” case can be proven “by 
showing:  inequitable conduct before the PTO; litigation misconduct; 
vexatious, unjustified, and otherwise bad faith litigation; a frivolous 
suit or willful infringement.”1850  Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides 
another method whereby “[a] district court can require an attorney 
to pay the opposing party’s reasonable costs, expenses, and attorney’s 
fees when that attorney ‘so multiplies the proceedings in any case 
unreasonably and vexatiously.’”1851  To make this determination the 
Federal Circuit reviews a district court’s finding of an “exceptional” 
case for clear error, and if a case is truly “exceptional,” the court 
reviews the district court’s decision to award attorneys’ fees for abuse 
of discretion.1852  In reviewing an award of attorneys’ fees, the court 
will conduct a rigorous review of the record rather than blindly 
deferring to the district court’s ruling.1853   
The Federal Circuit reversed a fee award in Medtronic Navigation, 
Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische ComputerSysteme GmbH.1854  In that case, 
after the district court issued its claim construction order, the 
defendant indicated an intent to seek summary judgment.  The 
district court informed the defendant that issues of fact existed, and 
ultimately denied summary judgment.  The defendant raised its 
arguments again on JMOL, which again was denied.  The jury found 
infringement.  After dismissing the jury, the district court judge 
stated that he “enjoyed working with counsel” and “that both sides, all 
of you, have presented the case in the best possible way.”1855 
Thereafter, the defendant renewed its JMOL motion, and the court 
granted it, finding non-infringement for all patents in suit.  The court 
noted that, with respect to one patent, the jury’s infringement 
finding “resulted from plaintiffs’ deliberate distortion of the court’s 
claim construction rulings and abuse of advocacy.”1856  Medtronic 
appealed the district court’s findings, and the Federal Circuit 
affirmed without commenting on the district court’s remarks 
regarding plaintiff’s counsel’s advocacy.1857 
                                                          
 1849. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006). 
 1850. Leviton, 606 F.3d at 1358, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436 (quoting Epcon Gas 
Sys. Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1034, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 
1479 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 1851. Advanced Magnetic Closures, 607 F.3d at 833, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006)). 
 1852. Leviton, 606 F.3d at 1358, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436. 
 1853. See id. at 1363–65, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440–42 (detailing the inadequacy 
of the district court’s action based on the record). 
 1854. 603 F.3d 943, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1855. Id. at 950–51, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070. 
 1856. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1857. Id. at 952, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070–71. 
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After the appeal, BrainLAB filed a petition seeking attorneys’ fees 
under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927.  BrainLAB argued that 
plaintiff’s counsel “had prolonged a frivolous lawsuit and had 
obtained an improper jury verdict through litigation misconduct and 
abusive advocacy.”1858  The district court agreed, concluding that the 
case was “exceptional,” awarding attorneys’ fees under § 285, and 
holding Medtronic’s counsel jointly responsible both under § 1927 
and the court’s inherent power to assess fees against counsel engaged 
in abusive litigation conduct. 1859  According to the district court, the 
plaintiff “should have accept[ed] that the claims construction rulings 
stripped the merits from this case” and either should have taken an 
interlocutory appeal from the construction order or abandoned the 
case in light of BrainLAB’s summary judgment motion,1860 and that 
plaintiff’s counsel “had engaged in various forms of litigation 
misconduct,” including misleading the jury and wrongfully arguing 
the law.1861   
The Federal Circuit reversed.1862  Noting a “reluctance to second-
guess” the district court on fee awards, the Federal Circuit 
determined that the court’s exceptionality finding could not be 
upheld.1863  With regard to the district court’s finding that Medtronic 
should have abandoned its claims, the Federal Court noted that the 
“presumption that an assertion of infringement of a duly granted 
patent is made in good faith” can only be overcome by clear and 
convincing evidence that the “claims were vexatious, unjustified, or 
frivolous, and were pursued in bad faith.”1864  Such evidence was not 
present in the instant case.1865  In fact, the district court’s denial of the 
defendant’s summary judgment and initial JMOL motions 
“undermined” any finding that the claims in suit were frivolous.1866  
The court acknowledged that, had the plaintiff relied on false or 
misleading evidence to survive summary judgment, it would not be 
protected from sanctions based on a denial of summary judgment; 
                                                          
 1858. Id. at 948, 952, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067, 1071. 
 1859. Id. at 952, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 1860. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071 (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 1861. See id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071 (noting that litigation misconduct 
included misleading the jury by drawing attention away from the issue at trial and 
incorrectly suggesting that a statement made by the FDA demonstrated admission of 
infringement). 
 1862. Id. at 948, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068. 
 1863. Id. at 953, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 1864. Id. at 954, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 1865. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 1866. See id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072 (“[A] party is entitled to rely on a court’s 
denial of summary judgment and JMOL, as well as the jury’s favorable verdict, as an 
indication that the party’s claims were objectively reasonable and suitable for 
resolution at trial.”). 
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however, the district court in the instant case did not point to any 
false or misleading evidence, nor did the Federal Circuit find any.1867  
Further, Medtronic revised its case and withdrew some of its claims 
based on the district court’s claim construction ruling.1868 
As to the alleged litigation misconduct, the court concluded that 
several statements made during closing and rebuttal arguments, and 
the testimony of Medtronic’s expert witnesses were unobjectionable 
and could not have misled the jury.1869  The Federal Circuit did agree, 
however, with the district court’s finding that the counsel had made 
statements intending to suggest to the jury that infringement by 
equivalents depended on comparing two specific machines, which 
was contrary to the court’s instruction.1870  Nonetheless, and even 
though trial courts are generally accorded deference in imposing 
fees, that finding, alone, was insufficient to support the exceptional-
case finding under § 285.1871  The panel reversed the finding that the 
case was exceptional under § 285, reversed the assessment of joint 
liability under § 1927, and vacated the fee award.  The panel further 
noted that the evidence did not support the district court’s reliance 
on its inherent authority to support the fee award, emphasizing that a 
case must be beyond “exceptional” to justify a fee award under a 
court’s inherent power.1872 
Another reversal of a district court’s imposition of attorneys’ fees 
occurred in Leviton Manufacturing Co. v. Universal Security Instruments, 
Inc.  Finding the case “exceptional” because of Leviton’s inequitable 
conduct and vexatious litigation, the district court had awarded over 
one million dollars in fees to Meihao.1873  The Federal Circuit reversed 
the grant of summary judgment of inequitable conduct, finding that 
genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether Leviton had 
an intent to deceive the PTO in withholding a previous patent 
application.1874 
In contrast, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit upheld a fee 
award based on inequitable conduct in Taltech Ltd. v. Esquel Enterprises 
Ltd.1875  Following a bench trial, the district court determined that 
                                                          
 1867. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073. 
 1868. Id. at 955, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073. 
 1869. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 1870. Id. at 964, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080. 
 1871. Id. at 965–66, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1081. 
 1872. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1081 (quoting Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye 
Steel Castings Co., 23 F.3d 374, 378–79, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 
1994)) (alteration in original). 
 1873. Id. at 1358, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436. 
 1874. Id. at 1363, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.  See supra notes 510–23 & 1271–77 
and accompanying text for discussion of the facts of Leviton and the Federal 
Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s inequitable conduct finding. 
 1875. 604 F.3d 1324, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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Taltech engaged in inequitable conduct with respect to the patent in 
suit.1876  Based on this finding, as well as a litigation misconduct 
finding, the district court determined that the case was exceptional 
under § 285, and awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to the 
defendant.1877  In a prior appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the 
inequitable conduct determination and the attorneys’ fees award 
(based in part on that determination) and remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings.1878  On remand, the district court again 
found the case to be exceptional based on two other instances of 
inequitable conduct and abusive litigation tactics.1879  The defendant 
again appealed.1880 
A two-judge majority affirmed the exceptional-case finding on all 
three grounds.1881  The majority determined that the district court did 
not commit clear error with regard to its inequitable conduct 
findings, affirming the district court’s first two bases for finding the 
case to be exceptional.1882  The panel further concluded that evidence 
in the recorded supported the district court’s abusive-litigation 
finding based on the dismissal of the plaintiff’s damages claim after 
discovery concluded; its waiver of a jury trial only weeks before the 
trial; its voluntary dismissal, in the middle of the trial, of five claims of 
infringement; and its withdrawal of an ITC complaint shortly before 
the hearing.1883  It “ill behoove[d]” the panel to second-guess the 
district court’s finding “when the litigation occurred in front of the 
trial judge, not the appellate court.”1884 
A divided panel of the Federal Circuit upheld a district court’s 
refusal to award fees in Aspex Eyewear Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc.1885  
After several years of litigation over patents related to eyeglass frames, 
the district court ultimately dismissed the infringement claims on the 
ground of equitable estoppel based on Aspex’s three years of 
silence.1886  Clariti moved to have the court find the case “exceptional” 
under § 285 based on either equitable estoppel, inequitable conduct, 
                                                          
 1876. Id. at 1327–28, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 1877. Id. at 1328, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 1878. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 1879. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 1880. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 1881. Id. at 1327, 95 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1258–59. 
 1882. See id. at 1329–34, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259–64 (affirming that the case 
was exceptional based on inequitable conduct in failing to disclose the URS and in 
misconstruing the double top-stitch seam).  For further analysis of these inequitable 
conduct findings, see supra notes 1250–55 and accompanying text.  Judge Gajarsa 
dissented based on the majority’s inequitable conduct conclusions.  Taltech, 604 F.3d 
at 1335, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting). 
 1883. Id. at 1334, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264 (majority opinion). 
 1884. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1885. 605 F.3d 1305, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1886. Id. at 1308, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858. 
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or both and to award attorneys’ fees, but the district court denied the 
motion.1887 
A majority of the Federal Circuit panel affirmed the equitable 
estoppel ruling and agreed with the district court that an award of 
fees was inappropriate.1888  The majority noted that, “[e]ven in the 
absence of misconduct in the litigation or in securing the patent, 
attorney fees may be assessed when the litigation was objectively 
baseless and was brought in subjective bad faith.”1889  According to the 
majority, however, § 285 was the “exception to the American Rule 
concerning attorney fees, and is limited to circumstances in which 
the award of fees is necessary to prevent a gross injustice.”1890  The 
panel concluded that defeat of Aspex’s litigation position on 
summary judgment did not in and of itself establish that the suit was 
objectively baseless.1891 
Clariti also argued that the case was exceptional based on a finding 
of inequitable conduct.1892  The district court, however, did not hold a 
trial on inequitable conduct, and was not required to hold such a trial 
because of the equitable estoppel finding on summary judgment.1893  
In any event, the facts in evidence did not meet “the threshold levels 
of materiality and intent necessary to establish inequitable conduct by 
clear and convincing evidence.”1894  Thus, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by ruling that inequitable conduct had not been 
established.1895 
The Federal Circuit also made several procedural rulings related to 
attorneys’ fees.  In SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,1896 the Federal 
Circuit refused to award fees on a basis different than the basis 
ordered by the district court.1897  The district court initially awarded 
attorneys’ fees based on willfulness, but ultimately vacated this award 
in light of Seagate.1898  On appeal, SEB argued that an award of fees 
was warranted on grounds other than willful infringement, including 
                                                          
 1887. Id. at 1309–10, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859.  
 1888. Id. at 1316, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.  Judge Rader dissented based on 
the majority’s affirmance of the district court’s equitable estoppel finding.  Id.,  
94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864 (Rader, J., dissenting).  For an analysis of that issue, see 
supra notes 432–55 and accompanying text.  
 1889. Id. at 1314, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862 (majority opinion). 
 1890. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1891. Id. at 1315, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
 1892. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
 1893. Id. at 1316, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 1894. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 1895. Id., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 1896. 594 F.3d 1360, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2010) cert. granted sub 
nom. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 458 (2010). 
 1897. Id. at 1381, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631. 
 1898. Id. at 1380, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631 (citing In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 
497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
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alleged litigation misconduct.1899  The Federal Circuit noted that the 
district court “did not find any litigation misconduct sufficient to 
warrant an award of attorneys’ fees,” and “decline[d] to impose 
attorneys’ fees on a different basis than ordered by the district 
court.”1900 
After vacating an inequitable conduct finding, the Federal Circuit 
in Lazare Kaplan International, Inc. v. Photoscribe Technologies, Inc.1901 
vacated an award of attorneys’ fees based on the erroneous 
inequitable conduct determination.  The panel reiterated that 
determining whether a case warrants an award of attorneys’ fees 
under § 285 is a two-step process.1902  The first step requires the court 
to determine whether the case is exceptional, a factual 
determination.1903  If the court finds the case to be exceptional, the 
second step requires the court to “determine whether attorney fees 
should be awarded,” a discretionary determination.1904  In Lazare, the 
vacatur of the basis for the exceptional-case determination required 
vacatur of the exceptional-case finding and the fee award.1905 
Nuances of regional circuit law can have a great impact in the 
realm of sanctions.  In Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fastener 
Corp.,1906 the Federal Circuit determined that the appellant waived its 
argument with regard to attorneys’ fees under §§ 285 and 1927 
because it failed to raise the issue in its appellate brief.1907  In that 
case, the appellant argued that the district court erred in 
determining that the case was exceptional under § 285, but did not 
argue in its brief that the fee award was improper based on litigation 
misconduct.1908  The district court had relied on litigation misconduct 
as an independent ground to support the finding of attorneys’ fees 
against AMC pursuant to § 285, as well as imposing joint and several 
liability among all of AMC’s attorneys pursuant to § 1927.1909 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the fee award.1910  Noting that “a party 
waives an argument not raised in its opening brief,” the panel 
acknowledged that it “maintain[ed] discretion to address an 
argument not properly raised . . . if disregarding the argument would 
                                                          
 1899. Id. at 1381, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631. 
 1900. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631. 
 1901. 628 F.3d 1329, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1902. Id. at 1381, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.  
 1903. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 1904. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 1905. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.  
 1906. 607 F.3d 817, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1907. Id. at 833, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523. 
 1908. Id. at 832, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523. 
 1909. Id. at 833, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523. 
 1910. Id. at 833, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523. 
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result in an unfair procedure.”1911  Because the appellant “clearly 
understood the issue, but simply never made the argument,” the 
instant case did not “present a case in which this court should address 
the issue to remedy an unfair procedure.”1912 
The Rome court, however, reversed the sanctions imposed under  
§ 1927.1913  Applying the Second Circuit’s “strict standard,” which 
requires “clear evidence that (1) the offending party’s claims were 
entirely without color, and (2) the claims were brought in bad faith—
that is, motivated by improper purposes such as harassment or 
delay”1914 with “a high degree of specificity in the factual findings,”1915 
the panel held that the district court did not address counsel’s intent, 
nor did it find the subjective bad faith required to support an award 
under § 1927.1916 
C. Preliminary Injunction 
In AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc.,1917 a majority of a Federal Circuit 
panel upheld a preliminary injunction barring Apotex from 
launching its generic version of a budesonide drug.1918  In that case, 
AstraZeneca filed suit for a declaratory judgment against Apotex after 
the FDA approved Apotex’s ANDA with regard to generic 
budesonide.1919  Apotex’s ANDA was accompanied by a statement that 
Apotex did not seek approval for its drug for once-daily use, a 
method of use covered by two AstraZeneca patents.1920  Apotex’s 
proposed label for its drug was essential identical to AstraZeneca’s 
label, including language that patients should “titrate down” to the 
lowest effective dose, thereby implicating once-daily use.1921  
AstraZeneca asserted that Apotex’s generic drug would directly 
infringe certain kit claims in the AstraZeneca patents, and would 
induce infringement of certain method claims in one patent by 
including the titrate-down language on the label.1922 
                                                          
 1911. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523.  
 1912. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523.  
 1913. Id. at 833–34, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523–24. 
 1914. Id. at 833, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523 (quoting Eisemann v. Greene,  
204 F.3d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 1915.  Id. at 833–34, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523–24 (quoting Dow Chem. Pac. 
Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 344 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
 1916. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1523–24.  
 1917. Nos. 2009-1381, 2009-1424, 2010 WL 4286284, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029 
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2010). 
 1918. Id. at *1, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031. 
 1919. Id. at *3, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033. 
 1920. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033.  
 1921. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033. 
 1922. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033. 
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AstraZeneca requested a preliminary injunction barring Apotex 
from distributing budesonide, which the district court granted.1923  
The district court determined that, although Apotex had shown a 
likelihood of success that the kit claims were invalid, it had not shown 
a likelihood of success on the method claims.1924  The court also 
found that AstraZeneca would suffer irreparable harm without an 
injunction because distribution of the generic drug could cause 
“layoffs and loss of consumer goodwill” and a confidential settlement 
agreement between AstraZeneca and another party made 
determining economic harm speculative.1925  The district court 
determined that “the public interest did not favor either party.”1926 
A divided panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the preliminary 
injunction.1927  With respect to the likelihood of success on the merits, 
the record supported the conclusion that AstraZeneca was likely to 
withstand a validity challenge and succeed on its infringement claims 
with respect to the method claims.1928  On the irreparable harm 
prong, the majority agreed that AstraZeneca would suffer harm 
without an injunction.1929  It would be complete speculation to put a 
number on what this market would have been worth to 
AstraZeneca.1930  Further, the panel agreed with AstraZeneca that any 
“data generated during the settlement negotiations was influenced by 
the relative bargaining power of the parties and is not an accurate 
reflection of a market with only AstraZeneca and Teva.”1931  Further, 
although the finding that distribution of Apotex’s generic 
budesonide and the subsequent removal of the drug from the 
market, resulting in confusion and price changes, would cause 
immeasurable harm was not “particularly strong,” the majority 
concluded that the district court did not clearly err in this 
determination.1932  As to the harm of possible layoffs, that was based 
on undisputed testimony, and thus the district court did not commit 
clear error.1933 
                                                          
 1923. Id. at *3–5, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033–35. 
 1924. Id. at *4, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 1925. Id. at *5, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 1926. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035. 
 1927. Id. at *21, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047. 
 1928. Id. at *6–17, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035–44.  Judge Bryson disagreed with 
the majority’s determination regarding validity, and dissented on this ground.  Id. at 
*21–23, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047–48 (Bryson, J., dissenting in part).   
 1929. Apotex, 2010 WL 4286284, at *17–19, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1044–45. 
(majority opinion). 
 1930. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1044 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1931. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045. 
 1932. Id. at *19, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045. 
 1933. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1045.  
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D. Permanent Injunction 
1. Scope  
The Federal Circuit decided two cases addressing general concerns 
about the scope of permanent injunctions.  In Ortho-McNeil 
Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1934 the Federal 
Circuit upheld the district court’s determination to extend the term 
of the patent pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 156.1935  The court then granted 
a motion for an injunction preventing the defendants from 
infringing during the extended term of the  patent.1936   
The Federal Circuit upheld the injunction.1937  The court noted 
that, other than sale and use, “the extended term does not 
encompass any other exclusionary patent rights.”1938  Additionally, “an 
extended patent term does not apply to unrelated uses of an FDA-
approved product.”1939  Because Lupin failed to assert that the drug at 
issue had any non-pharmaceutical uses, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that the injunction did not exceed a proper scope but 
instead was “commensurate with the patent rights of exclusion.”1940 
In contrast, the Federal Circuit rejected the scope of an injunction 
in Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.1941 based on 
the extraterritorial reach of the injunction.  There, the district court 
issued a permanent injunction preventing Medtronic from, among 
other things, “using, selling, offering for sale, or otherwise 
transferring any of the accused devices that have already been 
exported.”1942  The Federal Circuit determined that the district court 
abused its discretion,1943 concluding that “Medtronic’s overseas 
sales . . . cannot infringe any U.S. patent, and there is little risk that 
the infringing devices will be imported.”1944  Therefore, according to 
the panel, the exterritorial scope of the injunction could only be 
based on a desire to remedy past infringement.1945  Because “[a]n 
injunction is only proper to prevent future infringement of a patent, 
not to remedy past infringement,” the injunction was an abuse of 
discretion.1946 
                                                          
 1934. 603 F.3d 1377, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1935. Id. at 1378–79, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247–48. 
 1936. Id. at 1381, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249. 
 1937. Id. at 1382, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1250. 
 1938. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250. 
 1939. Id. at 1382, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250. 
 1940. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250. 
 1941. 620 F.3d 1305, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1640 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1942. Id. at 1320, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1943. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 1944. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 1945. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 1946. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
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2. eBay factors 
The Federal Circuit decided two cases this year pertaining to 
proper application of eBay in permanent injunction analysis.   
In Spansion, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,1947 the Federal 
Circuit held that the eBay factors applicable to injunctive relief 
analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 283 did not apply to injunctive relief issued 
by the ITC under § 337.  Spansion involved an ITC exclusion order 
that the defendants appealed.1948  On appeal, Spansion argued that 
the injunction should be vacated because the Commission did not 
give any meaningful consideration to the public-interest prong of the 
eBay injunctive relief test.1949 
The Federal Circuit disagreed.  Recounting the legislative history 
of § 337, the panel held that the history “indicates that Congress 
intended injunctive relief to be the normal remedy for a Section 337 
violation and that a showing of irreparable harm is not required to 
receive such injunctive relief.”1950  The court then turned to the 
injunctive relief available in a district court under § 284.1951  The panel 
noted that Congress made this type of relief discretionary and 
explicitly stated that the relief should be exercised “in accordance 
with the principles of equity.”1952  Relying on Supreme Court 
precedent, the court further explained that “section 283 did not 
endorse or establish a categorical grant of injunctive relief . . . but 
[r]ather, the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief 
under Section 283 depends on traditional principles of equity.”1953  
The panel then held that “[g]iven the different statutory 
underpinnings for relief before the Commission in Section 337 
actions and before the district courts in suits for patent 
infringement, . . . eBay does not apply to Commission remedy 
determinations under Section 337.”1954  This decision thus preserves 
the ITC exclusion order as a powerful tool against importers of 
infringing items, though, given the statutory requirement that the 
complainant demonstrate the presence of a “domestic industry” in 
the product at issue,1955 this tool is not likely to be available to non-
                                                          
 1947. 629 F.3d 1331, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1948. Id. at 1357, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 1949. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 1950. Id. at 1358, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436. 
 1951. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436. 
 1952. Id. at 1359, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1953. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006)). 
 1954. Id., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006). 
 1955. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).  
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practicing entities.1956 The Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s 
application of eBay in i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.1957  After a 
jury found that Microsoft willfully infringed i4i’s patent, the district 
court entered a permanent injunction preventing Microsoft from 
“selling, offering to sell, and/or importing into the United States” 
infringing products; the injunction went into effect sixty days from 
the day of the order.1958  With the exception of the timing issue, the 
Federal Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in ordering the injunction.1959  Reviewing the district 
court’s application of the eBay factors, the Federal Circuit noted that 
“[i]t was proper for the district court to consider the evidence of past 
harm” when considering the irreparable injury factor because “[p]ast 
harm to a patentee’s market share, revenues, and brand recognition 
is relevant for determining whether the patentee has suffered an 
irreparable injury.”1960  The court explained that even though 
permanent injunctions are prospective relief, “the first eBay factor 
looks, in part, at what has already occurred.”1961   
With regard to the second eBay factor—inadequate remedies at 
law—the court concluded that there was no evidence that i4i was 
licensing the patent in suit, but rather it was a small company 
practicing its patent that lost “market share, brand recognition, and 
customer goodwill” because of the infringement.1962  These types of 
losses were hard to valuate, which was “evidence that remedies at law 
are inadequate.”1963 
In balancing hardship, the third eBay factor, the court held that the 
district court was correct to consider “the parties’ sizes, products, and 
revenue sources” and properly ignored both the expenses incurred 
by Microsoft when it created the infringing software and the cost to 
redesign Word to prevent future infringement.1964  The fourth factor, 
the public interest, was adequately protected by the narrowness of the 
district court’s injunction; purchasers of Word prior to the 
injunction’s effective date were unaffected by its force, thus 
“minimiz[ing] disruptions to the market and the public.”1965 
                                                          
 1956. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006). Cf. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396–97, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
 1957. 598 F.3d 831, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1958. Id. at 840, 861, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950, 1965–66.  
 1959. Id. at 861, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966. 
 1960. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1961. Id. at 862, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966. 
 1962. Id. at 862, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1967. 
 1963. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1967. 
 1964. Id. at 862–63, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1967. 
 1965. Id. at 863, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1967–68. 
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The Federal Circuit disagreed with the effective date, however.1966  
The only evidence regarding timing was the statement of a Microsoft 
employee that it would take at least five months for Microsoft to 
comply with the injunction.1967  With no evidence to support the 
district court’s sixty-day timeframe, the Federal Circuit modified the 
injunction’s effective date to five months from the date of the district 
court’s order.1968 
E. Interest 
1. Pre-judgment interest 
In Telcordia Technologies, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,1969  the Federal 
Circuit held that, where it is unclear whether the jury’s damages 
verdict includes prejudgment interest, it is not clearly erroneous for a 
district court to conclude that the award did not include 
prejudgment interest.1970  The Federal Circuit reiterated that district 
courts have broad discretion to interpret ambiguous verdict forms.1971 
2. Post-judgment interest 
In Taltech Ltd. v. Esquel Enterprises Ltd.,1972 a divided panel of the 
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s post-judgment interest 
calculation.1973  On April 10, 2009, the district court imposed post-
judgment interest to run from the 2007 date on which it originally 
awarded attorneys’ fees.1974  This original judgment was reversed by 
the Federal Circuit in 2008, and the case was remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings that resulted in a new basis for 
attorneys’ fees, which the court awarded.1975 
The majority reversed the date that post-judgment interest began, 
stating that it should be calculated from the date of entry of the 
judgment supported by the evidence.1976  The interest could not be 
calculated from the date of the 2007 judgment reversed on appeal.1977  
Relatedly, the rate to apply was the rate applicable to the legally 
sufficient judgment, not the prior judgment.1978 
                                                          
 1966. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968. 
 1967. Id. at 863–64, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968. 
 1968. Id. at 864, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968. 
 1969. 612 F.3d 1365, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1970. Id. at 1378, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1971. Id. 
 1972. 604 F.3d 1324, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1973. Id. at 1327, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257. 
 1974. Id. at 1334–35, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264. 
 1975. Id. at 1328, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 1976. Id. at 1335, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264. 
 1977. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264. 
 1978. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264. 
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VI. ALTERNATE SOURCES OF LIABILITY OR RELINQUISHMENT OF 
RIGHTS 
A. Patent Misuse 
In 2010, the Federal Circuit addressed both procedural and scope 
issues relating to patent misuse.  The doctrine of patent misuse is a 
nonstatutory, judge-made defense to patent infringement claims.1979  
The basic rule allows a patentee to “exploit his patent,” but prevents 
the patentee from using the patent “to acquire a monopoly not 
embraced by the patent.”1980  An alleged infringer may invoke the 
doctrine to assert that the patentee is attempting to expand the 
physical and temporal boundaries of the patent beyond the limits 
embodied by it.1981  With respect to licensing, the doctrine limits a 
patentee’s right to use licensing conditions to expand a patent’s 
reach.1982 
1. Procedural issues 
The Federal Circuit refused to determine patent misuse in the first 
instance in In Novo Nordisk v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd.1983  
There, a majority panel of the Federal Circuit refused to consider the 
patent misuse defense because the district court “expressly declined 
to address” it.1984  Because a finding of patent misuse is rare, the panel 
refused to make determinations on the issue in the first instance.1985 
2. Scope 
The en banc Federal Circuit limited the scope of the patent misuse 
doctrine in Princo Corp. v. ITC.1986  Princo involved Philips’s licensing of 
patents needed to manufacture and sell recordable and rewritable 
CDs that met the technical standards expressed in the “Recordable 
CD Standard,” also known as the “Orange Book.”1987  The dispute 
turned on one specific element of this technology—the manner used 
to encode position information on the CDs.1988  While jointly 
developing the Orange Book standards, Philips and Sony each 
                                                          
 1979. Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1321, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 1980. Id. at 1327. 
 1981. Id. at 1328. 
 1982. Id. at 1321. 
 1983. 601 F.3d 1359, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1984. Id. at 1367, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038. 
 1985. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038.  
 1986. 616 F.3d 1318, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 1987. Id. at 1322, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.  This is, of course, unrelated to the 
FDA “Orange Book” that lists pharmaceutical patents.  See supra notes 383–84 and 
accompanying text.   
 1988. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
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developed and patented different methods to address position 
coding.1989  The Philips method, embodied in the Raaymakers patents, 
became the Orange Book standard; however, Sony’s position coding 
method patent, the Lagadec patent, was also included in the Orange 
Book licensing packages.1990  All licenses in the licensing package, 
including the Lagadec patent, had a “field of use” restriction that 
prevented a licensee from using the license to make anything other 
than Orange Book-compliant technology.1991  
In the late 1990s, Princo entered a package licensing agreement 
with Philips, but Princo stopped paying the required licensing fees 
shortly thereafter.1992  Philips filed a complaint with the ITC alleging 
infringement by Princo of several of the Orange Book patents, 
including the Raaymakers patents but not including the Lagadec 
patent.1993  Princo asserted a defense of patent misuse based on the 
inclusion of the Lagadec patent in the licensing package.1994  After 
multiple proceedings, the ITC rejected all of Princo’s patent misuse 
arguments.1995  On appeal, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit 
ruled against the ITC and Philips.1996   
On en banc review, a majority of the Federal Circuit determined 
that the instant case did not involve patent misuse, holding that 
patent misuse cannot exist where the patent in suit is not the basis of 
the alleged misuse.1997  The majority emphasized that patent misuse is 
a narrow doctrine,1998 and that “the key inquiry under the patent 
misuse doctrine is whether, by imposing the condition in question, 
the patentee has impermissibly broadened the physical or temporal 
scope of the patent grant and has done so in a manner that has 
anticompetitive effects.”1999  The doctrine does not and should not 
apply in all cases where a patentee engages in some kind of wrongful 
commercial conduct, but rather is reserved for “a handful of specific 
practices by which the patentee seemed to be trying to ‘extend’ his 
patent grant.” 2000  
Turning to the facts of Princo, the majority noted that those facts 
were “completely different” than prior cases of patent misuse.2001  
                                                          
 1989. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
 1990. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234–35. 
 1991. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235. 
 1992. Id. at 1323, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235. 
 1993. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235. 
 1994. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235. 
 1995. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235. 
 1996. Id. at 1325, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236. 
 1997. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237. 
 1998. Id. at 1329, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239 (internal quotation marks omitted).    
 1999. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239. 
 2000. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239.  
 2001. Id. at 1331, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241. 
1046 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:845 
Here, the alleged patent misuse stemmed from a supposed horizontal 
agreement between Philips and Sony to limit access to the Lagadec 
patent, a patent completely different than the patents at issue in 
Princo.2002  According to the majority, the existence of a horizontal 
agreement between Philips and Sony to restrict access to the Lagadec 
patent could not constitute patent misuse because “[s]uch an 
agreement would not have the effect of increasing the physical or 
temporal scope of the patent in suit”2003   
Indeed, even if Philips were using licensing fees from the Orange 
Book patents to pay Sony enough royalties to incentify Sony to 
suppress the Lagadec patent, this practice was not “patent leverage, 
i.e. the use of the patent power to impose overbroad conditions on 
the use of the patent in suit,” because the use of funds obtained from 
lawful activities to support different, anticompetitive behavior “does 
not place any conditions on the availability of Philips’s patents to any 
potential licensees.”2004  In its simplest form, Princo’s argument was 
that it could not license the Lagadec patent for non-Orange Book 
uses, which was “not patent misuse under any court’s definition.”2005  
Judges Dyk and Gajarsa dissented, arguing that the majority’s 
holding was “directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s view of patent 
misuse in its recent Illinois Tool Works decision,”2006 in which the Court 
stated that “[i]t would be absurd to assume that Congress intended to 
provide that the use of a patent that merited punishment as a felony 
[under the Sherman Act] would not constitute misuse.”2007  The 
dissent interpreted the majority opinion as “emasculat[ing] the 
[patent misuse] doctrine,” limiting it to instances of “unlawful tying 
arrangements and agreements extending the patent term.”2008  In 
Judge Dyk’s view, precedent and legislation “support[ed] a vigorous 
misuse defense, clearly applicable to agreements to suppress 
alternative technology.”2009 
According to the dissent, the majority incorrectly treated the 
agreements to suppress the Lagadec technology as separate from the 
agreements to shield the Raaymakers patents from competition.2010  
All of the agreements were part of the same course of conduct, and 
therefore “constitute[d] misuse of the Raaymakers patents.”2011  In the 
                                                          
 2002. Id. at 1331, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241. 
 2003. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241.  
 2004. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242. 
 2005. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.  
 2006. Id. at 1341, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 2007. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2006). 
 2008. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1342, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 2009. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249. 
 2010. Id. at 1346, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252. 
 2011. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.  
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dissent’s view, “the particular form or method by which the monopoly 
is sought to be extended is immaterial” to patent misuse analysis; 
rather, the question is merely whether the patent holder extended 
“the scope of [the] patent beyond the monopoly conferred by the 
patent laws.”2012  Here, the effect of the alleged two-agreement system 
was to prevent access to the Lagadec patent for use in technology that 
could compete with the Orange Book compliant technology. Thus, 
any agreement between Sony and Philips to suppress the Lagadec 
technology could not be treated as separate from agreements relating 
to the Raaymakers patents.2013 
In a short concurrence, Judges Prost and Mayer took a middle-
ground approach, arguing that “a finding of patent misuse is 
unwarranted on this record because Princo failed to meet its burden 
of showing that any agreement regarding the Lagadec patent had 
anticompetitive effects.”2014  Judge Prost concluded, however, that the 
patent misuse doctrine was not as narrow as the majority claimed, nor 
as expansive as the dissent asserted.2015   
B. Patent Exhaustion  
This year, the Federal Circuit decided two cases pertaining to the 
patent exhaustion doctrine, also known as the first-sale doctrine.  
This doctrine states that a patentee’s “unrestricted sale of a patented 
article, by or with the authority of the patentee” eliminates the 
original patent’s applicability to the article.2016  In other words, once 
an authorized, unrestricted, United States sale of an article occurs, 
“the patentee’s right to control the future sale and use of [the] article 
by enforcing the patent under which it was first sold” is exhausted.2017  
The territorial aspect of an authorized first sale was at issue in 
Fujifilm Corp. v. Benun.2018  There, the Federal Circuit determined that 
the United States territoriality requirement announced in Jazz Photo 
Corp. v. International Trade Commission2019 was not affected by Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.2020  The case involved defendant’s 
infringement of Fuji’s lens-fitted film packages (“LFFP”) patents, also 
known as single-use cameras.2021  The defendants bought Fuji’s used 
                                                          
 2012. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2013. Id. at 1349, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.   
 2014. Id. at 1340, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248 (Prost, J., concurring). 
 2015. Id., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248. 
 2016. Jazz Photo Corp. v. ITC, 264 F.3d 1094, 1104, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907 
(Fed. Cir. 2001).  
 2017. Id.  
 2018. 605 F.3d 1366, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 2019. 264 F.3d 1094, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 2020. 553 U.S. 617, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 167 (2008). 
 2021. Fujifilm, 605 F.3d at 1369, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985. 
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LFFPs, refurbished them, and sold them as new.2022  The defendants 
asserted that there was a patent-exhausting first sale of the LFFPs in 
question.2023  After a jury found in favor of Fuji, the district court 
denied the defendants’ post-trial JMOL motion on several grounds, 
including inapplicability of the first-sale doctrine because the sales in 
question occurred in foreign countries.2024 
On appeal, the defendants asserted several arguments, including 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Quanta eliminated the 
territoriality requirement for patent exhaustion announced in Jazz 
Photo Corp. in favor of a rule of “strict exhaustion” rule.2025  According 
to the defendants, Quanta’s “[w]hether outside the country” 
language confirmed that no United States territoriality requirement 
applied.2026  
The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that Quanta did not 
eliminate Jazz Photo Corp.’s territorial requirement.2027  In fact, Quanta 
“did not involve foreign sales.”2028  Moreover, in the majority’s view, 
the phrase “[w]hether outside the country” referred to a practicing 
use, which could be “outside the country,” while an infringing use 
had to occur in the country where the patent was enforceable.2029 
In Honeywell International, Inc. v. United States,2030 the Federal Circuit 
considered the impact of an infringing sale by an entity that later 
acquires the rights to a patent, holding that such a sale is not 
authorized and therefore does not invoke the first-sale doctrine.  The 
patent at issue in Honeywell related to cockpit warning lights, and its 
application was filed by Allied Corporation in the late 1980s.  The 
application was subject the Invention Secrecy Act2031 and ultimately 
made subject to a PTO-imposed secrecy order that prevented a 
patent from issuing until 2000.  While the secrecy order was in effect, 
                                                          
 2022. Id. 
 2023. Jazz Products LLC bought the LFFPs in question from Jazz Photo 
Corporation, a former company of defendant Jack Benun, in bankruptcy.  Id., 95 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1986.   
 2024. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1987. 
 2025. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988.  
 2026. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988–89. 
 2027. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988. 
 2028. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988. 
 2029. Id. at 1372, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989. 
 2030. 609 F.3d 1292, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  The Federal 
Circuit initially released an opinion in this case on February 18, 2010.  Honeywell I, 
596 F.3d 800, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1740 (Fed. Cir. 2010). That opinion was 
superseded by a new opinion on May 25, 2010.  Honeywell, 609 F.3d at 1292, 95 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193.  The two versions of the opinion are identical with regard 
to first sale analysis.   
 2031. The purpose of the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 181–188, is to prevent disclosure of inventions and/or technologies that could 
threaten the security of the United States.   
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Allied Corporation became AlliedSignal Inc., a company that, after 
merging with Honeywell, Inc., became Honeywell International, 
Inc.2032  That company ultimately amended the application, which 
issued as the patent in suit.2033  Two months after the patent issued, 
Honeywell filed a complaint against the United States seeking 
compensation under the Invention Secrecy Act for pre-issuance use 
of the invention and under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)2034 for post-issuance 
infringement of several claims.2035 
Included in this complaint were claims based on the government’s 
use of Color Multifunction Displays (“CMFDs”) that were 
manufactured and sold by Honeywell Inc. to the government while 
AlliedSignal owned the rights to the application.2036  Because 
Honeywell Inc. made the infringing sale and was now part of the 
same company as AlliedSignal, the Court of Federal Claims held that 
the first-sale doctrine precluded Honeywell from recovering 
damages.2037 
A majority of the Federal Circuit reversed.2038  After noting that the 
first sale doctrine applies only if there was “an authorized first sale,” 
the majority held that Honeywell Inc.’s sale of infringing CMFDs was 
not authorized because, at the time of the sale, it had no rights under 
the patent, which was owned by AlliedSignal.2039  The fact that 
AlliedSignal and Honeywell Inc. were now the same company did not 
affect the analysis because Honeywell’s current ownership could “not 
retroactively authorize the earlier sale.”2040 
Judge Mayer dissented, explaining that the first sale doctrine 
prevented Honeywell from recovering because the interests of the 
application’s owner (AlliedSignal) were aligned with the company 
that sold the infringing CMFDs (Honeywell Inc.).2041  In Judge 
Mayer’s view, the majority’s rule improperly allowed Honeywell to 
                                                          
 2032. Honeywell, 609 F.3d. at 1295, 1303 n.3, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196, 1202 
n.3. 
 2033. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196, 1202 n.3. 
 2034. Section 1498(a) provides that “[w]henever an invention described in and 
covered by a patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the 
United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or 
manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United 
States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for recovery of his reasonable and 
entire compensation for such use and manufacture.” 
 2035. Honeywell, 609 F.3d at 1296, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196–97. 
 2036. Id. at 1303–04, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202–03. 
 2037. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 400 (2005), rev’d, 596 F.3d 
800, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1740 (Fed. Cir. 2010), superseded by 609 F.3d 1292, 95 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 2038. Honeywell, 609 F.3d at 1293, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194. 
 2039. Id. at 1304, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202–03. 
 2040. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203. 
 2041. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206. 
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recover for infringement even though it received the profits from the 
infringing sales.2042 
CONCLUSION 
The year 2010 brought change aplenty to the Federal Circuit, both 
structurally and doctrinally.  More change in both categories looms 
on the horizon, courtesy of personnel changes as well as changes in 
the law from both the Supreme Court and Congress.  This is as it 
should be, for the Federal Circuit is now a federal court of appeals in 
full flower—an appellate court like no other, but also an appellate 
court like any other. 
                                                          
 2042. Id., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206. 
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ADDENDUM 
In our previous articles surveying the Federal Circuit’s 2000 and 
2006 jurisprudence,2043 we provided an addendum discussing, in 
statistical terms, the year’s patent law decisions from the Federal 
Circuit.  We were motivated by trying to provide an empirical (rather 
than anecdotal or impressionistic) answer to the sort of questions we 
are frequently asked, as Federal Circuit practitioners, by our clients.  
The most frequent:  “When can we expect a decision?”  So we 
provided a statistical “snapshot” of the Federal Circuit’s work in the 
years 2000 and 2006, based on our study of the court’s published 
patent opinions from those years. 
We have reprised that effort for the year 2010.  In 2010, there were 
116 published patent opinions by three-judge panels; in one special 
instance, a five-judge panel rendered a decision.2044  This number is 
appreciably larger than the number of published patent opinions in 
2000 (ninety-two) and in 2006 (ninety-eight).  In addition, we have 
provided a statistical look at separate opinions in these patent cases 
and how the presence of these separate opinions affects disposition 
time, as well as the most frequent lower-court or agency venues from 
which appeals originate, and a tally of how many Federal Circuit 
opinions resulted in affirmances, reversals, partial affirmances, etc. 
There are caveats aplenty here.  First, the universe of opinions 
being surveyed consists of the court’s published, patent opinions.  Our 
survey fails to account for the presumably shorter disposition times of 
unpublished patent opinions, or “Rule 36” affirmances, or the other 
areas of the court’s work (government employment cases, 
government contract cases, etc.).  Second, the statistics we provide 
may be of limited predictive value, especially in instances where they 
are based on a statistically insignificant number of data points.  
Finally, treating each decision as an equal data point for statistical 
averages may not be fair or accurate:  Every case is unique.  
Nevertheless, as in our earlier surveys, we have found many of the 
results set forth below to be enlightening, and for that reason we are 
again sharing them with the bench, bar, and other persons interested 
in the work of the Federal Circuit. 
                                                          
2043.  Kenneth R. Adamo, Gregory A. Castanias, Mark N. Reiter & Lawrence D. 
Rosenberg, Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Law Decisions in 2000:  Y2K in Review, 50 
AM. U. L. REV. 1435, 1699–1706 (2001); Gregory A. Castanias, Lawrence D. 
Rosenberg, Michael S. Fried & Todd R. Geremia, Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent 
Law Decisions in 2006:  A New Chapter in the Ongoing Dialogue With the Supreme Court, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 793, 975–85 (2007).  
2044.   Pressure Prods. Med. Supplies, Inc. v. Greatbatch Ltd., 599 F.3d 1308, 94 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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Table 1: Published Patent Panel Opinions by Judge, 
January 1, 2010 – December 31, 2010 
Judge 
Number 
Authored 
Number 
on panel 
Number 
separate 
opinions 
Number 
authored 
generating 
separate 
opinions
Percent 
author 
(3-judge 
panel) 
Michel 5 17 0 1 29.4 
Rader 16 38 3 52045 42.1 
Newman 9 29 9 4 31.0 
Lourie 13 33 0 1 39.4 
Bryson 5 23 0 1 21.7 
Gajarsa 8 27 3 2 29.6 
Linn 15 34 4 2 44.1 
Dyk 11 33 6 6 33.3 
Prost 13 36 4 6 36.1 
Moore 12 22 0 3 54.5 
Friedman 0 11 0 0 0.0 
Archer 0 5 0 0 0.0 
Mayer 3 14 2 3 21.4 
Plager 1 6 0 0 16.7 
Clevenge
r 
1 8 3 0 12.5 
Schall 1 5 0 0 20.0 
Visiting 
Judge 
1 9 1 0 11.1 
Per 
Curiam 
2 — — 1 — 
Court 116 3502046 35 35 — 
 
Table 1 sets forth some raw numbers about the published patent 
opinions issued by panels of the Federal Circuit during 2010, listed by 
judge. 
                                                          
2045.  Includes one opinion counted twice, because that case generated one 
separate opinion from each of the other panel members. 
2046.  Ordinarily, 116 panel opinions should require 348 panel members (116 x 3), 
but the statistics for 2010 also include one case decided by a five-judge panel.  See 
supra note 2073 and accompanying text.   
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The first column (“# authored”) reflects the number of majority 
patent opinions each judge published in 2010.  Thus, former Chief 
Judge Michel authored five majority patent opinions that were 
published in 2010, Chief Judge Rader wrote sixteen, Judge Newman 
wrote nine, and so on.  Chief Judge Rader led the way with sixteen 
opinions authored, followed by Judges Linn, Lourie, and Prost with 
fifteen, thirteen, and thirteen opinions respectively.  Judges Newman, 
Gajarsa, and Bryson authored the fewest (among active judges who 
sat for the full year) with nine, eight, and five, respectively.  Only two 
cases were decided per curiam, and one was authored by a visiting 
judge.  The second column (“# on panel”) sets forth the number of 
times each judge was on a panel for one of those patent cases decided 
in 2010 and resulting in a published opinion.  The range of variation 
among the active judges in this respect (e.g., Chief Judge Rader sat on 
thirty-eight of these panels, while Judge Moore sat on only twenty-
two) is striking.  One possible explanation for this 
difference―assuming that all active judges are likely to participate in 
roughly the same number of cases during the course of a year―is 
that Chief Judge Rader is perhaps somewhat more likely, and Judge 
Moore perhaps somewhat less likely, to request that the panel publish 
its disposition, which requires the concurrence of a panel majority 
(two of three judges) under Circuit Rule 47.6(b). 
The third column (“# separate opinions”) lists the number of 
separate opinions (concurrences and dissents) that each Federal 
Circuit judge filed in 2010.  Two observations about this column are 
in order.  First, these numbers reflect a high degree of unanimity in 
reasoning and result―only thirty-five separate opinions were filed in 
2010 in 116 panel decisions.  Second, two judges―Judges Newman 
and Dyk―were most likely to write separately in patent cases, far 
more than their colleagues, statistically speaking. 
Because of the relatively small number of separate opinions issued 
by Federal Circuit judges in 2010, the fourth column (“# authored 
generating separate opinions”) may not prove much at all.  It is 
meant to indicate the authoring judge for the majority in the cases 
where separate opinions were filed.  There are a couple of curious 
data points that emerge here.  First, each of the three opinions that 
Judge Mayer authored in 2010 generated a separate opinion from 
another member of the panel.  Second, over half (six) of Judge Dyk’s 
eleven authored opinions generated separate opinions―the same 
number of times that Judge Dyk himself wrote separately. 
The final column (“% author (3-judge panel”)) in Table 1 
indicates, based on the published patent opinions from 2010, how 
likely it was that a particular Federal Circuit judge would be the 
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author of the resulting opinion in a particular case argued before a 
three-judge panel.  In a hypothetical world where opinions are 
randomly and evenly assigned, one would expect that each judge on 
a three-judge panel would wind up writing exactly 33.3% of the 
opinions.  What stands out as significant from this data is that one 
judge—Judge Moore—in 2010 wrote over half (54.5%) of the 
opinions in cases where she voted on published patent decisions. 
Table 2: Separate Opinions In Patent Cases 2010 
Judge 
Concur 
in 
Opinion 
Concur 
in 
Judgment 
Concur 
in part, 
Dissent 
in part
Dissent 
 
Total 
Michel 0 0 0 0 0 
Rader 0 1 0 2 3 
Newman 0 1 5 3 9 
Lourie 0 0 0 0 0 
Bryson 0 0 0 0 0 
Gajarsa 0 1 0 2 3 
Linn 1 1 2 0 4 
Dyk 0 0 2 4 6 
Prost 0 1 0 3 4 
Moore 0 0 0 0 0 
Friedman 0 0 0 0 0 
Archer 0 0 0 0 0 
Mayer 0 0 0 2 2 
Plager 0 0 0 0 0 
Clevenger 1 1 0 1 3 
Schall 0 0 0 0 0 
Visiting 
Judge 
1 0 0 0 1 
Court 3 6 9 17 35 
 
Table 2 sets forth a breakdown of the thirty-three separate opinions 
by type and by authoring judge.  Again, because of the limited 
universe of separate opinions, these statistics may not carry much 
meaning.  These numbers for 2010 illustrate the Federal Circuit’s 
largely unanimous nature―only seventeen dissents, and nine partial 
dissents, were filed all year. 
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Table 3: Disposition Time By Judge (In Days)  
January 1, 2010 – December 31, 2010 
Judge 
Avg. time 
per 
opinion 
authored 
Avg. time 
per 
unanimous 
Opinion 
authored
Avg. time 
when 
writing 
separately 
Avg. time 
when on 
panel 
Michel 108 107 — 125 
Rader 170 156 188 150 
Newman 228 231 165 170 
Lourie 79 77 — 138 
Bryson 107 101 — 120 
Gajarsa 166 154 225 143 
Linn 170 169 163 149 
Dyk 109 93 148 126 
Prost 124 106 114 134 
Moore 92 78 — 117 
Friedman — — — 130 
Archer — — — 149 
Mayer 151 — 152 141 
Plager 62 62 — 141 
Clevenger 154 154 141 137 
Schall 161 161 — 122 
Visting 
Judges 
111 111 205 120 
Per Curiam 132 52 — — 
Court 137 128 163 137 
 
Table 3 sets forth average statistical information regarding the 
length of time it takes the Federal Circuit and its judges to dispose of 
published Federal Circuit patent appeals.  This table is the most 
interesting of these statistics, and also perhaps the one most subject 
to the criticism that every case is unique and demands unique 
treatment, and thus cannot be “averaged” together with other cases 
to yield meaningful results.  Because the Federal Circuit does not 
publish the date of argument on the face of its opinions, we obtained 
the date of argument (or submission) for each of the court’s patent 
opinions published in 2010 from the PACER docket on the court’s 
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website.  We then calculated the difference, in days, between oral 
argument (or submission) and decision, and utilized those calculated 
figures in our statistics. 
The first column on Table 3 (“Avg. time per opinion authored”) 
lists, in days, the average time from argument to decision for each 
judge of the Federal Circuit.  Thus, for the five published patent 
opinions Chief Judge Michel authored in 2010, the average amount 
of time from argument to decision was 108 days (slightly more than 
three months), while for the nine published patent opinions 
authored by Judge Newman, the average time from argument to 
decision was 228 days (about seven and a half months).  The average 
time of disposition for all of the Federal Circuit’s published patent 
opinions (in cases that were orally argued or submitted on the merits 
briefs) was 137 days, or a bit over four months. 
The second column on Table 3 (“Avg. time per unanimous 
opinion authored”) is meant to account for one type of delay in 
publication not attributable to the author of the majority opinion—
the authoring and issuance of a separate concurring or dissenting 
opinion.  In most―but not all―cases, limiting the relevant data set to 
unanimous opinions decreases the average disposition time per 
judge.  The average time for the entire court for issuance of 
unanimous published patent opinions was 128 days after argument, 
or about four months. 
The third column (“Avg. time when writing separately”) supplies 
the average time from argument to disposition when the judge in 
question has written a separate opinion.  This data may suffer from 
some inadequacies.  First, it is based solely on the limited number of 
separate opinions in published patent cases in 2010.  Second, it 
cannot account for the unknown factor of how long the author of the 
majority opinion took to prepare the draft opinion which occasioned 
the separate concurrence or dissent.  Here, the overall court average 
is 163 days, or a bit more than five months. 
The fourth and final column on Table 3 (“Avg. time when on 
panel”) supplies the average time from argument to disposition 
whenever a certain judge is on the panel hearing the case.  We have 
supplied this statistic on the assumption that the time a non-
authoring judge spends reviewing one of his or her colleagues’ draft 
opinion, even if it does not ultimately occasion a separate opinion, 
may have some influence on the disposition time.  For active judges, 
the results range from 117 days for Judge Moore to 170 days for 
Judge Newman.  The court average, as previously noted, was 137 days 
from argument to decision for published patent cases. 
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Table 4A:  Lower Court or agency Originating Case 
Lower Court or Agency Number 
Eastern District of Texas 9 
District of Delaware 9 
Southern District of New York 8 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 8 
U.S. International Trade Commission 7 
Northern District of California 7 
Central District of California 6 
Eastern District of Virginia 6 
District of the New Jersey 6 
District of the District of Columbia 5 
District of Massachusetts 5 
District of Colorado 3 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims 2 
District of Arizona 2 
Eastern District of Michigan 2 
Northern District of Ohio 2 
Southern District of California 2 
Southern District of Florida 2 
U.S. Supreme Court(remand) 2 
Western District of Pennsylvania 2 
Western District of Texas 2 
Western District of Washington 2 
Western District of Wisconsin 2 
District of Connecticut 1 
District of Maryland 1 
District of Nevada 1 
Eastern District of Missouri 1 
Eastern District of New York 1 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania 1 
Northern District of Georgia 1 
Northern District of Illinois 1 
Northern District of Iowa 1 
Northern District of Texas 1 
Southern District of Indiana 1 
Southern District of Ohio 1 
Southern District of Texas 1 
Western District of Michigan 1 
Western District of Tennessee 1 
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Total 116 
 
Table 4B: Circuits Originating Case 
Circuit Number 
First Circuit 5 
Second Circuit 10 
Third Circuit 18 
Fourth Circuit 7 
Fifth Circuit 13 
Sixth Circuit 7 
Seventh Circuit 4 
Eighth Circuit 2 
Ninth Circuit 20 
Tenth Circuit 3 
Eleventh Circuit 3 
D.C. Circuit 5 
No circuit (agency or U.S. Court of Federal Claims) 17 
Supreme Court of the U.S. (remand) 2 
Total 116 
 
Tables 4A and 4B demonstrate where the cases decided by the 
Federal Circuit (at least those resulting in published opinions) are 
originating.  Table 4A contains the unsurprising information that the 
Eastern District of Texas, the District of Delaware (the preferred state 
of incorporation for so many American companies), the Southern 
District of New York (New York City), and the Northern District of 
California (San Francisco, Oakland, and Silicon Valley), are leading 
the way. 
Table 4B simply breaks down the data in Table 4A by circuit rather 
than by district court.  It suggests that, if Congress had not 
centralized all patent appeals in the Federal Circuit, the Second, 
Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits would be the major patent law 
circuits today. 
Table 5: Results of Published Opinions 
Holding Number 
Affirmed 45 
Affirmed as modified 1 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part 5 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded 14 
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Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part 1 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded 
3 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part 2 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded 5 
Mandamus granted 1 
Reversed 8 
Reversed and remanded 16 
Reversed, remanded, and reassigned 1 
Reversed and vacated 1 
Reversed, vacated, and remanded 1 
Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded 3 
Transferred 2 
Vacated and remanded 7 
Total 116 
 
The final table, Table 5, sorts the “decretal language” from the 
Federal Circuit’s published patent opinions in 2010 to demonstrate 
how many of those opinions resulted in alterations of the rights of 
the parties.2047 Table 5 thus shows that, in 2010, the Federal Circuit’s 
116 published patent opinions yielded across-the-board affirmances 
in forty-five cases; total reversals in twenty-seven cases (eight 
“Reversed,” sixteen “Reversed and remanded,” one “Reversed, 
remanded, and reassigned,” one “Reversed and vacated,” and one 
“Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded”); and a variety of 
remedies in the rest.  Of course, using the universe of published 
opinions to compile these statistics will not reflect the court’s true 
rate of affirmances or reversals.  Not only do these statistics wholly 
exclude the numerous cases disposed of under the court’s Rule 36 
(all of which, by definition, are affirmances), but it is also probable 
that the opinions the court chooses to publish under its Rule 47.6(b) 
are those that address issues of first impression or otherwise “ad[d] 
significantly to the body of law”2048—and those cases are more likely to 
result in different outcomes in the lower courts as compared to the 
body of unpublished opinions.   
 
 
                                                          
 2047. See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, Decretal Language:  Last Words of an Appellate 
Opinion, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 727, 727 (2005) (“‘Decretal language’ is the portion of a 
court’s judgment or order that officially states (‘decrees’) what the court is 
ordering.”). 
 2048. FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b). 
